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CHAP~ER

I

INTRODUCTION
Plato's Republic and Thomas More's Utopia continue to
appeal to men of the most extreme ideological viewpoints
espite the political, industrial, and scientific revolutions
that have dated lesser works of Utopian literature.

Both

orks obviously possess some common elements that have given
them enduring significance.

In this study an attempt is made

o analyze the formal relationship between the Republic and
he Utopia in order that the relationship between the subject
atter and the form of the ytopia might be more clearly discerned.
In the sense used here, "formal" means the pattern
f organization which gives expression to the content of the
ork.

A comparison of the "form" of the two works, therefore,
an analysis of the following aspects of each work:

the

andling of the major theme as a unifying principle; the way in
major theme relates to the minor motifs; the logical
ivisions in the structure of .. the work; the way in which each
art relates to the whole; and the relationship of the image
atterns and other techniques of style to the work's theme and
tructure.
Ever since the Utopia was written, commentators have
enerally acknowledged that its subject matter was influenced
y

Plato.

The extent and the limit to which More used the
I

2

Republic as a model, however, have never been thoroughly
explored.

In recent years, moreover, various contrary and

even contradictory opinions about Plato's influence on More
have arisen.
In the nineteenth century Lina Beger published the
most complete study of the subject matter of the two works,
but her analysis was made from a political not a literary
point

0f

.

Vlew.

I

She points out how More uses the Republic

and Plato's other political dialogues as reservoirs from which
he draws various details and separate ideas.

After comparing

the two works, she concludes that More borrowed particular items
from the Republic, but that his plan for the structure of the
Utopia is different.

The summary of her conclusion is as

follows:
Die Entlehnungen oder Anregungen aus Plato sind zahlreicher, als es auf den ersten Augenblick scheinen
mag. Sie betreffen jedoch mehr Einzelheiten, als den
Plan des Ganzen, da die Grundgedanken beider Schriftsteller auseinander gehen und es ist somit in der
Utopia die eigenthUmliche Erscheinung geboten, dass
ein Werk, welche~ zahlreiche fremde Bestandtheile
mosaikartig eingefUgt sind, als Ganzes do 2h den Eindruck
eines einheitlichen und originalen macht.
Lina Beger's conclusion has been assumed in much of
the criticism of the Utopia

ever since.

Even critics who

have been concerned with the literary aspects of More's work
1

Lina Beger, "Thomas Horus und Plato: ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte des Humanismus," ZeitQchrift fUr die gesammte
Staats"wi~senschaft, TUbingen, XXXV ( 1879), 187-216, 405-83.
2Ibid .•

P.

466.

3
have not questioned her statement that More did not follow
the

Republ~c

for the "plan of the whole."

Some have suggested

that there might be a greater structural similarity than
that seen by Lina Beger, but the comparison of the two works
in this respect has not been pursued.

The Reverend Edward

Surtz, in the Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia,
for example, recognizes that the Republic influenced the "broad
bases of the Utopia" and that "the dominant moral search in
both is for justice," but his discussion mainly concerns the
specific characteristics in which the Utopia parallels Plato's
RepuQlic, 1aws, and &ritias. 3
Other opinions that have gained currency in recent
criticism tend either to minimize Plato's influence or to
emphasize the differences rather than the similarities between
the Republic and the Utopia.

Russell Ames, for example, thinks

that Plato's influence on the Utopia is not as great as the
influence of More's own personal experiences.

Ames writes that

"there is sUbstantial truth in Preserved Smith's assertion,
concerning More and his Utopia, that 'the sources of its
inspiration were neither Plato·s.Republic nor the writings
of Roman and Christian publicists, but his own experiences
3Utopia, eds. Ed\'18rd Surtz, S.J., and J. H. Hexter
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), Vol. IV
of The Yale Edition of the Comple~e Works of St. Thomas More
(14 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1963--), pp. clvi-clx. All citations from the text of the
Uto9i~-~re taken from this edition.
Quotations will be
aeslgnated in footnotes simply wit~ title, pa~e,
pa~e~ and line.

~·----------------------~~4------------------------'
as lawyer, judge, and government officer. ,«4

J. H. Hexter

also stresses "how little More was bound either in detail or
in essence by Plato's imaginary commonwealth. u5 He points out
hoW More differs from Plato in regard to such significant matters
as communism, family relationships, and military affairs.
Although Hexter puts greater stress than Lina Beger on the
differences between the ReRublic and the Utopia, his conclusions,
like hers, derive from a comparison of the ideational content
of the two works and not from a comparison of literary form.
A. R. Heiserman, a recent critic who compares literary
aspects of the two works, also sees a great difference
between them. 6 This tendency to minimize the relationship
between Plato's t'Jork and that of More represents a curious
quirk in literary history, since More and his contemporaries
make a very definite identification of the Utopia with the
Republic.

This identification is made in several introductory

pieces in the parerga of the Utopia.

In his introductory poem

Anemolius, the Utopian poet laureate, makes the claim:

fl

I am

a rival of Plato's republic,·perhaps even a victor over it.,,7
4Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (Princeton:
ton University Press, 19~9~, p. 8.

Prince-

5Utopia, p. xxxii.
6"Satire in Utopia," PMLA, LXXVII (June, 1963), 163-79.
7Utopia, p. 2115-6. This quotation is taken from "Six
Lines on the Island of Utopia by Anemolius, Poet Laureate,
Nephew of Hythlodaeus by His Sister." These lines and the

5
Peter Giles likewise in a letter to Jerome Busleyden says, "It
is known as yet to few mortals, but it is eminently worthy of
everyone's knowledge as being superior to Plato's republic."B
Heiserman explains that these and other remarks
contained in the parerga are meant to be ironic.

He asks,

"What did More and his contemporaries mean by likening UtoRia
to the ReQublic?"

He then provocatively answers, "No student

of the Republic could have imagined that More was writing a
philosophical discussion in imitation of Plato's."9
The intention here is neither to dispute Heiserman's
thesis that More's purpose in the Utopia is satiric nor to
disparage his incisive remarks about the

~epublic.

But the

contention that the Utopia cannot be seriously considered as
an imitation of the Republic serves as an antithesis to the
main argument of this thesis.

If it is possible to ascertain

the reason why More, Giles, and their contemporaries,
,.
particularly Erasmus, Bude, and Busleyden, identify the two

.

works, then perhaps the meaning of the Utopia can be better
letters referred to in the follo\o'ling pages were reprinted by
John Froben at Basel with the March 151B edition of the Utopia.
See discussion of this edition in the Introduction to the Yale
edition, pp •. clxxxix-cxc.
BUtoRia, p. 21/17-19. Peter Giles' letter is entitled:
"To the Most Illustrious Jerome Busleyden~ Provost of Aire
and Councilor to the Catholic King Charles, Peter Giles of
Antwerp Sends Greetings."
9"Satire in Utopia," p. 170.

~--------",,------:------------,
~---------------:------------,
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appreciated.
Thomas More imitates the theme and the structure of
the Republic in much the same way that he imitates the subject
matter.

Just as he takes details and specific ideas and

adapts and changes then, he likewise takes the theme and
structural pattern from the Republic and adapts and changes
them to suit his purposes.

This characteristic of More's

style has been described by Richard S. Sylvester in regard to
the way More uses his sources in writing Richard III:

"He

borrowed from everyone; when he did imitate, he paid greater
attention to the larger matters of structure, characterization,

style."lD
and tone than he did to the purely verbal aspects of style.
olD
The case to be made, then, in the comparison which follows
here, is that the UtoQia is a thematic and structural imitation
of the Republic which was changed and adapted by More to suit
purposes different from but not contrary to- those of Plato.
The proposition at the core of this argument is that
justice is the theme and unifying principle of both the
Republic and the Utopia.

That More's contemporaries recognize

this theme in the Utopia and that they make a serious identification of it with the Republic is evident from many of their
remarks and particular from letters written by William Bude
lDThe History of King Richard III, ed. Richard S. Sylvester (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), Vol. II
of The Yale Edition of the Com~?ete \-forks of St. Thomas fvIore
Nore (14
vols:;.New Haven and London:
ale University Press, 1963--), p.
lXXXlll.

.
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and Jerome Busleyden. ll

Unfortunately, Erasmus has not left

a critical analysis of the Utopia, but he remarks that More had
in his youth written a dialogue "in which he carried the defense
of Plato's commonwealth even to the matter of wives.,,12
But if we lament Erasmus' failure to publish an
interpretation of the Utopia, we can be grateful that such
I

eminent humanists as Bude and Busleyden published their
illuminating commentaries.

Although he does not mention Plato

or the Republic by name, in his letter to Thomas Lupset, Bude
sees justice as the predominant motif in the Utopia.

The

structure of Bude's letter in a general way corresponds to the
structure of the Utopia.

In the first half he bemoans the lack

of justice in Europe just as More portrays the lack of justice
in Europe in the first book of the Utopia, and in the second half
he praises the admirable justice practiced in Utopia.
In the first part of his letter Bude's remarks about
the injustice in Europe are particularly significant because
he interprets the false European concept of justice as being
t'the stronger a man is the more he should possess ... 13

This

is the same concept advanced by Thrasymachus and refuted by
11Utopia, pp. 4-15, 32-37. These letters are headed
"William Bud~ to Thomas Lupset, Englishman, Greetings," and
flJerome Busleyden to Thomas More, Greetings."
12The Epistles of Erasmus, tr. F. M. Nichols (London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1904), III, 398.
13Utopia, p. 9/9-10.

•
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Socrates in the Rep,ublic and also advanced by various characters
in Book I of the UtoQia and refuted by Hythlodaeus.

Bude

points out how Europeans neither understand nor follow justice
because they are concerned with the letter of the law instead
of being guided "by the standard of truth and by the command
of the Gospel to be simple ••,14

They cannot distinguish bebJeen

legal codes as promulgated in civil and canon law--the law that
binds--and the law of justice that frees men.

He laments that

there is nowhere in evidence the definition of justice
"acceptable to ancient writers. fl1S
In the second part of his letter Bud~ identifies the
causes for the prevalence of justice in Utopia and praises that
island as the only place where justice is practiced.

The

basis of Utopian justice, according to Bude, rests on three
principles:

equality, peace, and contempt for gold and silver.

The institutions of Utopia are responsible for this happy
state of affairs.

He praises the customs and laws of the

Utopians, and he wonders at their holiness that has kept away
the avarice and cupidity that expels justice and decency.

In

the most poetic passage in the letter, BUde contrasts the lack
of justice in Europe with the admirable justice in Utopia.
suggests that justice has flown from Europe not to the skies
14UtOQia, p. 7/29-30.
lSUtOQiq, p. 9/1.

He

--------------------.

~..

9

but to Utopia:
In Utopia the assertion could be made that Aratus
and the ancient poets were dangerously close to being
mistaken \'Jhen they stB.tioned Justice in the zodiac after
her flight from the earth. If we are to believe
Hythlodaeus, she must have remained behind on the i and
of Utopia and not yet have made her way to the sky.

r6

Busleyden's praise of the UtoQia, like Bude's, pOints
up the theme of justice and directly ties the
Republic.

Utopi~

to the

He begins by thanking Nore for giving the '·world a

description of the good and just constitution, which all must
desire, in the commonwealth of Utopia."17·
Utopia."17- He comments that
the much lauded commom'leal ths of the Spartans t Athenians,
and Romans would not have been leveled to the dust if they
had been regulated "by the same institutions, laws, decrees,
and customs as this state of yours. H18 Then he praises the
practice in Utopia of "training the most qualified officials"
rather than devoting too much energy to framing laws.

The

Utopians have "not done so without reason, for otherwise, if
we are to believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted
dead."19

After this reference to Plato, Busleyden makes a

direct comparison between the virtues of Plato's ideal man and
the Utopian ideal man:
16UtOQ1a, pp. 11/36-13/2.
17UtoQia, p. 33/15-16.
18UtoQia, p. 3517-8.
19Utogia, p. 35/17-19.

(Italics added. )

~----------------~------1-0------------------------'

After the likeness of such officials, the pattern of their
virtue, the example of their conduct, and the picture of
their justice, the whole setup and proper course of a
perfect commonwealth should be modeled. Above all else,
there should be a combination of wisdom in the
administrators, bravery in the soldiers, temperance in
individuals, and justice in all. 20
In.view of the twentieth-century concern with the
issue of communism, it is interesting to note that Busleyden
commends the Utopian institutions because they are based on a
communistic principle.

It should be emphasized, however, that

Busleyden does not discuss communism as a separate issue, as
many recent critics have done.
an end.

He mentions it as a means to

Sharing goods in common "is totally directed to the

maintenance of one uniform justice, equality, and communion."21
Bud~

the

UtoR~

and Busleyden both write in the spirit and tone of

in that they sustain the pretense that Utopia

actually exists.

As Heiserman points out, this fiction adds to
More's satiric thrust. 22 At the same time, however, their
remarks indicate that they consider the question of justice
seriously.

They see 'justice as an essential idea in the UtoQia,

and Busleyden in particular makes a direct comparison between
Plato's views on justice and those of More.
/

That critics since Bude's and Busleyden's commentaries
20ut oQ!a,
.
p. 35/19-24.
21UtoQia, p. 35/34-36.
22nSatire in UtoQia," p. 165.

11

were written have stressed neither the theme of justice in
the utoQia nor the thematic similarity between the UtoQia
and the Republic perhaps can be accounted for by the
comprehensive nature of the concept of justice.

The threads of

the themes of both works are difficult to follow because
justice touches upon every aspect of life.

The problem is less
difficult in the Republic; but despite Socrates t repeated
assertions that the subject of the inquiry of the dialogue
concerns justice, some of the topics under consideration do
not seem relevant.

One commentator on the Republic seems to

have identified the reason for these digressions:

"It is

difficult to say precisely what is the subject of the Republic,
because in Platots belief it is impossible to answer
satisfactorily the question between the just and the unjust
life without at the same time answering other questions of
almost equal interest."23

Socrates himself suggests why the

discussion of justice must necessarily involve every other
/

important question in life.

After Thrasymachus has advanced

his inadequate definition of-- justice, Socrates reprimands him
for attempting to quit the discussion before his definition
can be challenged:

"Do you think it is a small matter that you

are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life
23%he Republic of Plato (Everyman Edition; New York:
E. P. Dutton, n. d.), Introduction, p. xvii.

~----------------------------------~
12
that for each of us would make living most worth while?"24
Justice,

then~

necessarily involves every other serious

concern of man.
Since the themes of both works are entwined with
various other motifs, it is not surprising that the relationship
between the ReQubliQ and the Utopia is not readily apparent.
Many readers of both works discover subordinate themes in
accordance with their individual interests.

Thus many

interpreters deal primarily with such matters as education,
communism, poetry, or metaphysics rather than with the subject
of each work as a whole.

Because the theme is even less

evident in the Utopia than in the Republic, the tendency to
discuss separate issues raised by the consideration of justice
is perhaps more prevalent.

It must be remembered that More

never borrowed without changing and adapting for his purposes.
Because his purpose was more literary and less philosophical
than that of Plato, the theme in the Utopia obtrudes less
than the theme in the Republic.

Whereas Plato attempts to

arrive at a definition of justice through dialectic, More
24Plato, The Republic, t~. Paul Shorey, ed. T. E. Page
(2 vols.; rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press;
London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1963). All quotations from
the Republic are taken from this translation and are cited
hereafter by title, book, marginal number, volume of Shorey's
translation, and page, as follows: Rep. I 344 D-E (Shorey,
I, 71). In the following discussion Plato's ideal state will
be referred to as "the republic," as distinguished from the
Republic as a literary work.

13
intends to give a dramatic representation of justice.
The difference between the two works in this regard
reflects the difference between Plato's and More's ideas about
the nature of poetry.

Despite the fact that the Republic is

a literary masterpiece and contains poetry of the highest order,
Plato holds that poetry is inferior to philosophy or
dialectic as a means of apprehending truth.

He therefore

has no qualms about being overtly didactic.

In typical

Renaissance fashion, however, More puts great stress on
delighting as well as teaching his audience.

He states his

own intention best in a letter to Peter Giles:

"I do not

pretertd that if I had determined to write about the commonwealth
and had remembered such a story as I have recounted, I should
have perhaps shrunk from a fiction whereby the truth, as if
smeared with honey, might a little more pleasantly slide into
men's minds."25

In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to

teach about justice by defining it; rather he disguises his
intention through a fiction in order to "slide" justice into
--

the reader's mind by an art that conceals art.
These different concepts about the nature of poetry
are reflected primarily in the way Socrates and Hythlodaeus
participate in their respective dialogues.

Whereas Socrates

25utopia, p. 251/5-9. This quotation 1s taken from
More's letter to Peter Giles appended to the text and entitled:
"Thomas More to Peter Giles, His Friend, Greetings," pp. 248-53.

~-··~-------------------14------------------~
leads the discussion in the manner of a philosopher or teacher,
Hythlodaeus delights his listeners in the manner of a poet.
Socrates knows all the time where the logic of his dialectic
leads, although Plato's artistry conceals the outline of the
plan.

Whenever conversation wanders into side paths, Socrates

brings the participants back to the pursuit of justice; he
states and restates the purpose of the inquiry at regular
junctures.

When the members of the party seem to be coming

close to the meaning of justice, Socrates likens their art
to the art of huntsmen:
Now then, Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen to
surround the covert and keep close watch that justice
may not slip through and get away from us and vanish
from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabout~6
Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it.
Socrates signals the theme in a similar manner throughout the
entire dialogue.

However far from the main path the pursuants

have strayed, he insists on keeping the object of justice in
view.
Socrates also regularly summarizes parts of the discus.-

sion and points the way to the next topic under consideration.
Although the massive scope of the subject matter of the Republic
gives rise to various interpretations of the structural plan of
the whole, such orienting transitional statements clarify the
connection between individual parts.

26 Rep • IV 432 B-C (Shorey, I, 365).

~--------------------------------------------~
15
In contrast to Socrates' manner, Hythlodaeus' method
characteristically seems illogical in argument and unsystematic
in description.

He does not, like a teacher, draw his students

to his point of view by rational dialectic.

He is more like

the evangelist who hopes to persuade by parable or like the
didactic poet who hopes to instruct by holding the mirror up
to nature.
The apparent absence of logic in Hythlodaeus' approach
is primarily evident in Book I.

Instead of continually

bringing the conversation back to the subject, as Socrates would
have done, Hythlodaeus consistently avoids the issue "placed
before him.

When Peter Giles and Thomas More urge him to

seek a position as a kingts councilor, he takes the opportunity
to spell out the various evils that beset the nations of Europe,
~ut

he never adequately answers the main point of the question

about councilorship.

He argues that he would be useless as a

councilor because no king would listen to him, but this
explanation hardly answers Thomas More's contention that duty
calls him to do his best to effect a change in the corrupt
state of affairs in Europe.

Likewise, Hythlodaeus' other

comments about councilors only indirectly and somewhat
inadequately answer Thomas More's point about duty.

But this

unwillingness to answer the question in a straightforward and
logical manner is understandable when the thematic center of
Book I is apprehended.

The real concern of Hythlodaeus is not

~--------------------16------------~~-----'
to convince Giles and More that he should not be a councilor
but to reveal to them the causes and effects of injustice in
the states of Europe.
Hythlodaeus' manner of discussion, then, in Book I
points up More's indirect method of introducing the theme of
justice in contrast to Plato's direct method.

In the Republic

Cephalus raises the subject of justice and Socrates relentlessly
pursues it.

In the Utopia Peter Giles introduces the subject

of councilorship, but Hythlodaeus uses it as a pretext to expound
his ideas on the subject of injustice.

Socrates continually

leads the conversation back to justice from the various
subordinate themes to which it has strayed.

Hythlodaeus, in

contrast, consistently carries the conversation forward to a
consideration of injustice from the issue of councilorship
stated and put before him by Giles and More.
Book II of the UtoQia reveals another respect in which
ythlodaeus and Socrates differ.

Socrates invariably provides

orienting statements that signal transitions between parts of
the structure; Hythlodaeus passes from one point in his description to another without summary or introduction.

There are, of

ourse, other points of comparison between Hythlodaeus and
Socrates that will be discussed in later analysis of the two
orks.

The contrast in their respective modes of participation

in the dialogues is mentioned here in order to suggest why the
theme of the QtoQia may not be readily perceived and to give an

f,--------------------~1~7--------------------~
f'·--------------------~17~-------------------,
indication of how the central characters in the two dialogues
nevertheless serve an analogous literary function.
The analysis presented in the following pages centers
on the comparison between the UtoQia and the ReQublic in regard
to their formal relationship, but to demonstrate such a formal
relationship is not the primary end of this study.

The primary

objective is to discern the relationship between the subject
matter and the form of_ the UtoQia.

The analysis proceeds upon

the premise that the meaning of the

UtoQi~

becomes clearer

wh~n

the relationship between its form and that of its main literary
source is clearly discerned.
Either one of the two works could serve as the primary
and the principal basis for the discussion of the comparison
between them.

It would hardly be practicable to discuss the

structures of the two works simultaneously, because the parts
of the structure of each work do not occur in the same order.
The Utopia has the same unifying theme and includes most of the
minor motifs and subject matters as the RepubliQ, but the
arrangement of the parts of its structure and the rationale for
their arrangement are different.

In the next several chapters,

therefore, the subject matter of the two works will be compared
within the context of the analysis of the structure of the
Republic.

In later chapters, after the parts of the

BeQubl~c

have been considered in the order in which they occur, the
parts of the structure of the

UtoRi~

will be analyzed.

In
c....-• .. R--.

~--------------------------------~
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this way the structure of the Utopia will reveal itself more
claerly as the prior analysis of the structure of the

R~R~blic

serves as a gloss.
The reason for beginning the comparison with an analysis
of the structure of the ReQublic rather than that of the Utopia
is twofold:

first, the way that Plato handles

~he

theme of

justice in order to unify the parts of the structure serves as
a gloss on the way that More handles the same theme; secondly,
the structure of the gepublic offers a convenient outline to
compare and contrast the subject matters of the two works.
Socrates' pursuit of justice through the dialogue is easy to
follow once the key to the structure is found.

At every

juncture in the dialogue, therefore, his ideas can be
compared and contrasted with corresponding ideas in the

Utop~a.

Although the meaning of justice in the two works is
similar, it is not absolutely identical.

More's life, times,

and philosophy--particularly the Christian aspects of his
philosophy--reflect differences in the function and organization
of the just state.

Since, in Plato's view, justice functions

in man in a way similar to the way it functions in the state,
the comparison of the concept of justice involves a comparison
of both Plato's and More's assumptions and assertions about
the nature of man.
If the works differ in subject matter and in form to
the extent suggested, what then is the relationship between

pc
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the two?

The Republic can be compared to a great classical

symphony with a theme of justice that recurs in every movement.
The Utopia, on the other hand, is more like a grand panoramic
mural that depicts the contrast between injustice and justice.
The Republic seems to develop in time and the theme recurs
cyclically; the ytopia seems to unfold spatially so that the
theme can be apprehended only when all the parts are seen at
once in relationship to the whole.

Hythlodaeus himself suggests

such a distinction when he compares his own method of
representation with Plato's method of dialectic.

Referring to

the skeptics who doubt the virtues of communism, he says,
"What if I told them the kind of things which Plato creates
in his republic or which the Utopians actually put in practice
in theirs?,,27

In this statement he implies that the republic

"comes into being" as Plato creates it, but that Utopia already
has a being and existence which he intends to depict.
The analysis of the Utopia and the ReRublic undertaken
in this study attempts to avoid many of the irresolvable
uestions about r10re and his -time.

Numerous studies of More's

ork have been made from a variety of viewpoints--historical,
iographical, economic, and sociological--but there have been
elatively few studies which attempt to analyze the formal
spects of the Utopia as a work of art.
27Utopia, p. 101/12-14.

The practice of

20

attempting to know More's personality and personal opinions
through a reading of the Utopia perhaps accounts for the many
conflicting interpretations of the work.

That More has been

hailed as a prophet of the Soviet Union and has been canonized
as a saint of the Roman Catholic Church indicates the extent
of the cleavage in critical opinion.

Another controversy

concerns the question of the seeming inconsistency between
More's apparently revolutionary ideas in the UtoQia and his
supposedly reactionary views later in life.
Growing out of the attempt to reconcile More's life
with his work, at least three discernible schools of
interpretation have arisen:

one views More as a product of

the Middle Ages and the Utopia as reactionary; a second sees
More as a man of the Renaissance and the Utopia as a Christian
humanistic work critical of its time but neither radically
liberal nor reactionary; the third champions More as a
farsighted liberal reformer and the Utopia as a social document
which anticipates the twentieth century. 28 Although the con28Representative critics of the medieval school of
criticism are R. W. Chambers, Thomas More (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1962) and P. Albert Duhamel, "Medievalism
of More's Utopia,·' §f" LII (1955), 99-126. Representative
critics of the Renaissance school are Edward Surtz, The Praise
of Pleasure: Philosophy, Education. and Communism in More's
Harvard University Press, 1957), The Praise
Uto~ (Cambridge:
of v.lisdom: A CommentarY on the Religious and Moral Problems and
Backgrounds of st. Thomas More's Utopia (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1957), and J. H. Hexter, Hore's Utopia: ~
~iograRhy of an Idea (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,
195~. Representative of the "modern ff school are Karl Kautsky,

------------------2-1------------------·
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elusion of this analysis would tend to reinforce the second view
stated above, the intention is to avoid such labelings of More
and the Utogia.

The life and times of the author will be

referred to only as they reinforce or clarify a point that might
arise naturally from a consideration of the text.
It is not to be inferred from these

rem~rks

that

studies of the Utopia which aim at understanding the author
or his times are not interesting and valuable in themselves.
But subordinate issues ought not to be confused with the main
theme; the meaning of the work can easily be distorted if
separate parts are substituted for the whole.

For example,

much of the criticism of the Utopia assumes that the work
has no unifying principle.
discussed separately.

More often than not, each book is

The common assumption is that the

subject matter of Book I is councilorship and that the subject
matter of Book II is communism.

When justice is seen as the

unifying principle, however, it will also be seen that councilorship and communism are at bottom questions of justice.
Hyth10daeus t debate with More- and Glles about whether the
philosopher can be an effective councilor is a problem of the
moral obligation of the just man; Socrates discusses the same
trhomas f10re and His UtQpia (1899), tr • .I. H. Stenning (London:
11\. & C. Black, Ltd., 1927), and Russell Ames, Citizen Thomas More
~nd His Utopia (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949).
For an extended discussion of the various interpretations of the
~tQPia, see Edward Surtz, "Interpretations of Utopia," Catholic
listorical Review, XXXVIII (1952), 156-74 •.

~
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problem in the Republic.

Likewise, neither More nor Plato

thinks of communism as a form of government as distinguished
from democracy and aristocracy.

In neither the Republic

nor the Utopia is communism an end in itself.

It is rather

a means to be used to counteract the chief causes of injustice
in the state.
That separate issues are often discussed to the exclusion
of the main theme results not only from the comprehensive
nature of the concept of justice but also from numerous other
textual and historical difficulties.
itself come from More's style.

Difficulties in the work

His constant use of irony, for

example, gives rise to a variety of possible interpretations of
any given issue and hence to a variety of interpretations of
the whole.

The fictional pretense that Utopia actually exists

(as compared to the admission by Socrates in the ReQublic that
his ideal state does not exist) raises the question whether
More in certain sections intends us to take Hythlodaeus seriously.
These difficulties are related to the problem of point of view.
Because the character Thomas More participates in the dialogue,
the reader must distinguish between the voice of the author
and the voice of the persona.

While this problem relates

primarily to Book I, the structure is particularly difficult
to perceive in Book II because of the lack of orienting
transitional links among the parts.
These stylistic difficulties within each book are

rr
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compounded by the differences between each book.

The tone

and the degree of participation among the members of the
dialogue unquestionably change in Book II.

These apparent

differences have no doubt been magnified by an historical
incident relating to the composition of the work.

Erasmus

states that More wrote Book II at leisure and af.terwards
dashed off Book I as time permitted. 29 This remark has added
external evidence to the internal evidence in the text.
has supported the assumption that the

UtoRi~

It

is a fractured

work--that Book I is distinct and separate and has little
organic connection with Book 11. 30 This assumption has been
given further credence by J. H. Hexter's explanation of the
history of the composition of the text. 31 Although Hexter
does not maintain that More's work lacks unity, his analysis
tends to confirm the opinion that the subject matter of the .
"dialogue fl in Book I differs essentially from the "discourse"
in Book II.
Hexter's theory about the order of composition of
29 Xhe Epistles of Era~mus, From His Earliest Letter 1Q _
gis Fiftl-First Year, tr. Francis Morgan Nichols (New York:
Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), III, 398.
0
3 It is interesting to note that similar remarks have
been made about the ~eRublic. For a discussion of some theories
about the composition of the ReQublic, see "On The structure Of
Plato's Republic And Its Relation To Other Dialogues," by Lewis
Campbell, in Plato'~epublic, eds. B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell
(3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), II, 1-20.
31More's Utopia:

The Biography of an Idea, pp. 11-30.
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various parts of the UtoQia raises some pertinent questions
about the overall structure of the work which must be
considered before getting into the detailed discussion of
its parts.

After all, to assert that the whole of the UtoQia

has an organic structural unity assumes that Book I naturally
precedes Book II and that the various parts fit together
harmoniously.

To assert that the

UtoRi~

is about "justice"

presumes that it can be ascertained in most cases when More
intends to be serious and when he intends to be ironic.

That

is, problems of structure are inextricably bound to problems
of style and to problems of idea.
The difficulties in More's style and the enigma of
the meaning of the Utopia, however, should not be emphasized
too strongly; the literary excellence and disarming simplicity
of the work account for its continued appeal.

In proportion

as it is difficult to get at the thematic center of the
Dtopia,
UtoQia, it is rewarding to see the way in which More has
~eveloped
~arious

the theme throughout and has embellished it by

literary techniques.

~tructure,

~tyle:

The analysis of theme and

therefore, will involve a consideration of More's

how he uses figures and rhetorical devices and how

his diction and image patterns reinforce the theme of justice.
The emphasis, then, in this thesis will be on the
Pormal literary aspects of the UtoQia,
UtoRia, but any such discussion
~ust

necessarily involve a consideration of subject matter.

~-----------------------~--~
~-------------~--~
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Indeed, to attempt to discuss either the Utopia or the
Republic without becoming gripped by the most basic questions

-

which have concerned mankind is hardly possible.

The subject

matter and the form of the Utopia, like those of any great work,
are inseparable.

But since the critical mind dissects in

order to understand, the form must be artificially separated
from the subject matter so that the parts my be analyzed.
It is, therefore, the premise of this thesis that the subject
matter of the Utopia can be better understood through a' formal
criticism of the work taken as a whole.

When the relationship

bet''leen the beginning, the middle, and the end is seen and
when all the parts are viewed in relationship to the unifying
principle of justice, not only does the meaning reveal itself
more clearly, but other literary techniques become evident.
First to be considered is how the theme of justice
works as a unifying principle in the Republic and how the
concept of justice in the Republic compares and contrasts
with More's concept of justice in the Utopia.

-------,
rr--------rr=--~
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CHAPTER II
WHAT IS JUSTICE?
Plato unifies the structural_parts of the Republic
through the development of the theme of justice.

The problem

of defining justice is presented in the first book.

The theme

develops as the participants in the dialogue attempt to descry
justice in the ideal state.

Each stage in the development

of the theme constitutes a structural part, with each part
relating to the whole insofar as it contributes additional
meaning to the understanding of the concept of justice.
In following this structural plan, Plato gives an
exemplary demonstration of Aristotle's dictum that a poem
should have a beginning, a mi'dd1e, and an end.

The beginning,

which is the first of five major parts of the entire work,
includes all of Book I and the first half of Book II (I 327 A1
The four other major parts then develop from the
II 367 E).
problem posed in this first major part.

The problem to be

lVarious commentators on the Republic have divided its
structure into five major parts. To my knowledge, however, no
one has identified the organic relationship among the parts in
the same way as that described in the following pages. R. L.
Nettleship's lectures have been helpful in working out the
structural plan of the Republic and in interpreting difficult
passages. See his Lectures on the Republic, ed. Lord Charnwood
(London: r1acmillan and Co., 1925). Many of his ideas occur
in my interpretations without specific documentation.
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solved in the entire dialogue as presented in Part I (I 327 AIl 367 E) is posed in three questions pertaining to the
concept of justice.
1s its nature?

What is the origin of justice and what

What is the sanction for justice?

Is justice

or injustice more beneficial to man and to the state?
The middle of the entire dialogue begins where Part I
ends (367 E) and extends to the beginning of Part V (X 595 A-

621 D).

This middle segment contains three major parts--Part

II (II 368 A-V 471 C), Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Part IV
(VIII 543 A-IX 592 B)--each of which gives an answer to the
three questions about the concept of justice posed in Part I
(I 327 A-II 367 E).
Since the structure of the Republic is the basis of
discussion in the next several chapters, and since the parts
will be referred to repeatedly, it may be helpful to visualize
the bare outline of the entire structure in a brief diagram:
The Beginning

[Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E): The formulation
l of the problem of defining justice
-Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C):
and nature of justice

The Middle

The End

The origin

Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B):
for justice

The imperative

Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B):
of justice and injustice

The results

Part V (X 595 A-621 D): The poets' role in
teaching about justice and the relationship
{ of immortality to justice
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Thomas More's handling of the theme of .justice in the
Utopia is analogous to Plato's in the Republic.

The basic plan

of the Utopia, like that of the Regublic, is the formulation
of a problem and the presentation of its solution.

In the

Utopia, however, this plan results in only two major parts,
two books, which correspond to the formal divisions of the
text.

In Book I the problem is formulated--Hythlodaeus descries

the unjust conditions in the states of Europe and identifies
the causes and effects of injustice.

In Book II the solution

is presented--Hythlodaeus portrays the means whereby justice
could be brought into existence, and he portrays the results
of a rule of justice.

The work is unified through the contrast

between the injustice of the Europeans in Book I and the justice
of the Utopians in Book II.
The same theme of justice, then, unifies both the
Regublic and the Utopia, but More's basic philosophical
assumptions differ in certain respects from those of Plato.
Hence in each work a similar theme produces a different picture
of the ideal commonwealth.

Basically More's ideas in the

Utopia agree with those of Plato in the Republic in regard to
the origin, the nature, and the results of justice, but More
differs from Plato as to how justice manifests itself in the
nature of man and in the body politic.

The differences can be

attributed mainly to More's Christianity and his propensity
toward democracy.

29
The ideas about justice in the UtoRia can conveniently
be compared with corresponding ideas in the ReRublic by tracing
socrates' pursuit of justice in the latter work.

Once the

reader sees the outline of the structure of the ReRublic,
Socrates' argument becomes relatively easy to follow.

The

separate parts of the structure provide concise segments in
which Plato analyzes particular facets of the concept of justice.
In the following chapters each part of the structure of the
ReRublic is considered in order, and Plato's ideas are compared
and contrasted with More's corresponding ideas in the UtoRia.
The structural analysis of the Utopia, it should be noted,
will not be undertaken simultaneously with the structural
analysis of the ReRublic.

The structure of More's work will

be analyzed after the plan of the whole Republic has been
outlined and Plato's seminal ideas have been compared with those

.

of More.

The rationale for this procedure was discussed in

the previous chapter.

2

Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) of the Republic can be divided
into two sections, which serve as a prologue and an exordium
to the remainder of the whole dialogue:

Book I is the prologue,

and the first half of Book II (357 A-367 E) is the exordium.
In the prologue, Book I, Plato plants the seeds of the
main arguments to be developed and expanded in the remainder
-------.--------------,----------~---------------------
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pp. 17-18.
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of the work.

Socrates prepares for the subsequent revelation

of the true meaning of justice by showing the inadequacy of the
definition advanced by Cephalus and Polemarchus and by
demonstrating the essential falsity of the definition advanced
by Thrasymachus.
Book I opens with a brief introductory sketch of the
place, the occasion, and the characters of the dialogue.

This

sketch provides some interesting pOints of comparison with the
brief introductory sketch at the opening of the

UtoQi~.

The

dialogue in the ReQublic takes place at Peiraeus, a seaport,
where Socrates and Glaucon are visiting on a religious holiday.
The dialogue in the

UtoR~~

takes place in Antwerp, a seaport,

where Thomas More goes on business during a recess from his
diplomatic mission in Bruges.
The occasion of the dialogue in the Republic is a
chance meeting of friends following a religious service.
Socrates and Glaucon are returning from paying their
devotions to the goddess when they are met by Polernarchus
and his friends.

After exchanging friendly banter the company

retires to the home of Polemarchus, where they meet the others
who participate in the dialogue.

Chief among this group are

Cephalus, the aged father of Polemarchus; Adeimantus, the
brother of Glaucon; and Thrasymachus.

Cephalus graciously

greets the new arrivals and encourages them to talk.

The old

man begins to wonder about the world below, because he knows

~--------------~~----------------~
)1
~,~~

that his death is not far off.

He tells Socrates "that when

a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled
with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did
not occur to him.")

Cephalus, therefore, spends a great deal

of his time making peace with the gods through prayer and
supplication.

His opinions about the afterlife have been

formed by the traditional teaching of the poets.
This opening conversation not only typifies the
character of Cephalus, but it also balances and contrasts
with Socrates' final statement about the poets and the
afterlife at the conclusion of Book X.

The ReQublic, then,

opens as it closes with thoughts of immortality.
The occasion of the dialogue in the

UtoQ~

is also

a chance meeting of friends after a religious service.

Thomas

More is returning from Mass when he meets Peter Giles in
conversation with Hythlodaeus. 4 Before Peter Giles formally
introduces the two men he describes Hythlodaeus to Thomas More
as a man with these two sayings constantly on his lips:

"He

who has no grave is covered by the sky," and "From all places
it is the same distance to heaven. 1I5 Although this statement
3RElQ • I 330 D(Shorey, I, 17).
4UtoQia, p. )00. In the note here which refers to the
text p. 48/17, this parallel between the openings of the two
works is drawn by the editors.
5UtoQia, p. 51/13-15.
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of Peter Giles is not expanded in the ensuing conversation,
it indicates Hythlodaeus' concern with the afterlife, a concern
which is analogous to that of Cephalus at the opening of the
dialogue in the Republic.

Hythlodaeus' closing comments in

his description of Utopia in Book II also concern the afterlife.
He describes the prayer of the Utopian priest:

"Finally, he

prays that God will take him to Himself by an easy death, how
soon or late he does not venture to determine. fl6 The Utopia,
then, like the Republic, opens and closes with thoughts of
immortality.

This should serve as a reminder to the reader that

the central problems in each dialogue transcend the immediate
and transient condition of man on earth.
The introductory sketches in the two works are also
interesting for what they reveal of how More adapted incidents
ReQublic to suit his purposes.
and characters in the Republic

In the

Republic Socrates, the central figure, is the narrator; in the
Utopia Thomas More, a minor figure, is the narrator.

The

persona More's narration, however, is for the most part a
recording of the narration of the central figure, Hythlodaeus.
Since Socrates leads the discussion of the Republic and Plato
himself does not participate, the relationship between the
author and the narrator is relatively simple and unambiguous.
In the Utopia the relationship between the author and the

l~· ·
~

,

6UtOQia, p. 237/27-28.
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It is safer to

ssume'

that Socrates speaks for Plato in most instances than it is to
assume that either the Qersona Thomas More or Hythlodaeus speaks
for Thomas More the author at all times.
This difference in the handling of the narrative is
also reflected in each work in the relationships between the
minor figures and the central character.

In the Republic

eleven characters are mentioned as attending at the discussion.
Seven--Socrates, Glaucon, Polemarchus, Cephalus, Adeimantus,
Thrasymachus, and Cleitophon--actively participate in the
dia19gue.

In the Utopia only Thomas More, Peter Giles, and

Hythlodaeus actively participate in the dialogue.

(John Clement,

More's servant, is present, but he does not actively participate.)
There are other characters, of course, described by Hythlodaeus
but not present at the discussion at Thomas More's lodgings.
Besides the Utopians and other fictitious peoples, there are
individuals such as Cardinal Morton, the lawyer who is a guest
at his house, and the French and anonymous kings.

Some of

these individual characters bear a relationship to Hythlodaeus
analogous to the relationship borne Socrates by characters of
the dialogue in the

~epublic.

The most obvious correspondence between characters of
the two works is that between Hythlodaeus and Socrates.

34
Hythlodaeus, like Socrates, is a philosopher, respected by a
minority of his fellow men but rejected by the majority.

He

eschews riches and devotes his time to urging men to follow
the good and just life.

Other points of comparison between

these two central characters will be made in the course of our
discussion.

Correspondences between other characters in the two

works may not be readily apparent, yet there are significant
likenesses which reveal themselves under closer analysis.
Cephalus, the first character who engages Socrates in
serious conversation, corresponds to Cardinal Morton in the
Utopia.
place.

It is at the horne of Cephalus that the dialogue takes
This old friend of Socrates represents the good

qualities in the passing generation.

Characterized as holy and

hospitable, he strives to lead the good life.

His knowledge

of what is the good life comes from experience, not speculation.
He cares more about making peace with the gods than about
disputing with younger men.
Cephalus' chief literary function is to introduce the
theme of justice.

The problem of defining justice arises

naturally from Cephalus' opinions about the satisfaction he
intends to make in preparation for death.

He says that the

poets speak beautifully when they speak of a man who
his days in justice and piety."7

~lives

Cephalus then goes on to

7Rep • I 331 A (Shorey, I, 19).

out

~-----------35----------~
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define justice as telling the truth and paying one's debts.
This first mention of justice in the dialogue signals the
theme, which runs as a continuous vein through the remaining
books.
Although Cardinal Morton does not actively participate
in the main dialogue of the Utopia, as does Cephalus in the
Republic, the character and function of the two old men are
alike in many ways.

It is at Cardinal Morton's home that the

first dialogue described by Hythlodaeus takes place.

He is

described as a man "who deserved respect as much for his
prudence and virtue as for his authority.fl8

He represents the

fine qualities of an older generation in contrast to the kings
and their councilors who have brought about injustice in Engl-and
as well as in ,the other states of Europe.

Like Cephalus, he·

is not as much interested in theoretical speculation about
justice as he is in leading the just life.

This attitude is

evident from his involvement in the debate between Hythlodaeus
and the lawyer.
Although Cardinal Morton himself does not introduce
the theme of justice in the Utopia, it is at his table that
the subject is first mentioned.

Hythlodaeus describes how the

lawyer sparks the conversation:

"Availing himself of some

opportunity or other, he began to speak punctiliously of the
8utoQia, p. 59/25-27.
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strict justice which was then dealt out to thieves."9

In the

ensuing discussion Cardinal Morton does not participate as a
disputant, but he acts as though he were a judge hearing
evidence.

Hythlodaeus confutes the lawyer's notions about

penal justice as it is practiced in England; he recommends that
the death penalty be abolished.

At the conclusion of the

argument the Cardinal shows his prudent and practical character.
On the one hand he does not entirely accept Hythlodaeus'
proposal, but on the other hand he overrules the objection of
the lawyer.

His reaction to the debate is one of a pragmatic

and open-minded administrator who truly wishes to implement
justice.

He remarks that "it is not easy to guess whether it

would turn out well or ill inasmuch as absolutely no experiment
10
has been made."
Cardinal Morton, then, like Cephalus,
represents a middle position between the wise and theoretical
philosopher Hythlodaeus and the ignorant and materialistic
practitioners of politics like the lawyer.
In the Republic Socrates does not directly confute
Cephalus' notion of justice.

Before Socrates can question him

about the implications of his definitions, the old man departs
to offer sacrifice to the gods.
by his son, Polemarchus.
9UtoQia, p. 61/8-11.
10UtoQia, p. 81/7-9.
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The character of Polemarchus corresponds to the
character of Peter Giles in the UtoQia.

Polemarchus serves as a

character who brings the participants in the dialogue together.
He meets Socrates and Glaucon returning from the festival and
persuades them to come to his home so that they might have
dinner and "good talk" and later attend the torchlight races.
He is characterized as a personable young man, t'lho has accepted
without question the traditional opinions of his elders.

He is

interested in good talk, but his mind is not sufficiently
trained to think through the implications of his naive opinions.
In taking up the arguments abdicated by his father,
Polemarchus defines justice as giving every man his "due."
Socrates shows that this definition is inadequate because it
does not cover many obvious situations.

Socrates points out

that it would hardly be just to return a borrowed weapon to
a mad man, although it may legally be his "due."

Polemarchus

then amends his definition and says justice is doing good to
friends and harm to enemies.

Socrates also shows this definition

to be inadequate because sometimes we think our friends to be
enemies and vice versa.
Socrates' attitude toward Polemarchus is that of an
indulgent teacher.

He simply insists that the young man attempt

to define some of the terms that he uses glibly.

Socrates

finally succeeds in leading Polemarchus to the place where he
can begin to

acqui~e

wisdom--the point at which he admits that

··~'~ .
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he does not know what justice means.
In the

UtoR~~

Peter Giles, like Polemarchus, serves the

function of bringing the persons of the dialogue together.
Apparently, he is a personable fellow who readily makes friends.
Thus he can introduce an English diplomat to a Portugese
philosopher.

Although he delights in the conversation of the

philosopher, Peter Giles is rather superficial in his opinions.
An example is the commonplace reason he uses to urge Hythlodaeus
to become a king's councilor:

service to a king, he tells

Hythlodaeus, could bring him riches and honor.

In contrast,

Thomas More, who also advises Hythlodaeus to be a king's
councilor, appeals to the philosopher's sense of duty.

After

Hythlodaeus rejects Peter Giles's advice, Thomas More adds his

It is plain that you, my dear Raphael, are desirous
neither of riches nor of power. Assuredly, I reverence
and look up to a man of your mind no whit less than to any
of those who are most high and mighty. But it seems to
me you will do what is worthy of you and of this generous
and truly philosophic spirit of yours if you so order your
life as to apply your talent and industry to the public
interest, ev~y if it involves some personal disadvantages
to yourself.
The argument advanced by the persona More in this passage
parallels Socrates' explanation of why the good man must seek
public office.

In his explanation, Socrates also rejects

as

spurious those reasons which Peter Giles urges on Hythlodaeus.
llUtopia, p. 57/7-14.
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He says that "the good are not willing to rule either for the
sake of money or of honour. u12 He goes on to explain that the
good man consents to rule only to insure that a worse man
than himself does not gain control of the state. 13
Despite the prosaic opinion expressed by Peter Giles,
he is treated with respect by Hythlodaeus,

whos~

attitude

toward Peter is much like that of Socrates toward Polemarchus.
Hythlodaeus is friendly toward Peter and does not ridicule him,
but he insists that his own view of the best state of the
commonwealth is the right one.
Hythlodaeus' respect for Peter Giles differs markedly
from his treatment of the anonymous lawyer.

He confutes the

lawyer in much the same way that Socrates does Thrasymachus.
In the Republic after Polemarchus admits his ignorance,
Thrasymachus charges in with what he proclaims to be the true
definition of justice.

He says blatantly and simply that

justice is the advantage of the stronger.
As a character in the dialogue, Thrasymachus represents
a particular type of Sophist--who makes rhetoric the chief
subject of his teaching. His opinion about justice contains
two major points:
(I 338 C) and

~he

justice is the advantage of the stronger
life of the unjust is happier than that

12Rep • I 347 B (Shorey, I, 81).
13Rep. I 347 C (Shorey, I, 81).
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of the just (I 343 D).

The first point depends on a philosophical

system which assumes a strict materialistic determinism.

In

this system nature is determined by blind force and thus is the
result of necessary law, but a law that has no purpose behind
it.

Therefore, determinism, not free choice, explains man's

conduct.

In this scheme it follows that justice has no

objective existence and that politics and legislation are
artificial, rather than natural.

Justice does not originate

from an eternal law of the universe, but its validity comes
from human conviction which creates

it.

Accordingly,

Thrasymachus defines justice simply as the advantage of the one
who has the power to enforce his will.

He considers good and

evil as subjective notions, dependent on the opinions of the most
powerful.

People, therefore, are objects to be used by the

ruler in whatever way he chooses.
The philosophy of Thrasymachus is diametrically opposed
to that of Socrates.

Socrates argues that justice could not be

the advantage of the stronger unless the stronger, namely, the
ruler, were infallible in all his jUdgments.

Furthermore,

the ruler, like any artist, should exercise his art for the good
of the object of the art.

He should, like the good shepherd,

concern himself with those committed to his care.
Thrasymachus refuses to accept Socrates' argument.
maintains that the ruler is not truly a ruler when he makes a
mistake.

Then he insists that the sensible shepherd does not

He
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tend his sheep for their benefit but for his own profit.

The

smart king, accordingly, will manipulate his people to enhance
his own power.

In effect, Thrasymachus denies the existence

of any non-material principle in man and equates man with
beast.
Socrates counters this argument by showing Thrasymachus'
inconsistency.

Pointing out that Thrasymachus insists on being

exact in regard to the infallibility of the ruler but not in
regard to the art of the shepherd, Socrates maintains that when
the shepherd raises sheep in order that they may be eaten or
sold for profit he is not acting as a shepherd but as a
banqueter or as a wage-earner.

He explains further that the

wage-earining art differs from the ruling art:

"Do you not

perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the
office of rule, but they demand pay, \'lhich implies that not to
them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to
those whom they rule?"

14 Socrates cites this example primarily

to demonstrate that the good ruler should be concerned about the
well-being of his subjects.
After reversing Thrasymachus' contention that justice
is the advantage of the stronger, Socrates turns to what he
considers to be a weightier matter--Thrasymachus' "assertion
that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the
14ReQ . I 345 E-346 A (Shorey, I, 75).
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Thrasymachus maintains that in any competition

between the just and the unjust the unjust invariably wins.
Tyranny, which is "the most consummate form of injustice," best
exemplifies the superiority of the unjust over the just.

The

superiority of tyranny can be seen in the result which "makes
the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are
wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most
miserable. n16
Socrates confutes this second point of Thrasymachus with
three arguments.

He first shows that virtue is goodness and

wisdom and not vice and ignorance (I 348 A-350

c).

He continues

with the argument that justice is stronger than injustice
(I 350 D-352 D).

Finally he concludes with the proposition

that the just have a better life than the unjust and are
happier (I 352 B-354 A).
To establish his first point Socrates again draws
examples from the arts.

He leads Thrasymachus to agree that

in all arts there is an objective measure of perfection at
which the good artist aims.

The man who is without the idea

of right or wrong or the idea of a limit at which he must stop
is not the man who understands his art.

If this is the case

with all good artists, the unjust man, the one who attempts to

.
,

15Rep • I 347 E (Shorey, I, 83).
16Rep. I 344 A (Shorey, I, 69).
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acquire all he can, is like a bad and ignorant craftsman.
Socrates concludes this part of the argument by reversing
Thrasymachus' opinion that justice is ignorance and simplicity:
"Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and
wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant. tt17
Socrates' next point that justice is stronger than
injustice derives from the principle that unity is a
desirable end in itself.

He uses Thrasymachus' own admission

that the unjust man tries to acquire all he can to argue that
a city of such men would be filled with factions and strife.
Likewise the unjust man would have strife or factions in his
soul.

It is self-evident that such a city or such a man could

not be stronger than a just city or a just man that is

unified~

The final argument in Socrates' confutation of
Thrasymachus naturally comes from what has gone before.

He

reasons that the soul of man, like all other things, has its own
proper function, which is to live well and not badly.

He next

reminds his hearers that justice is the virtue proper to the
soul:

--

"And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of

soul is justice and its defect injustice?,,18

It follows, then,

that the just man by definition is the one who lives well and is
happy and the unjust man lives badly and is unhappy.
l7ReR • I 350 C (Shorey, I, 93).
l8ReR. I 353 E (Shorey, I, 105).
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Socrates' debate with Thrasymachus, encompassing the
greater portion of Book I of the

R~Qublic,

in many ways parallels

the three dialogues described by Hythlodaeus in the greater
portion of Book I of the UtoQia.

The lawyer at the home of

Cardinal Morton and the councilors to both the French king and
the anonymous king represent the same kind of irisidious element
in European society as do the Sophists in Athens.

No character

in the UtoQia expresses as blatantly as Thrasymachus that justice
is the advantage of the stronger, but the opinions advanced
by Hythlodaeus' adversaries, individually and collectively,
amount to the same thing.
The lawyer who argues with Hythlodaeus at Cardinal
Morton's house most resembles Thrasymachus.
proud, and insensitive.

He is audacious,

He begins the conversation by boasting

of the strict justice dealt out to thieves in England.

His

notion of justice, like that of Thrasymachus, gives the
advantage to the stronger, as is evidenced in his advocacy of
the death penalty for sheep stealing, a policy which obviously
furthers the interest of the rich landowners at the expense of
the poor.
Hythlodaeus confutes the lawyer with tactics similar to
those of Socrates by showing that if the lawyer's opinions are
followed to their logical conclusion they become absurd.

He

argues, for example, that the lawyer's "strict justice" in
ridding the infested country of thieves results in an increase

4.5
of thievery and that it further induces the thief to commit
murder.

Hythlodaeus also reasons that the lawyer's policy

results in war.

The large number of idlers in England will

inevitably turn to thievery when they fallon hard times because
they can serve no useful function.

When the lawyer maintains

that such idlers are necessary for national defense, Hythlodaeus
comments wryly, "You might as well say that for the sake of war
we must foster thieves. N19
The lawyer's reaction to Hythlodaeus' remarks shows
that he is more concerned with verbal victory and precise
logic than he is with justice or truth.

When he has obviously

been beaten in debate, he is condescending and boastful in a
manner that is reminescent of Thrasymachus:
Certainly, sir • • • you have spoken well, considering that
you are but a stranger who could hear something of these
matters rather than get exact knowledge of them--a
statement which I shall make plain in a few words. First,
I shall repeat, in order, what you have said; then I
shall shot'J in what respects ignorance of our conditions
has deceived you; f~6ally I shall demolish and destroy
all your arguments.
Besides the

lat'~yer,

__ the

bJO

kings and their councilors,

described by Hythlodaeus in Book I, view justice like
Thrasymachus as the advantage of the stronger.

These kings

and their councilors presume that any means could be employed
to satisfy their desire for territory and wealth.

19UtoRi~, p. 63/30-31.
20UtoQia, p. 71/22-28.
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Hythlodaeus argues that the policies of the two kings
can lead only to misery for them and their subjects.

The French

king's policy will end negatively after "draining his resources
21
and destroying his people."
Hythlodaeus argues his case
against the French king's policy with an anecdote that exemplifies
the same principle of unity that is stated by Socrates.

He

tells of the people called the Achorians, who, because they were
not content with what they had, attempted to secure another
kingdom for their monarch.

After continual strife from within

and without the two kingdoms, they decided finally that he and
they would be better off if he ruled well the kingdom he first
had, instead of attempting to rule over two disunited peoples.
In his hypothetical debate with the anonymous king,
Hythlodaeus argues that a king should put the welfare of his
people before his own.

In stating this case Hythlodaeus uses

the same image of the shepherd and his sheep that is used by
Socrates in his discussion with Thrasymachus:
At this point, suppose I were again to rise and maintain
that these counsels are both dishonorable and dangerous
for the king, whose very--safety, not merely his honor,
rests on the people's resources rather than his own.
Suppose I should show that they choose a king for their
own sake and not for his--to be plain, that by his labor
and effort they may live well and safe from injustice
and wrong. For this very reason, it belongs to the king
to take more care for the welfare of his people than for
his own, just as it is the duty of a shepherd, insofar
21utopia, p. 91/23-24.
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as he is a shepherd, to feed his sheep rather than himself. 22
Although the metaphor of the shepherd and his sheep to
describe a king's relationship to his people is an ancient one,
there is a striking similarity between the contexts in which
both Socrates and Hythlodaeus use the image.

Compare Hythlodaeus'

statement with Socrates' answer to Thrasymachus in Book I of
the Republic:
You see that while you began by taking the physician in
the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards
to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion
of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he
herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with
regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were
a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good
cheer or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he
were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of
the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how
to provide what is best for that over which it is set,.
since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely
sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of
being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed
that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every
form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best
for nothing else than that which is governe~3and cared for
by it, alike in political and private rule.
In the

Utop~a,

then, the lawyer, the kings, and their

councilors dramatically represent ·the very notion of justice
which Thrasymachus states as a theory in the Republic.

In both

works the basic assumptions for the antagonists' opinions are
the same.

For the lawyer, the kings, and their councilors, as

for Thrasymachus, justice has no objective existence.
22Utopia, p. 95/10-19.
c
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23ReQ. I 345 C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75).
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only criterion in which they believe is the power of the will
of the stronger.
The rebuttals to this philosophy, as have been indicated,
occur in the first books of both the Republic and the UtoQia.
The first book in both works functions to pose problems concerning
the definition and realization of justice and to show the
inadequacy of popular opinions about the solution to these
problems.

With Book I serving as a prologue in each work, the

contrast between the false ideas and the true ideas about justice
are subsequently revealed in the description of the ideal state.
The prologue, Book I, of the ReQublic serves a much
wider function, however, than merely stating the problem of
defining justice.

While Socrates is negating the propositions

advanced by Thrasymachus, he is also outlining the argument
which continues in the remaining nine books.

In the concluding

paragraph of the first book he summarizes the three main questions
about justice that have been raised in the course of the
discussion in Book I:

"But just as gluttons snatch at every

dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly
enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first
object of our inquiry--what justice is--let go of that and set
out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice
and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the
view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than
justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other

~-'--~~-------------------49~----------------------~
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Implied in this passage are three basic questions

about justice:

What is justice?

Is justice a good thing to be

desired for its own sake, or an evil to be avoided?
more profitable than injustice?

Is justice

These three questions form a

nucleus around which Plato builds the structure of the whole
~2Yblic.

Despite the logic used in refuting Thrasymachus,
Socrates' abstract argument does not altogether convince the
other participants in the dialogue.

Most of the time Thrasymachus

has a concrete case in mind, whereas Socrates assumes an oversimplified meaning of his terms.

In the discussion, however,

Plato raises the major questions about justice which are
amplified in the remaining nine books.

These questions

summarized by Socrates in the concluding paragraph of Book I
relate to the nature of justice, the imperative for justice, and
the results of justice.
The transition between the prologue and the remainder
of the dialogue comes immediately at the beginning of Book II,
which serves as an exordium to the remainder of the discourse.
Because Thrasymachus' negative argument in Book I has provided
no real opposition for Socrates' Glaucon demands that the same
questions be restated and answered ina positive way.

In echoing

the popular opinions about justice, Glaucon weaves the main
24 Rep • I 354 B (Shorey, I, 107).
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strands for the web of the whole argument of the Republic.

He

advances three arguments about justice which Socrates answers
in the three main parts of the dialogue:

Part II (II 368 A-

V 471 E), Part III (V 472 A-VII 541 B), and Part IV (VIII

543 A-IX 572 B).

After Glaucon has made his three points,

Adeimantus adds another element to the argument which Socrates
answers in Part V (X 595 A-621 D).

Thus, the entire structure

of the Republic divides into five natural parts, with the
problems to be answered in each of the last four parts contained
in the exordium.
First, Glaucon restates the questions about justice
which were raised in Book I:

"I will renew the argument of

Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature
and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do
so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary and not as
a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus
acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better
than that of the just man--as they say; though I, Socrates,
don't believe it. u25

As his statement suggests, Glaucon does

not advance the argument because he wants to convince his
listeners.

He proposes the three challenges because he wants

Socrates to answer them positively and seriously, riot negatively
and glibly as he has done in his refutation of Thrasymachus.

25Rep . II 358 C (Shorey, I, 113).
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Glaucon's first argument raises the question:

What is "the

nature and origin of justice"?

Socrates· answer is contained

in Part II (II 368 A-V 451 B).

Here he traces the origin and

nature of justice in the origin and nature of the ideal state.
Glaucon's second argument is basically the same as the question:
~hat

motivates men to act justly?

in Part III (V 457 B-VII 541 B).

Socrates' answer is contained
Here he explains that justice

is a universal form desired by men for its own sake and that
justice in the state can be realized only when those who apprehend
the form of justice--the philosophers--become the rulers.
Glaucon's third argument raises the question:
has justice over injustice?

What advantages

Socrates answers this question in

Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 502 B).

In these two books, he contrasts

the just state and the just man with the tyrannous state and the
tyrannous man.

He shows that injustice begets tyranny and that

tyranny is the most slavish and unhappy of all states in
existence.
After Glaucon has advanced his three questions and has
mplified the popular opiniori~
amplified
opinions about them, Adeimantus makes his
dditions.
additions.

Adeimantus' views mainly reiterate the points made

y Glaucon, but Adeimantus also gives a dimension to the
by
argument
rgument not

considere~

by Glaucon.

He argues that those who

ct justly do so only for reputation and that in reality
act

.•
.

'njustice brings more pleasures and rewards than justice.
injustice
~hese
hese

arguments state in another way the two last points made
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by Glaucon--namely, that necessity, not free choice, motivates
men to be just and that injustice is more advantageous than
justice.

But in restating Glaucon's argument, Adeimantus

introduces two questions:

one about the immortality of

t~e

soul and the other about the didactic function of the poets.
He argues that the advantages of the unjust
even to rewards and punishments after death.

ove~

the just extend

The poets and

soothsayers, he maintains, teach that one who has been unjust
during life on earth can buy his reward after death.

On one

hand the poets teach that flnei ther secrecy nor force can avail"
against the gods.

On the other hand, however, they teach that

the gods can be persuaded:
These same authorities tell us that the gods are capable
of being persuaded and swerved from their course by
"sacrifice and soothing vows" and dedications. We must
believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe
them, the thing to do is to commit injustice ~gd offer
sacrifice from the fr.uits of our wrong-doing.
Socrates answers this argument in his famous commentary on the
poets and in the myth of Er in Book X.

Book X has been

considered to be the least organic part of the ReQublic.
consider it as an afterthought.

Some

But the symmetry of the whole

work is better appreciated when the reason for this addition
can be seen adumbrated in Book II.

Just as Adeimantus' argument

on supernatural grounds is an epilogue to Glaucon's pragmatic
argument in the

exordiu~,

Socrates' consideration of the effects

26 Reg • II 365 D-366 A (Shorey, I, 137-39).
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of poetry on justice and the matter of immortality of the soul
constitute an epilogue to the other nine books of the entire
dialogue.
The first part of the Fepublic, with its prologue and
its exordium, resembles in many ways Book I of the UtoQia, which
also contains a prologue and an exordium.

The prologue in each

work constitutes a complete unit, but at the same time it is
organically linked to that which follows.

It would not be

necessary to read the prologue of either work in order to appreciate the literary value of the descriptions of the ideal states.
In each work, however, the prologue serves as an effective
contrast to what follows.
between the two prologues.

Of course, there are many differences
Thomas More selects essential elements

of Plato's analysis of injustice in Books VIII and IX and
includes them in Book I of the Utopia.

Whereas Socrates delays

the discussion of the causes and effects of injustice until
after his description of justice in the ideal state, Hythlodaeus
discusses the causes and effects of injustice during the
refutation of the false concepts in Book I.

Hence the prologue

in the Utopia occupies a greater proportion of the entire work
than does the prologue of the Republic.
The concluding portion of the first major part of
each work contains an exordium.
as has been
300k II.

~ndicated,

The exordium in the Republic,

occurs immediately at the beginning of

It serves as a transition between the prologue and

......-_----_.---_-----------------.--,
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the description of the ideal state.

The exordium in the

utoQia, which is the transitional link between Book I and
Book II, comes at the conclusion of Book I.
The exact point at which the exordium in the Utopia
begins is debatable.

In his analysis of the composition of

the work, Hexter has raised some interesting

qu~stions

about

the matter which will be taken up below in the more detailed
27
analysis of the text (Chapter VIII).
Here it need only be
indicated that Hythlodaeus makes the transition from Book I
to Book II by suggesting the contrast between injustice in
Europe and justice in Utopia.
the following paragraph:

This transition begins with

"Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you

candidly my heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever
you have private property and all men measure all things by
cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth
to have justice or prosperity--unless you think justice exists
where all the best things flo\,l into the hands of the worst
citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among
very few--and even they are riot altogether well off, while the
rest are downright wretched.,,28

This passage brings into

focus the contrast between the themes of Books I and II, and
the remainder of the exordium amplifies the contrast.
27Hexter, More's Utopia:
pp. 11-30.
28utopia, p. 103/24-31.
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exordium in the Utopia, occurring as it does after the
refutation of the false concept of justice and before the
description of justice in the ideal state, corresponds
approximately to the function and the place where the exordium
occurs in the Republic--that is, at the opening of Book II
before the description of the ideal state and after the
refutation of the popular opinions of justice in the prologue.
Another noteworthy similari ty bebleen the prologues and
exordiums of the two works is the relationships among the
characters.

Both Plato and More put the reasonable arguments

against the protagonists in the mouths of persons with whom the
reader can sympathetically identify himself.

In the Republic

Glaucon and Adeimantus eloquently and persuasively present
the same arguments which are asserted grossly and unconvincingly
by Thrasymachus.
two things:

By this rhetorical device Plato accomplishes

(1) he exposes the shallow philosophy and the

flagrant techniques of the Sophists; (2) he seriously considers
the deeper philosophical questions raised by Thrasymachus'
naive assertions.

In the Utopia a boorish lawyer and two

tyrants and their sycophants oppose Hythlodaeus' theories
about justice.

In contrast, Cardinal Morton, Peter Giles, and

the persona More, all sympathetic characters, offer more reasonable objections to Hythlodaeus' ideas.

In the dialogue of the

Utopia these sympathetic characters bear the same relationship
to the lawyer, the kings, and the councilors as Glaucon and

~-.--------------------------------~
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Adeimantus bear to Thrasymachus in the dialogue of the ReQublic.
Immediately after the exordium in each work, a distinct
break occurs.

In the Utogia the break is the formal division

bett1een Book I and Book II.

In the ReQublic the break occurs

without a formal division in the middle of Book II (368 A).
Socrates sets out in his search for justice in a seemingly
roundabout fashion.

He states his well-known plan to find

justice in the individual by first identifying it in the larger
elements of the state.

As Socrates sets out in this way, he

does not specifically indicate that he will answer Glaucon's
and Adeimantus' arguments in turn.

But when the entire

discussion is seen in retrospect and the structural divisions
are discerned, it becomes apparent that Socrates has answered
each of their challenges point by point.

Only in a less

artistic work would this structural plan be more obvious.

CHAPTER III
JUSTICE IN THE STATE
Socrates begins the pursuit of justice in Book II of
the Republic with an analysis of the origin of the state.

He

proceeds in this way in order to discern the nature of justice
in the body politic and in the nature of man.

This discussion,

Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) of the entire dialogue, constitutes
Socrates' first answer to the three challenges advanced by
Glaucon in the exordium.
In his first challenge Glaucon reiterates the popular
notions about the origin and nature of justice.

Justice,

he maintains, comes into existence because men mutually
distrust one another.

Since each man fears violence at the

hands of another, all men in a group must agree on rules for
their individual protection.

Hence justice has no prior

existence but comes into being when men recognize it.

The

nature of justice, therefore, is simply a compromise agreement,
which each man would willingly break if he could do so with
impunity.

Glaucon puts the argument very succinctly as

follows:

L~ .\
.

By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and
to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in
being wronged is greater than the excess of good in
doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged
by one another and taste of both, those who lack

.

~
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the power to avoid the one and take the other determine
that it is for their profit to make a compact with one
another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and
that this is the beginning of legislation and of
covenants between men, and that they name the commandment
of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the
genesis and essential nature of justice--a compromise
between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity,
and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent
to get one's revenge.
This argument rests on the same materialistic premise
as Thrasymachus' simple definition of justice as the advantage
of the stronger.

Implied is a nominalism which denies the

existence of universal forms.

~,

evil, true, and

fal~~

are assumed to be simply words which owe their validity to men's
subjective opinions.
purpose

wor~ing

The theory also implicitly denies any

behind the functioning of the universe.

Since

no eternal or natural law exists apart from men's subjective
opinions, the clever man will follow his natural instinct for
power.
by

Those who lack power contrive to subdue the strong man

promulga~ing

the fiction that an absolute concept of justice

exists.
The theory of an original social contract has been very
influential and has been used in the most diverse interests.
was applied by Hobbes to justify absolute monarchy and by
Rousseau to prove the absolute authority of the will of the
people.

They arrive at opposite conclusions, however, because

they base their theories on opposite assumptions about the
1Re-2. II 358 E-359 A (Shorey, I, 115).

It
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nature of man:

Hobbes assumes that man is naturally warlike

and destructive; Rousseau assumes that man is naturally good
and peace-loving.

These writers, and many others of the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries, commonly take an idea such as
the theory of an original social contract and project it into
the past with apparent solidity and concreteness.
The theory of,the origin of justice predicated in both
the Republic and the Utopia opposes the theory of an original
social contract.

Socrates attempts to determine where and how

justice originates by looking for it in the origin of the
state.

He proposes that if the participants in the dialogue

could observe the growth of a political organism, they would
"see also the origin of justice and injustice in it. tl2 He then
proceeds to trace the development of the state.

He does not

attempt, however, to describe realistically the historical
evolution of society; rather, he creates an hypothetical model
from his logical analysis of the fundamental requirements
of existing states.

Socrates' theory about the beginnings of

Society directly contradicts-the statement made by Glaucon in
the exordium.

Glaucon says that the state comes into being

because of men's mutual fear; Socrates says that the state
originates in men's mutual needs:

tiThe origin of the city,

then • • • is to be found in the fact that we do not severally
2Rep . II 369 A (Shorey, I, 149).
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suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things."3
Glaucon raises no objection to this statement, although it
opposes his argument that man has a natural tendency toward
war and strife.
From the premise that no man suffices unto himself,
Socrates goes on to describe the essential
healthy society.

elem~nts

of a

The first and chief need is food for

"existence and life."

Then comes the need for housing, and

the third is for clothing.

To fulfill these needs various

essential occupations come into existence.

In describing

these occupations Socrates propounds one of the fundamental
tenets upon which he bases his ideal state.

He maintains that

in order to perform his proper function well, a man should not
divide his efforts among many different tasks.

Thus the

elemental state will have farmers, carpenters, shepherds, traders,
and wage earners, each performing his own job and not pursuing
the occupation of another.
After identifying the essential trades and occupations
of the elemental society,

S6~rates

goes on to describe the

manner of the lives of the citizens.

Before he can proceed far,

hO\'lever, Glaucon protests that the city described is fi t only
for pigs.

Glaucon opines that men naturally desire

conveniences such as couches and tables.

Socrates allows Glau-

-------------------------------------------------------------------3ReR. II 369 B (Shorey, I, 149).
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con's objection but reminds him that the elemental city does not
require the conveniences he suggests:

ftThe true state I believe

to be the one we have described--the healthy state, as it
were.

But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a

fevered state, there is nothing to hinder.«4

The discussion

then turns to the nature of the luxurious city.

The description

of the healthy city, however, has sufficed to identify the
genesis of society.

From this beginning it is implicitly

agreed that the city comes into existence because of the needs
and not, as Glaucon has maintained, from the fears of mankind.
It follows, therefore, that justice does not originate
in fears.

Justice, as Socrates explains in the ensuing

discussion, has objective existence outside the minds of men.
Socrates' description of the basic elements of the
healthy city corresponds in many ways to the economic basis of
the Utopian commonwealth.

Although Hythlodaeus does not explain

in detail the genesis of society, he does mention that utopus,
the founder of the state, came upon a ·'rude and rustic people"
and brought them almost to a state of "perfection of culture
and humanity.uS

In purporting to have seen an existing

reality, Hythlodaeus describes the geographical features of the
island at the same time that he explains the political, economic,
4Rep • II 372 E-373 A (Shorey, I, 161).
SUtOQia, p. 113/5-6.
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t

and social bases of the commonwealth.

In Utopia, as in Socrates'

state, the occupations of the citizens grow out of their
essential needs for food, shelter, and clothing.
occupation is agriculture.

The basic

The only other crafts that occupy

any number worth mentioning are wool-making, linen-making,
masonry, metal-working, and carpentry.
In regard to the occupations in each state, however,
there are two significant points of difference.

First,

the Utopians do not follow Socrates' injunction that each
man should continue in one occupation.

In Utopia every citizen

receives military and agricultural training.

In addition, the

individual Utopians pursue the other trades mentioned above:
"Besides agriculture (which is, as I said, common to all),
each is taught one particular craft as his own."6
A second point of difference between the elemental
states described in each work is the use of money.
state money is assumed to be a necessity.

In Plato's

In Utopia it is not.

Socrates explains that buying and selling will be necessary for
Socretes
the exchange of the products·-of their labor:

"A market-place,

then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange will be
this."7
the result of this."?

Since the Utopians share their goods,

they have no need for money.

Instead of buying and selling in

6Utopia, p. 125/33-35.
?Rep.
7Rep • II 3?1
371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155).

63
the marketplace, the head of a Utopian household simply goes
to the public storehouses and "seeks what he and his require
and, without money or any kind of compensation, carries off
what he seeks."8

With the elimination of money the Utopians

have eliminated also the trading and selling class, which is
necessary in Socrates' elemental society.
(
~.

,

~

t

This difference in regard to money and common property
in the two works is mentioned because it is sometimes assumed
that More's communism is

si~ilar

to that of Plato.

It should

I

be remembered that communism in the Republic applies only to

'"

Book III.

the

~ardians.

Socrates makes this clear at the

closi~

of

He says that the other citizens may have money and

possessions, but whenever the guardians "shall acquire for
themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be
householders and farmers instead of guardians. u9
Despite the differences in the elemental needs of the
two societies, the underlying assumption about the origin of
justice is the same in the Utopia as it is in the Republic.
In both works the existence of society depends on a mutual
understanding among the citizens.

Justice is not imposed as

a coercive force to insure that citizens do not harm one another.
Justice comes into existence neither because men mutually
8Utopia, p. 137/38-39.

9Rep • III 417 A (Sho~ey, I, 313).
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distrust one another nor because men promulgate laws.

Justice

exists as an idealized form apart from the codification of
specific laws.

In fact, a point stressed in both works is that

too many laws inhibit rather than promote justice in the state.
The theory of the origin of justice contains at its
core the epistemological question of the existence or nonexistence
of universals.

Since the beginning of the recorded history of

philosophy, men have been divided over the question of whether
such concepts as truth, justice, and goodness have objective
existence or whether their validity comes solely from men's
opinions.

Herschel Baker has described the persistence of this

dichotomy among men in his two books, The Dignity of Man and
The Wars of Truth.lOHe sees this question at the root of most
ideological controversies in the history of Western civilization.
Baker's thesis is exemplified by the arguments of the Republic
and the Utopia and the positions they oppose.

For example,

Machiavelli in The Prince, written in the same decade as the
Utopia, propounds a theory of rulership similar to that which
Thrasymachus advances in the--Republic.

It was little more than

a century later in England that Thomas Hobbes set down almost a
10

e

Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the
Persis~~nce of an Idea (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press,
19ij7) , and The Wars of Truth: Studie~.in the Decay of Christian
Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1952).
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verbatim copy of the social contract stated by Glaucon. 11
Perhaps the occurrence of the same political theories
in Greece in the fourth century B.C. and in Europe during the
Renaissance accounts for the sense of immediacy conveyed by
both the Republic and the Utopia.

Neither work can be read

without feeling the polemical environment in whtch each was
written.

In this respect, both works differ from Aristotle's

political writings, which seem to have been composed with an
air of clinical detachment.
More's and Plato's refutation of the notion of relative
justice does not involve only the question of the origin of
justice.

The philosophical assumptions underlying the entirety

of each work repudiate the philosophy of materialistic
determinism.

In Book VI of the Republic, however, the discussion

of the relative and the absolute nature of justice becomes
specific.

In this book Socrates explains how the knowledge of

absolute justice proceeds from the apprehension of the form of
the good.

But since that section of the dialogue more

11Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton and
Co., 1950). The theory of social contract is discussed in
Chapters XIV and XV of Part I, pp. 106-33. Specifically, on
pp. 118-19, Hobbes states: "And in this law of Nature, consisteth
the Fountain and Originall of Justice. For where no Covenent
hath proceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every
man has a right to every thing; and consequently, no action can
be Unjust: But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is
Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the
not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is
Just."

~-.
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specifically pertains to the question raised by Glaucon
concerning the imperative for justice, it will be discussed
under that heading in a later chapter.
The second part of Glaucon's first argument in the
exordium concerns the nature of justice:

flJustice... is

accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured
in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone who had the
power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would

ne~er

make a

compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged; for he
would be mad."

12

Glaucon implies that a natural friction

exists among men in the state and that each man naturally
attempts to do as he wills.

Justice is simply a safeguard

against destruction.
Socrates does not give his definition of justice until
the middle of Book IV.

This definition, when he finally states

it, seems oversimplified.

He says, "This, then • • • my friend,

if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this
principle of doing one's own business. H13
the opposite:

Injustice is simply

"The interference with one another's business,

then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one
for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most
,

•

rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it
12

HeR. II

35~

B (Shorey, I, 115).

1 3Hep • IV 43J B-C (Shorey, I, 369).
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harm."14

The relevance of these simple definitions to Glaucon's

challenge is not apparent by itself.

Socrates derives the

definitions from the description of the ideal state, which he
has been developing up to this point in the dialogue.
Socrates equates justice with order and unity and
injustice with disorder and disunity.

Justice in the state,

therefore, means a correct ordering of the parts of one polity,
and justice in man means a correct ordering of the parts of one
soul.

The attainment of order in both the state and the

individual depends upon a correct recognition of the
hierarchical structure of each.
The just state is an organism, with three distinct
classes, each performing its proper function.
of an individual determines his class.

The function

As has already been

mentioned, craftsmen and tradesmen, who supply the necessities
of the state, make up the lowest class.

The guardians, who

protect the state, comprise the next class.

The rulers, who

direct the affairs of state, occupy the highest place in the
hierarchical class structure.
In the Utopia More equates justice with order and unity,
and injustice with.disorder and disunity, as Plato does in the
Republic.

The concept of order in the Utopia, though not as

rigid as that in the Republic, is also based on a hierarchy.
-

14Rep • IV 434 B-C (Shorey, I, 373).
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utopians achieve order, however, with institutions and laws
different trom those in Plato's ideal state.

The comparison of

Plato's and More's concepts of hierarchy, order, and unity
reveals their similarities and differences in regard to justice
and injustice.
In the Republic the outline of the education of the
guardians, which extends from II 367 E to III 412 B, serves
as a basis of discussion for Socrates' answer to the question
as to how order is achieved in the state.

More's work has no

comparable segment of the structure concerned with the
description of the educational system of the Utopians.
Furthermore, the space devoted to the discussion of education
1n relationship to the whole of the

Utopi~

(about one-twentieth)

is not proportional to the treatment given to it by Plato in
relationship to the whole of the Republic (about one-fifth).
Perhaps More does not emphasize education because he does not
adhere to Plato's philosophical premise that virtue follows
inevitably from knowledge.

This difference in educational

philosophy will be discussed--in greater detail in the analysis
of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the Republic, where Socrates
explains how the just soul, which has been properly nurtured,
naturally seeks the form of the good.
Although the section on the education of the guardians
in the ReQublic has no exact counterpart in the UtoQia,
Hythlodaeus discusses in other

c~nnections

many topics related to

~----------,
P':=----------.
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those raised by Socrates in his explanation of the educational
curriculum.

Socrates begins the discussion of education by

explaining the need for a special class of guardians.

Because

the city has needs beyond those of food, shelter, and clothing,
wars of acquisition must be conducted.
reason:

Socrates explains the

"Then we shall have to cut out a

cantl~

of our

neighbour's land if we are to have enough for pasture and
ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon
themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding
the limit set by our necessary wants. h1S From this inevitable
requirement it follows that the city needs a special class of
guardians.

Their sole task is to conduct war and to stand guard

in time of peace.

Because of Socrates' basic premise that

each man should devote himself to only one task, he exempts
the guardians from other duties.
The great importance of the guardian class and its
function in war contrasts sharply with the classless society of
the peaceful Utopians.
Utopia.

There is no special class of guardians in

Each citizen trains for military duty in order that

every citizen be in readiness when the need arises.

The Utopians

are far more reluctant to engage in a war of expansion than
Socrates suggests the citizens of the Republic are.

The Utopians

do not simply cut out a cantle of their neighbor's land, but

lS ReR . II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163).
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when the need arises, they do seek out unoccupied and uncultivated
lands of the mainland nearest them and invite the inhabitants
to join them in cultivating it.

The Utopians, however, have no

compunction in forcing the inhabitants to live according to
their laws.

Those who refuse, "they drive from the territory

which they carve out for themselves.
u16
war against them.

If they resist, they wage

Hythlodaeus t and Socrates' commentaries upon the justice
of such wars of acquisition provide interesting contrasts.
Hythlodaeus says that the Utopians consider this kind of war
just, because the inhabitants of the land fail in their
obligation to cultivate it.
just war.

Socrates avoids the question of a

He says that it is not yet time to speak lIof any evil

or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further
discovered the origin of war. tl17 Although Socrates does not
condone war he considers wars of acquisition to be inevitable
for a luxurious state.
Because wars are inevitable the guardians of the
republic must receive the best education possible in order to
develop the necessary character to protect the state.

The

guardians' education, as outlined by Socrates, reveals how
completely Plato integrates subordinate motifs into his major
16UtoRia, p. 137/17-19.
17Rep • II 373 E (Shorey, I, 165).
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theme.

The whole system aims to develop and sustain justice in

the state.

In each part of the curriculum, Socrates keeps in

view the end of developing order, harmony, and unity in the
student.
Socrates begins the discussion with the prescription
that education should develop the whole man.

In establishing

the music curriculum, which is addressed to the soul, the
rulers must consider the tales told to the youths.

The kind

of tales prescribed by Socrates shows another facet of the way
in which Plato conceives of the state as a rigid hierarchical
structure.

If the guardians are to know their proper place

and function in the hierarchy, they must have a true understanding of the nature of God.

Socrates maintains that the

tt<10 laws and patterns concerning the gods to which speakers
and poets will be required to conform are these:

"God is not

the cause of all things, but. only of the good,f1 and rthe is
simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his
18
own form."
This understanding of the nature of God underlies Plato'
whole concept of the ideal state.

Throughout the dialogue,

Socrates emphasizes that stability, order, and unity are good,
and that change, instability, and disorder are bad.

For

example, Socrates warns that the state must be wary of innovation

18 .
HeR. II 380 C-E (Shorey, I, 189).
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in music and gymnastics, for as he explains, "the modes of music
are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental
political and social conventions."19

Socrates also implies that

the ideal state cannot be the cause of evil.

Indeed he seems

to attribute the same characteristics to the ideal state as
he does to God.
The Utopians, like Socrates, place great importance

,
\

~

.

on the belief in God.

All Utopians, "though varying in their

beliefs . • • hold there is one supreme being, to whom are due
both the creation and the providential government of the whole
20
world."
The attitudes toward God in the respective works,
however, points up the difference between Plato's rational
habit of mind and More's voluntaristic tendencies.

Socrates

emphasizes that education should teach about the true nature of
God.

The Utopians stress belief in the inscrutable mystery

of God.

They hold that He is "a certain single being, unknown,

eternal, immense, inexplicable, far above the reach of the
human mind, diffused throughout the universe not in mass but
in power." 21
Socrates' recommendation for tales to be told about the
nature of God concludes Book II of the Republic.
19Rep • IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 333).
20Ut opla,
.
p. 217 18-21.
21Ut op~~,
.
p. 217/12-15.
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he specifies other tales that should be told to inculcate the

i'~

proper virtues in the youths.

Since the guardians above all

others must have courage, they should hear tales that will
inculcate bravery:

tllf they are to be brave, must we not extend

our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them
22
least likely to fear death?"
Another virtue needed by the
guardians is temperance.

The education must, therefore,

contain tales which inculcate self-control.

Socrates points

out the need for this virtue in the just state:
Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?
• • • And for the multitude are not the main points of
self-control these--to be obedient to their rulers and
themselves to be rulers over the bodilY2~ppetites and
pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?
The matter of the tales in the musical education of the guardians,
then, must reflect the true nature of God and must inculcate the
virtues of courage and temperance.
After describjng the matter of the tales, Socrates
discusses the proper. manner in which they should be told.

He

considers under this heading the mode (imitation or narration),
the harmonies, and the rhythms.

Here again he rejects or

accepts the various possibilities according to the criterion of
justice.

The narrative is bo be preferred over the imitative

mode, because, as Socrates reasons, the imitator of base actions
22Rep • III 386 A (Shorey, I, 201).
23Rep. III 389 D (Shorey, I, 215).
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tdll
will himself become debased.

The guardians should not imitate

cowards, drunkards, and slaves, "but if they imitate they
should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them-men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things
of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should
neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet

~ny

other

shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the real' t y. ,,24

1.

The harmonies of songs that induce softness and sloth
must also be eliminated.
virtues are allowed:

Only those which develop the required

"Leave us these two modes--the enforced

~:'
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and the voluntary--that will best imitate the utterances of men
failing or succeeding, the temperate,
these ••,25

th~

brave--leave us

The rhythms, like\~ise, should not be complex but

should be orderly and follow the natural movements of life.
Socrates' insistence on the ethical purpose of education
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also extends to painters and craftsmen.

All must be forbidden

from representing evil or illiberal dispositions in any
product of their arts.

The whole obJ'ect of the educational

system is to inculcate in the soul an appreciation of that
which is orderly, beautiful, harmonious, and good.
The training in gymnastic, like the training in music,

24 Rep. III 395 C (Shorey, I, 235).

25 Rep
ReQ • III 399 C (Shorey, I, 249).
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is directed at the

develop~ent

of virtue in the individual.

In the training of the body, as well as that of the soul, it
is simplicity that achieves this end:

"\·lhile simplici ty in

music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training
26
it begets health in bodies."
The discussion of gymnastics and the training of the
body leads Socrates to a consideration of the role of physicians
and judges in the state.

The necessity for physiriians and judges,

he says, is a sure proof of an evil and shameful state of
education in the city.

A man who spends the better part of his

days in a court of law as a defendant or as an accuser is
despicable.

It is particularly shameful when, from a lack of

all true sense of values, he "is led to plume himself on this
very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust
act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice, every
evasion, and wriggle out of every hold in defeating justice. n27
Like\'Ji se it is shameful to require medicine "not merely
for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies," but
because of sloth and dissipa~ion.28

Socrates severely

criticizes the practice of treating lingering diseases and
prolonging the life of a man beyond the period of his
26ReR • III 404 E (Shorey, I, 269).
2 7Rep • III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271).
28 ReQ • III 405 C (Shorey, I, 271).
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usefulness.

He suggests that the practice of Aesculapius,

which was followed in former years, should be adopted:

flBut

if a man was incapable of living in the established round and
order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him,
since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the
state."

29
The interesting pOint of Socrates' discussion of

medicine and law is that he evaluates them both in terms of
justice.

Only in a state where the bodies and souls of the

citizens are in proper harmony can justice be realized.

After

describing the kind of judges and the kind of physicians that
will be allowed in the state, he relates the art of the judges
and the physicians to the souls and bodies of man:
Then will you not establish by law in your city such an
art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with
this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the
bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly
well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective
in body they will suffer to die and those who are evilnaturedoand incurable in soul they will themselves put to
death.)
The Utopians in the .. training of their youths also stress
the development of virtue in the soul as well as health in the
body.

There is no mention of the kinds of tales that are told

to children, but Hythlodaeus says that flaIl children are intro-

29ReQ • III 407 E (Shorey, I, 279).

30ReR . III 410 A (Shorey, I, 287).
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duced to good literature. flJ1

Their concern for moral development

1s evidenced by the fact that the priests are entrusted with
the education of children and youth.

The Utopians "regard

concern for their morals and virtue as no less important than
for their advancement in learning. flJ2 They also inculcate
virtue in their recreations.

The adults as well as the

children regularly play two games after supper:

"The second is

a game in which the vices fight a pitched battle with the
virtues. t,JJ
The Utopians apparently do not include gymnastic in
their educational system, but they do not neglect the
development and training of the body.

They develop nimble,

active, and strong bodies by "diligent labor" and "temperate
living."

They also participate in military training.

As a

result of their good habits, "nowhere are men's bodies more
vigorous and subject to fewer diseases."J4
Because of the excellent conditions of their bodies,
the Utopians have little need for physicians.

They do not,

however, hold the medical profession in the same low esteem
as does Socrates:

"Even though there is scarcely a nation in

J1Uto12ia, p. 159/10-11.

J2UtoQ\~, p. 229/10-11.
J2Uto12\~'
JJUto12ia, p. 129/21-22.
J4Utopia, p. 179/28-29.
J4UtoQia,
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the whole world that needs medicine less, yet nowhere is it
held in greater honor."35

The Utopians esteem medicine because

"they regard the knowledge of it as one of the finest and most
useful branches of philOSophy.H3 6 The chief abuse mentioned
by socrates in the

ReQubl~c

is avoided in Utopia.

The physicians

of Utopia do not attempt to prolong life beyond the period of
a man's usefulness.

If a Utopian has a disease Hnot only

incurable but also distressing and agonizing without any
cessation," the priest encourages him to put an end to his own
misery or to allow others to do it. 37
Although they respect physicians, the Utopians regard
lawyers with the same low esteem as does Socrates.

Socrates

points out the necessity for good judges, but he considers
lawyers as useless.

The Utopians allow judges to hear the

cases of citizens, but they have the same opinion of lawyers:
"They absolutely banish from their country all lawyers, who
cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal pOints. H38
In the Republic, Socrates' explanation of the
relationship of the judges and physicians to the souls and
bodies of the guardians closes the discussion of education.
35[topia, p. 183/8-10.
36utopia, p. 183/11-12.
37Utopia, p. 187/5-6.
38Utopia, p. 195/15-17.
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Socrates next considers who are to be the rulers of the
guardians and how they are to be selected.
based on loyalty and

pat~iotism.

The selection is

The rulers are picked from

the ranks of the guardians on the basis of their demonstrated
patriotism.

All the guardians are subjected to a test, similar

to that given young colts by their trainers.

Socrates describes

the test and the reaction expected of a true leader:

"Just as

men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable
to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears
and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more
carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains
immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout,
a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received,
maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all
those conditions, and the character that would make him most
useful to himself and to the state.,,39
The designation of the ruling class completes Socrates'
identification of the three classes in the hierarchical
structure of the state.

He suggests that order can be

achieved in the state only if the founders take into account
the inherent inequality and the essential differences among
these three classes.

Workers, guardians, and rulers must

perform their respective functions, and they must maintain a
39Rep • III 413 E (Shorey, I, 299-301).
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proper relationship to one another.
Socrates recognizes that there may be a problem in

making the citizens realize their differences and the
necessity for maintaining the distinctions between classes.
All the people, therefore, must be told what Socrates calls
an opportune falsehood.

The ruler, the guardian, and the worker

classes are to be told respectively that while they thought
they were being educated they were in reality being fashioned
beneath the earth into gold, silver, and brass.

Each man born

into one of these classes remains in that class throughout
life.

Only rarely a son of a brass or a silver father will

show enough native ability to advance to the next higher
class.

The hierarchy inherent in the opportune falsehood

sets Plato's thought apart from that of More.
Although God holds the place of eminence in the
Utopia as well as in the Republic, in Utopia there is little
hierarchy in the ranks of men.

More eschews Plato's insistence

that men are divided into classes in respect to their separate
functions.

In Utopia each person must learn to farm, in addition

to his regular trade.
trades, if they desire.

Some citizens may also learn additional
All receive military training and

fight when the need arises.
Unlike the citizens of the republic in their classes of
gold, silver, and brass, the Utopians share equally their

f

responsibilities and privileges.

In contrast to the republic,
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where class distinctions are hereditary, in Utopia the citizens
elect their officials.

Every thirty families choose annually

an official whom they call a syphogrant.

The syphogrants, "by

secret balloting appoint a governor, specifically one of the four
candidates named to them by the people."40

Apart from the

average citizens, besides the officials and priests, there
exists only one small scholar class.

A worker who shows

exceptional ability may advance to this class, but since the
number of scholars is not large (there are a combination of
five hundred scholars and others exempt from labor in each
city), the number of such advancements is necessarily limited.
Because More deviates from Plato as to what constitutes
order, he likewise differs from him regarding what contributes
to disorder.

Plato sees disorder in any deviation from his

hierarchical structure.

When the ruling class fails to rule

or when the warrior class becomes weak, disorder and injustice
naturally follow.

Hence, any tendency toward equality brings

inevitable injustice.

Democracy shows this tendency by
.-

treating equals and unequals alike.
eventually terminates in tyranny.

This state of disorder
In this last extreme of

injustice the hierarchy is completely upset.

The worst element

in the state rules and enslaves the best.
Thomas More, on the other hand, sees the causes of
40

Utopia, p. 123/15-17.
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injustice in a different light.

The whole thrust of the argument

in Book I of the Utopia is that disorder and injustice come from
class distinction.

It must be noted, of course, that More

condemns a class distinction based on ownership of money and
private property, as well as on rank and title.
hardly approve this kind of distinction.

Plato would

Nonetheless, the

desideratum of equality prevails throughout both books of the
Utopia.

Only when men share responsibilities and privileges

can true justice be achieved.
Although the Utopians differ from the guardians in
that they perform multiple functions, they are similar to the
guardians in the regimen of their lives.

At the conclusion of

Book III of the Republic, Socrates briefly describes the
habitation and the way of life of the guardian class.
three stipulations to be followed in their lives:

He makes

flln the

first place, none must possess any private property save the
indispensable.

Secondly, none must have any habitation

or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. u41
The third is that all the guardians should eat at a common mess:
Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes
of war sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed
stipend from the other citizens as the wages of their
guardianship,so measured that there shall be neither
superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack. And
resorting to a common mess like soldiers on campaign they
will live together. 42

&
t.
f·
~

~

41 Rep • III 416 D (Shorey, I 311).
42Re~. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).
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These three stipulations could be applied to all the Utopians.
In utopia the citizens do not own property.

They do not live

in military quarters like the guardians, but their family
houses are equipped with folding doors which give admission to
anyone, and they eat at common dining halls.
The regimen of life suggested by Socrat"es at the
conclusion of Book III is criticized by Glaucon at the
opening of Book IV.

Glaucon opines that the guardians seem to

have the most difficult lives of all the citizens.

Instead

of making the guardians content, he says such a life would
make them the reverse of happy.

Socrates answers that the

ideal state is not established for the exceptional happiness
of anyone class but for the greatest possible happiness of
the city as a whole.

The happiness of all classes can only

come about when each class performs its proper function:

wAnd

so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each
class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature
comports. u43
itself.
he
~e

In Plato's view happiness is not an end in

Socrates does not demean the desire for happiness, but

considers the happiness of the individual secondary to the

primary objective of achieving justice in the state.
Happiness for the individual is considered more important
in the Utopia than it is in the Republic.

43Rep • IV 421 C (Shorey, I, 321).

The Utopians'
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attitude toward pleasure particularly gives evidence of this
importance.

In their philosophical debates, "they discuss

virtue and pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is
in what thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that
happiness consists.,,44

In both works happiness is important,

but in the Utogia, unlike the Regublic, the happiness of the
individual is the reason for which justice in the state is
desired.
In both works, moreover, it is assumed that a chief
cause of unhappiness arises from the strife that the introduction
of wealth foments.

In the ReQublic, Socrates explains that

and silver destroy the unity of the city.

~old

The result of

[Wealth's being introduced is that "there are two at the least at
~nmity

with one another, the city of the rich and the city of

the poor, and in each of these there are many ... 45
~hat

It follows

the rulers and the guardians of the ideal state should

~void

the accumulation of gold and silver.
Socrates explains' hO\'J the state that spurns riches

~as

the advantage over other states in war.

~tate

~o

He compares the

without wealth to a lean athlete and the wealthy states

fat middle-aged men.

He points out that the lean athlete

Would not only have the advantage in face-to-face combat with
auch adversaries, but he could also play one of his soft

44 Ut~Qia, p. 161I 23-25.
45ReQ. IV 422 E-423 A (Shorey, I, 327).
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opponents off against another by appealing to one or the other's
lust for gold.

The state that has no desire for gold can use

the greed of other states to its advantage.

When engaged in

war with a powerful adversary, the republic would send an
embassy to the neighbor of the enemy.
following proposition:

The embassy makes the

"We make no use of gold.and silver

nor is it lawful for us but it is for you:

do you then join

uS in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy."46

Because of

the greed of the rulers in the average state, such a proposition
would hardly be refused.
In the UtoRia, More as author also shows wealth to be
a force that disrupts the unity of the state.

In Book I

Hythlodaeus depicts England as a state divided into two classes,
rich and poor.

He points out that the country is in such

deplorable condition not simply because of poverty, but also
cause "alongside this wretched need and poverty you find
ill-timed lUXUry.n 4 7 Utopia, in contrast to England, is a
ity because the citizens are neither rich nor poor.

The

topians
pians use gold only insofar as its true nature deserves.
Instead of hoarding it in the treasury, or being without it
ltogether, they keep a supply on hand to make "humble vessels"
and to use in adorning their slaves.

Similarly gems, which

46Re~. IV 422 D (Shorey, I, 325).
47Utopia, p. 69/29-30.
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others account precious, the Utopians give to their children
as playthings.
The Utopians keep gold on hand chiefly for the
reason that Socrates recommends.

In the conduct of war, they

hire mercenaries and promise huge rewards to those who aid in
defeating the enemy.

In victory they disdain the spoils and

offer them to their allies:

nThey present their auxiliaries

with the rest of the confiscated goods, but not a single one
of their own men gets any of the booty.n 48 The message
ReQublic is that strength and
implicit in the Utopia and in the Republic
unity can be attained only when the citizens of the state free
themselves from the greed for wealth.
Furthermore, strength and unity can only be achieved
in a state of manageable proportions.

In the Republic Socrates

answers Glauconts question as to the desirable size of the
ideal state with the following prescription:

"They should

let it grow so long as in its growth it consents to remain a
unity,
ty, but no further.,,49

This is also the simple rule

followed by the Utopians.

They never allow th~ commonwealth

to grow in population beyond that size which would destroy its
unity.
ty.

When the population increases beyond a fixed number,

the Utopians set up colonies in uninhabited lands nearby.

When

the population decreases, the colonists come back to Utopia.
48Utopia, p. 215121-22.
4 9Rep • III 423 C (Shorey, I, 329).
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In a city whose institutions and customs are founded
on principles of order and unity, few laws are necessary.

In

the ReQublic Socrates explains that the ideal state would not
have to follow the practice of corrupt states, in which laws
for innumerable trivial matters are constantly enacted.

For

example, there should be no reason to legislate. the following
matters:

"Such things as the becoming silence of the young

in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and
rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the
cut of the hair and the garments and the fashion of the
footgear, and in general the deportment of the body and every0
thing of the kind.,,5
In Utopia there are avery few laws
because very few are needed for persons so educated. a51 The
Utopians find that the chief fault "with other peoples is that
almost innumerable books of laws and commentaries are not
sufficient. f ,5 2 Despite their few laws, the houses and the
clothing of the citizens are remarkably uniform, and their
habits are disciplined and praiseworthy.

At the common meals,

for example, the minors of both sexes "either wait at table on
the diners or, if they are not old and strong enough, stand by-and that in absolute silence. fl53
50Reg. IV 425 B (S~orey, I, 335).
5 1Utopia, p. 195/8-9.
52ptopia, p. 195/10-11.
53UtoQia, p. 143/16-19.
53Utooia,

88
Socrates' emphasis on unity terminates the main part
of his description of the origin and development of the
ideal state.

He says shortly before the middle of Book IV:

At last, then, son of Ariston • • • your city may
be considered as established. The next thing is to
procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself,
and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus
and the rest, if we may in anY5~ise discover where justice
and injustice should be in it.
He then proceeds to identify justice in the state by first
.

identifying the other virtues which he assumes any well-ordered
state or man should possess.

As each man in each class performs

his own function, the class manifests one virtue in the life
of the state.

Hence, the function of the golden class is to

rule, and it should possess the virtue of wisdom.

Since the

warrior class must defend the city or wage war, it should
exhibit the virtue of courage.

Socrates makes it clear that,

although courage may be a characteristic of members of other
classes, only the warriors manifest courage in the state.
Temperance applies to all classes since it is the virtue by
which one does well whatever one does.

Justice also applies

to all classes because it determines the correct relationship
among the other virtues as they are possessed by separate classes.
Finally, justice is the chief virtue because it manifests order
in the state as well as in the individual.
Since More does not assume the idea of separate functions
54Reg • IV 427 D (Shorey, I, 345).
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and classes, he does not assume the idea ·of separate virtues
manifested in the state.

Because of their equality the Utopians

are all expected to be as wise, courageous, and temperate as
possible.

In addition, they display Christian attributes

which are not mentioned among the virtues by Socrates.

A

comparison of the virtues in Platots and More's concept of the
nature of man will be a subject of discussion in the following
chapter.
After identifying justice in the state, Socrates returns
to the point of his original inquiry.

He proceeds to consider

justice as it manifests itself in the individual man.

The same

principles of order and disorder, unity and disunity, he assumes,
will be applicable in finding justice in man as have been
pplicable in finding it in the state.

Socrates reveals how he

identifies man and the state in his description of the ideal
state as a perfectly functioning human being:
"That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest
number use the expression tmine t and 'not mine' of the
same things in the same way." IIMuch the best." "And the
city whose state is most like that of an individual man.
For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the
entire community of bodily connexions stretching to the
·soul for 'integration' with the dominant part is made
aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though
it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to
say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any
other member of the man the same statement holds, alike
for a part that labours in pain or is eased by pleasure."
"The same,1I he said, "and, to return to your question, the
best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.,,55
55Rep • V 462 D-E (Shorey, I, 471).
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More also conceives bf the state as an organism, but

f

he dbes not identify the relationship between the individual
and the body politic as closely as Plato.

He assumes, as Plato

does, that the virtues and vices in individual men will be
reflected in the virtues and vices of the state as a whole.

For

example, Hythlodaeus explains how the Utopians aid the public
welfare in their pursuit of individual pleasure:

"As long as

such la\,ls are not broken, it is prudence to look after your
own interests, and to look after those of the public in
addition is a mark of devotion.

But to deprive others of their

pleasure to secure your own, this is surely an injustice."56
Although he does not directly correlate the parts of
the soul and the parts of the state in the Utopia, More does
make the correlation in one of his Latin epigrams:
in all its parts is like a man:
natural affection.
other parts.

:I,'
',..

,"<,

·'A kingdom

it is held together by

The king is the head; the people form the

Every citizen the king has he considers a part of

his own bOdy.tt57
The origin and nature of justice, then, are similar
in the Republic and in the Utopia.

Both works assume as a

basic premise that justice is not simply a notion which originate
56Utopia, p. 165/29-32.
57HEpigrammata • • • pleraqu~ e Graecis versa," tr. and
57HEPlgrammata
ed. L. Bradner and C. A. Lynch, The Latin Epigrams of Thomas
More (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p. 172.
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in the minds of man' rather it has absolute existence which
transcends man's life on earth.

In a state where justice mani-

fests itself, the elements of the state function harmoniously
so that order and unity result.

Thomas More differs from Plato,

however, as to how order and unity might be achieved in an
ideal state, chiefly in that he eschews Plato's'concept of a
rigid hierarchical class structure.
This passage in the dialogue where Socrates descries
justice in man and in the state (IV 432 A-434 C) marks a
juncture in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C).

Up to this passage

the discussion has concerned the functioning of the parts of the
state.

In the remainder of Book IV he turns to consider the

functioning of the corresponding parts of man's soul.

In the

first half of Book V he then proceeds to analyze the relationship
between the nature of man and the nature of woman and the
relationship between the family and the state.

The second half

of Book IV and the first half of Book V serve as the basis
for the discussion in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
JUSTICE IN THE NATURE OF MAN
At the beginning of the pursuit of justice in Book II
of the ReQublic, Socrates implies that the study of man should
logically precede the study of the state.
[

In the ensuing

discussion, however, he reverses the order and begins with the

~

~

~
~
~

f

state.

He explains that the component elements in the body

politic are larger and more readily seen than those in man's
nature.

It is assumed, nevertheless, that the aim of the

dialogue is to find justice in man.
Some commentators on the Regublic emphasize Plato's
concept of man as more important than his concept of the
state.

They interpret the work primarily as a treatise on

moral philosophy.

C. H. McIlwain, for example, expresses

this opinion:
Its name might suggest that it was a book of political
philosophy, but we very soon find that it is rather a
book of moral philosophy. Its justice is in reality,
as Aristotle later said,the whole of virtue shown in
our dealings with others. It is a book about human
life and the human soul or human nature, and the refl
question in it is, as Plato says, how to live best.
The BeggQ1l£ is certainly a classic treatise on morals, but it
I The Growth of Political T~Qught in the West (New York:
.
Macmillan Co., 1932Y, p. 337
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would be a mistake not to recognize that it is also a book on
political philosophy.

Indeed it is difficult to separate the

two aspects of the work without obscuring the meaning of the
whole.

Plato reminds us throughout the dialogue that the

entity of the state and the entity of man are similar.
The

ytopi~

also is read variously as a treatise on

morals and as a treatise on politics.

Some critics interpret

it primarily as a work of political philosophy.

For example,

commentators such as Karl Kautsky and Russell Ames regard
More as a prophet and assume that the Utopia is a model of. the
ideal state.
read the

2

Other critics, however, such as A. R. Heiserman,

gtop~

as a treatise on morals.

In opposition to those

who interpret More's work as a serious political manifesto,
Heiserman counters with this opinion:

"While Utopia is not an
ideal state, it provides a model for private conduct. H3
The explanation for this contrary emphasis that was

given above for the Republic also applies to the Utopia.

More's

work contains both political philosophy and guidance for private
conduct.

Other classic political works of the time, such as

Machiavelli's The Prince and Castiglione's The Courtier, stress
the conduct of the individual.

The Utopia differs from these

in that it concerns the state as a whole and not only the
2S.upra, p. . 20 •

3Heiserman, p. 171.
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individual.

It is true, as Heiserman says, that Utopia "provides u
private conduct, •• 4 but More subsumes the model of the

man in the model of the ideal state.
The ReRublic and the UtoQia have meanings greater than
moral or political paraphrase that can be made of them.
Their artistic characteristics, therefore, should be kept in mind
in the attempt to extricate a model of the ideal man from the
whole of each work.

In abstracting and comparing the models

of the ideal man, their differences in style and manner must be
into account.
The close identity that Socrates makes between man and
state not only determines the subject matter but also
shapes the form of the work.

The entire dialogue can be

divided into a series of comparisons between the larger elements
of the body politic and the smaller elements of the individual
Socrates gives the rationale for making this kind of
comparison at the termination of his discussion of justice in
state:
But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed
that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice
and viewed it there, we should more easily discover its
nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this
larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best
city in our power, well knowing that in the good city
it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we
saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if
it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something
different manifests itself in the individual, we will

,

~-.----------------~------------~
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return again to the state and test it there and it may
be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing
them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks
we may cause the spark of Justice to flash forth, and
when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds. 5
Throughout the remainder of the work Socrates continues to
test what he observes in man's nature against what he sees
in the body politic.
In the Utopia Hythlodaeus does not alternate his
attention between the state and the individual.

Nonetheless,

Thomas More's philosophy of man permeates the entire work,
although it is somewhat more difficult to abstract the profile
of the ideal man from the Utopia than from the Republic.

The

reader of the Utopia must do for himself much of the work Socrates
does for the

re~der

of the Republic.

Socrates draws conclusions

about man's nature from his description of the ideal state;
Hythlodaeus describes the actions of men in the ideal state,
which allegedly he has seen in his visit to the land of Utopia.
This difference between the analysis of Socrates
and the narration of Hythlodaeus again points up how More's
style differs from that of Plato.

The consideration of the

nature of man in the Republic is raised as a philosophical
question, and the discussion is theoretical and abstract.

In

the Utopia man's nature is represented concretely in the actions
of the Utopians and the various peoples with whom they are
5Rep. IV 434 D-E (Shorey, I, 375).

p

~

96
contrasted.

In order to compare concepts of man in the two works,

therefore, one must compare Socrates' definitions and
logical demonstrations with the inferences that can be drawn
from Hythlodaeus' description of the collective actions of the
utopians.
In the Republic assumptions about human nature pervade
the whole dialogue.

The discussion of justice as it is

produced in man, however, becomes specific in the last part
of Book IV.

From an analysis of man's behavior Socrates

concludes that the soul is divided into parts and that the
moral virtues emanate from these parts.

In his discussion of

the parts of the soul, however, Socrates does not discuss
all the aspects of man's nature.

For example, he does not

consider here the end or highest good of man.

This he discusses

in the next major part of the dialogue, where he considers
the problem of the imperative of justice (V 471 D-VII 541 B),
for the question of the end of man's nature more specifically
relates to the two questions of what motivates men to be just
and how the philosophic nature apprehends justice.

These

aspects of Plato's philosophy will be discussed in the
following chapter.
The discussion of man's nature in Book IV primarily
concerns the way the other moral virtues relate to justice

~

in the soul.

After the description of the ideal state,

Socrates proceeds to descry justice in the individual as he

pPI-'
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promised at the outset of the pursuit (II 368 A-B).

Socrates'

definition of justice in the individual shows a complete
correspondence between the organism of the state and the
human being.

Justice in man as in the state requires

hierarchy, order, and unity among his constituent parts.

As

justice results from the maintenance of a hierarchy among the
parts of the soul, the disruption of the hierarchy produces
disorder and disunity and results in injustice.
In his analysis of man's
the close union of body and soul.

natu~e,

Socrates presupposes

In the earlier books (II,

III) he had developed the whole educational system with the
assumption of a body-soul duality.
and

milit~ry

He had recommended gymnastic

training in order to develop the body, and music

and literature for the development of the soul.

Similarly,

at this point Socrates explains that justice and injustice
f'are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in
the body; there is no difference. fl

6

Socrates' rationale for the division of the soul rests
on the premise that man's functions parallel the functions of
the state.

The parts of the body politic are simply the sum

total of the parts of the souls of individual men.

The

state, therefore, should have a life corresponding to the
lives of all the men in it taken collectively.

6Rep • IV 444 C (Shorey, I, 417-19).
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state has three discernible parts, the soul should likewise
have three:

"We shall thus expect the individual also to have

these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical
affections of these with those in the city to receive properly
the same appellations."7
Deriving his conclusion about the soul Srom an analysis
of man's behavior, Socrates observes that the human being
functions in three distinct ways.

From this observation he

concludes that a man's actions must emanate from three
different parts of the soul:

the reason, the appetite, and

the spirited element, called the Thumos.
One can most readily observe the functions of the
~ppetitive

things.
~ore,

part, since all men can be seen to desire certain

A thirsty man, for example, desires drink.

the appetites can be divided into two kinds.

FurtherHe calls

necessary appetites those desires that we cannot divert or
suppress and whose satisfaction is beneficial to us.
~nd

sleeping are such appetites.

Eating

He identifies as unnecessary

--

those that exceed what is necessary for health.

~ppetites

These harmful appetites can be eliminated by correction and
training. 8
Socrates further observes that frequently anotper part,
7Rep. IV 435 C (Shorey, I, 377).
8

'

The discussion of the division of the appetites does
pot occur in the Republic until Book IX (Shorey, II, 291-92).
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which controls or checks the appetite, draws the soul away
from the thing desired.

From such observations he suggests

that it might appear that the soul has only two parts:

"Not

unreasonably • • • shall we claim that they are two and
different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby
it reckons and reasons the rational and that with which it
loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation
of other desires, the irrational and appetitive--companion of
various repletions and pleasures. fl9 Socrates explains, however,
that in addition to appetite and reason a third element,
called the Thumos, or high spirit, can be discerned.
High spirit manifests itself in feelings of anger.

At

first glance it seems to be like the appetites, but on closer
observation it frequently appears to oppose the appetites.

For

example, the spirited element makes a man angry within himself
when he commits evil.

This part in a properly functioning soul

marshals itself on the side of reason in repelling the
unnecessary appetites.

In characteristic fashion Socrates

explains how high spirit functions in the soul by comparing it
to the analogous part in the body politic:

"It is then distinct

from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there
are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the
appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing
9Rep. IV 439 D (Shorey, I, 397-99).
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kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers,
the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind,
this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason
by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?f,lO
Socrates' definition of justice in man, then, follows
logically from his correspondence between the soul and the state.
Justice in a man results from the maintenance of the natural
hierarchy among the parts of his soul.

Order requires that

reason, with the help of spirit, controls the appetites.

He

explains, "We must remember, then, that each of us also in
whom the several parts within him perform each their own
task--he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair. flll
Because order in the soul also means unity, the just
man, like the just city, is one instead of many.

For justice

to be produced in man, then, three correlated requisites must
be operative--hierarchy, order, and unity.

Socrates includes

all three requisites in the following summary statement:
It means that a man must not suffer the principles in
his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere
and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose
well of what in the true sense of the word is properly
his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and
beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized
these three principles, the notes or intervals of three
terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the
mean, and all others there may be between them, and having
linked and bound all three together and made of himself
10
ReR.IV 440 E-441 A (Shorey, It 40)-05).
11ReQ • IV 441 E (Shorey, I, 407).
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a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in
unison, he should then and then only turn to practice
if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth
or the tendance of the bodYl~r it may be in political
action or private business.
Man's nature, as assumed in the UtoQia, is basically
compatible with the analysis Socrates makes in the Regublic,
but there are also differences which reflect More's deviation
from Plato's philosophy.

The Utopians, like Socrates, assume

a close union between soul and body.
"they inquire into the good:
and of external gifts.,,13

In their philosophy

of the soul and of\ the body

Hythlodaeus makes the same analogy

as Socrates in likening injustice in the state to disease in
the body.

He says that "special legislation" might sustain

life in the body politic, but unless private property is
eliminated there can be no hope of a cure:
legislation, I maintain, as sick bodies

"By this type of

whic~:are

past cure

can be kept up by repeated medical treatments, so these evils,
too, can be alleviated and made less acute.,,14
Neither Hythlodaeus nor the Utopians apparently concern
themselves with establishing whether the soul of man is divided
into three parts.

Hythlodaeus' description of the philosophy

and the actions of the Utopians, however, suggests that their
souls manifest the functions of the three parts Socrates
12Reg • IV 443 D-E (Shorey, I, 413-15).
13Utopia, p. 161/19-21.
14UtoQia, p. 105/35-37.
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describes.

They recognize the necessity for reason to control

the appetites:

"That individual, they say, is following the

guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding
another, obeys the dictates of reason. u15
Although the Utopians recognize the necessity for the
control of the appetites by reason, they take more delight in
the proper satisfaction of their legitimate desires than
Socrates would allow.

They recognize two kinds of appetites.

The appetites that Socrates calls necessary, they designate as
those which contribute to genuine pleasure.

Believing that

reason leads man to sntisfy the necessary appetites, they divide
the necessary appetites into two classes:

"The first is that

which fills the sense with clearly perceptible sweetness u ;16
the second "they claim to be that which consists in a calm and
harmonious state of the body."1?

They use health as a criterion

for determining a necessary appetite:

"The delight of eating and

drinking, and anything that gives the same sort of enjoyment,
they think desirable, but only for the sake of health.,,18
The Utopians also recognize the danger of satisfying
what Socrates would call the unnecessary appetites.

These

appetites, when not checked by reason, follow spurious pleasures.
15UtoQia, p. 163/23~25.
16UtoQia, p. 173/17-18.
17UtoQia, p. 173/30-31.
18UtoQia, p. 177/1-3.
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A clouded reason judges even unnatural things to be pleasurable:
urn fact, very many are the things which, though of their own
nature they contain no sweetness, nay, a good part of them very
much bitterness, still are, through the perverse attraction of
evil desires, not only regarded as the highest pleasures but
also counted among the chief reasons that make life worth
living. H19 Among the unnecessary appetites are the desires for
honors, wealth, and fine clothes and the preoccupation with
idle pastimes like dicing and hunting.
The Utopians reveal in their actions another function
of the soul apart from reason and appetite.

This function

corresponds to that which Socrates calls the spirited element.
Hythlodaeus comments that in war "their spirit is so stubborn
that they wo~ld rather be cut to pieces than give way.n 20
The Utopians exemplify Socrates' prescription that the spirit
should work on behalf of the reason in a properly ordered soul.
Rather than being bold or impetuous in their fighting, they
are determined and fired with conviction:

"They are not fierce

in the first onslaught, but their strength increases by degrees
21
through their slow and hard resistance."
The Utopians, then, do not speculate about how the soul
19
UtoQia, p. 167/22-26.
20UtoQia"

p. 211/17-18.

21UtoQia, p. 211/15-16.
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operates, but they act as though it functions as Socrates says
it should.

Recognizing that the properly functioning soul

produces virtue, they define virtue in the same way as Socrates.
For Socrates virtue, like justice, results when the soul maintains
the hierarchy within itself by following nature:
And is it not likewise the production of justice in
the soul to establish its principles in the natural
relation of controlling and being controlled by one
another, while injustice is to cause the one to
rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?
• • • Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of
health and beauty and good condition of the soul, 22
and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness.
The Utopians, likewise, think that virtue results from
following nature and from allowing reason to control the
appetite:
The Utopians define virtue as living according to nature
since to this end we were created by God. That individual,
they say, is follm'l1ng the guidance of nature who, in
desiring o~~ thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates
of reason. J
.
.
An extremely important point of similarity in these
two definitions of virtue is the idea of "following nature."
Like Plato, More bases his understanding of justice on this
notion.

Throughout both the Republic and the

UtoQi~

justice

is equated with the natural and injustice with the unnatural.
In the ReQublic Thrasymachus and Glaucon's understanding
of "natural" differs markedly from Socrates' meaning.

22Rep~ IV 444 D-E (Shorey, I, 419).
23Utopia, p. 163/21-25.
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Thrasymachus implies that a king acts according to nature
when he follows impulse and rules over his subjects in order
to gratify his own selfish desires.
the popular meaning of nature:

Glaucon likewise quotes

"By nature, they say, to commit

injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil."
of a hierarchy of the parts of the soul has no
this concept of "natural."

24

The notion

~elevance

to

This meaning precludes the idea

that to follow reason is to follow nature.

Following nature

in the materialistic philosophy-means following impulse or
desire.

Hence what Thrasymachus and Glaucon call "natural"

Socrates calls "unnatural.·'

For Socrates, to follow desire

unguided by reason would be to completely disrupt the natural
hierarchy of the soul.
In the Yi2Qia
Y12Qia the kings, the councilors, and the lawyers
at Cardinal Morton's assume Thrasymachus and Glauconts meaning
of natural, but the Utopians live in accordance with Socrates t
meaning.

The Utopians believe that nature calls all men to

help one another to a happier life but that it is unnatural to
--

advance one's own interest at the expense of another:

Consequent-

ly nature surely bids you take constant care not so to further
your own advantages as to cause disadvantages to your fellows • .,25
The natural actions and philosophy of the Utopians in Book II
24

Rep. II 358 E (Shorey, I, 115).

25Q1QQi~~ p. 165/20-22.
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implicitly castigate the unnatural behavior of the kings and
councilors in Book I.

The kings and councilors act unnaturally

by putting their interests before the interest of the common
good.
The discussion of the moral virtues, other than justice,
in the two works reveals the same differences that were indicated
in the comparison of how Socrates and the Utopians regard the
divisions of the soul.

Socrates thinks it important to define

and explain the nature of each-of the four moral virtues,

l,t'

because in his philosophy correct action follows from correct
knowledge.

Hythlodaeus simply describes the actions of the

utopians which demonstrate the virtues.

The Utopians exercise

the four moral virtues, however, in the way Socrates defines
them.
Socrates begins the discussion of the moral virtues
with wisdom.

In this section (IV 428 B-429 B), however,

Socrates does not examine the entire meaning of wisdom.

He

does not consider, for example, ashe does in Part III
--

(V 472 A-VII 541 B), this virtue as it pertains to the philosophic
nature.

In its full meaning, as possessed by the true

philosopher, wisdom means the love of truth.

In Book IV Socrates

has not yet shown how the virtue of the true philosopher differs
from that of other men.
In Book IV Socrates only explains how wisdom relates to
justice.

In the just state wisdom is possessed by the rulers;

p
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in the just man wisdom pertains properly to reason, the ruling
part of the soul.

In the just state this virtue of the rulers

enables them to exercise forethought on behalf of the whole
polity; in the just man it enables the reason to exercise
forethought on behalf of the whole soul.

This exercise of

forethought, or judgment, Socrates identifies as the ability
to counsel well.

He makes it clear, however, that counseling

is only a single aspect of wisdom:

"And surely this very thing,
26
good counsel, is a form of wisdom."
The other aspect (or
form, as Socrates calls it) of wisdom, namely, the philosophic
love of truth, will be discussed in the following chapter in
the analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 D).
In the Utopia wisdom is associated also with the
ability to counsel well.
~ersona

In Book I Peter Giles and the

More urge Hythlodaeus to be a kingts councilor for the

reason that in his travels he has acquired experience to add
to his theoretical wisdom.

Because ·JRaphael
"Raphael had touched with

much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and that,f,27 they
urge him to assist some king- or other with his counsel.
Hythlodaeus t chief reasons for rejecting the advice of his
friends indicate that he does not believe that kings and
councilors can be taught wisdom.

Implying that the kings of

26Rep • IV 428 B (Shorey, I, 349).
27Utopia, p. 55/9-10.
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Europe do not exercise wisdom on behalf of their own kingdoms,
he says that kings "care much more how, by hook or by crook,
they may win fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well
,,28
Then he adds sarcastically that "among
what they h ave go t •
royal councilors everyone is actually so wise as to have no
need of profiting by another's counsel, or everyone seems so
wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to profit by it. n29
The councilors' lack of wisdom contrasts sharply with
its possession by the

Utopians~

The difference stems from

prejudice and pride.

Displaying their characteristic

narrow-mindedness in their unwillingness to take advice, they
rationalize their failure to adopt new and better ways of dOing
things with an appeal to tradition:

"Our forefathers were

happy with that sort of thing, and would to heaven we had
30
their wisdom."
They fail, however, to follow in those
things in which their forefathers were really wise:

"And yet,

no matter what excellent ideas our forefathers may have had,
we very serenely bid them a curt farewell. n31
This characteristic· of a narrow mind is closely
associated with pride.
28

The kings and their favorites show

UtoQia, p. 57/29-30.

29UtoQia, p. 57/31-34.
30UtoQia, p. 59/6-9.
31UtoQia, p. 57/35-36.

,
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their lack of humility by their insatiable desire for praise
and flattery.

Hythlodaeus explains that the councilors

constantly play the role of sycophants to these "royal
favorites whose friendliness they strive to win by flattery.H3
In order to win approval the
fault with others.

flat~erers

continually find

They "behave as if their whole reputation

for wisdom were jeopardized • • • unless they could lay hold
of something to find fault in the discoveries of others ... 33
Specifically attributing the councilors' chief faults to pride
and prejudice, Hythlodaeus concludes his description of their
attitude with the remark:

"Such proud, ridiculous, and

obstinate prejudices I have encountered often in other places
and once in England too. H34
In contrast to the Europeans, the Utopians are truly
wise, mainly because they are open-minded and not too proud to
learn from others.

They, unlike the Europeans, retain the

good aspects of their tradition, but they readily accept new
ideas.

They take precaution to insure the continuity of the

constitution, but they never reject what can be learned
from others.

For example, "whoever, coming to their land on

32UtoQia, p • 57/35-36.
. 33QtoQ~a, p. 59/4-6.
34UtoQia, p. 59/16-17.
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a sight-seeing tour, is recommended by any special intellectual
endowment or is acquainted with many countries through long
travel, is sure of a hearty welcome."35

In contrast to Europe,

where the proud councilors fawn on the royal favorites in order
to gain preferment, in Utopia the citizens make no attempt
to gain positions of influence.

Hythlodaeus observes that'the

officials and the people "live together in affection and good
6
will" and that "no official is haughty or formidable.,,3
Hythlodaeus makes it plain that the wisdom of the Utopians
does not come from a superior natural intellectual endowment
but that it prfmarily results from their open-minded attitude
and their moral excellence.
Utopians with the comment:

He compares the Europeans to the
flThough we are inferior to them

neither in brains nor in resources, their commonwealth is more
wisely governed and more happily flourishing than ours • .,37
In the Utopia, then, the European kings and councilors
are prejudiced and proud and, therefore, lack wisdom.
result there is no justice in any state in Europe.

As a

The

Utopians are properly open-minded and humble and, therefore,
possess wisdom.
ruled.

As a result their commonwealth is justly

In the Utopia, as in the Republic, wisdom properly

pertains to reason, the

~uling

function in the nature of man.

35Utopia, p. 18513-5.
36UtOQia, pp. 193/39-19512.
37Utopia, p. 109/18-20.
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Socrates next explains that as the rulers must exercise
wisdom in the just state, the warriors must possess courage
(IV 429 A-430 C).

In the just man courage properly pertains

to the spirited part as distinct from the rational and from
the appetitive parts of the soul.

Courage, however, is not an

appetite but functions in the spirited part on behalf of reason.
socrates clarifies the connection between reason and spirit
by comparing the soul to a beseiged city: "Would not these
two [the reason and the spirit], then, best keep guard against
enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and
body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle,
attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the
8
ruler's deSignS?.,3
Stressing the necessity for it to be
.

"~'

associated with reason, Socrates defines courage as an
"unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about
things to be and not to be feared • .,39
The idea of correct convictioti in Socrates' definition
assumes importance, because courage Is' sometimes used as though
--

it had no relationship to reason--as though it were synonymous
with fearlessness.

Shakespeare, for example, portrays Lady

Macbeth as a person with such a notion of courage.

Taunting

her husband into murdering Duncan, she urges him to the deed
8
3 Bep • IV 442 B (Shorey, I, 409).
39Beg • IV 430 B (Shorey, I, 357).

,J£
p
112
by exhorting him to screw his courage to the sticking place.
She fails to see that in murdering the king, Macbeth's spirit
would not be working in behalf of reason.

Macbeth, however,

realizes that such an unnatural action, which goes against
reason, would not be courageous.
epitomizes his tragedy:

His answer to Lady Macbeth

ttl dare do all that may become a man.1
man./

Who dares do more is none:,,40

Despite the fact that Macbeth

commits the murder, he knows that his action is contrary to
man's nature and is therefore a mockery of courage.
In the Republic neither Thrasymachus nor Glaucon
-

specifically defines courage, but their understanding of "natural"
precludes the ruler's use of reason in guiding his actions.

In

the state of nature outlined by Glaucon, the strong man need
not use reason, but he must be fearless in gaining power over
his peers.

The way that Glaucon would have defined courage

can be surmised, perhaps, by looking at courage in the
enlarged picture of the theory of social contract drawn by
Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes says that courage is a passion:

"Amongst the Passions, Courage (by which I mean the Contempt
of Wounds, and violent Death) inclineth men to private Revenges,
and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace. rt41
40
I, vii, 46-47, Shakespeare, The Complet~ Works, ed.
G. B. Harrison (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1952) •

41Hobbes, p. 619.
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In Socrates' view of the nature of man courage is not numbered
"Amongst the Passions."

Courage would not incline men either

to t'private Revenges" or to the "unsetling of the Publique
Peace."

On the contrary, the courage of the guardians preserves

the public peace.

Hobbes includes no idea of correct conviction

in his definition, as does Socrates.

When one considers

Socrates' definition next to that of Hobbes, the significance
of Plato's influence on Thomas More becomes more apparent.
In the UtoRia the virtue of courage is emphasized less
than in the Republic.

When the need arises, however, the Utopians

display courage as defined by Socrates and not as defined by
Hobbes.

In the

ReRubl~c

courage becomes important because

war must be accepted as a condition of existence.

Socrates

suggests, for example, that a state of enmity naturally exists
between Greeks and non-Greeks:

"I affirm that the Hellenic

race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to
42
the barbarian."
The Utopians consider war "as an activity
fit only for beasts,,,4 3 and they have no enmity toward nonUtopians.

They "think that nobody who has done you no harm
44
should be accounted an enemy."
Because the Utopians do not accept war as customary,
42Rep • V 470 C (Shorey, I, 497).
43Utopia, p. 199/39.
44Utopia, p. 199/31-32.
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courage becomes significant only at intervals.

Nonetheless

all the citizens train for military duty and all are expected
to be courageous.

The Utopians, however, have no respect for

military gains made through brute force.

They primarily

respect victory that comes through the use of reason:

"They

boast themselves as having acted with valor and heroism whenever their victory is such as no animal except man could have
won, that is, by strength of intellect; for, by strength of
body, say they, bears, lions, boars, wolves, dogs, and other
wild beasts are wont to fight.,,45

Furthermore, the Utopians do

not consider fearlessness without reason as an ingredient of
courage.

As Hyth10daeus explains, "When personal service is

inevitable, they are as courageous in fighting as they were
ingenious in avoiding it as long as they might.,,46

The

Utopians' courage is fostered by their just institutions, which
eliminate the cause of fears that beset most men when in danger:
"The absence of anxiety about livelihood at home, as well as the
removal of that worry which troubles men about the future of
their families (for such solicitude everywhere breaks the
highest courage), makes their spirit exalted and disdainful of
defeat."47
45ptopia, p. 203/21-25.
46utOQia, p. 211/13-15.
47Utopia, p. 211/18-21.
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..r."

All the Utopians, then, put in practice the courage
that Socrates defines as necessary for the

g~ardians.

Their

courage is based on reason and involves the correct conviction
about the things to be feared and the things not to be feared:
"So they do not hold their life so cheap as recklessly to throw
it away and not so immoderately dear as greedily and shamefully
to hold fast to it when honor bids them give it up.,,48
In the Republic the next virtue considered after
courage is temperance.

Socrates explains that it, like justice,

does not pertain to any specific part of the state or the soul.
Rather, temperance creates harmony in the state or in the soul
between the part that rules and the part that obeys.

In the

state the ruler should have a sufficient amount of wisdom to
rule well, and the subject should be obedient; in the soul of
the individual, the reason should be properly developed so that
it can rule with authority over the appetite.

Maintaining

a balance between reason and appetite, a temperate man follows
nature in avoiding excess.

Socrates characterizes such a

man as one who is "master of himself."
Temperance is a most conspicuous virtue in Utopia and
in the Utopians.

In the Utopian commonwealth the exercise of

authority is hardly noticed.

The chief functions of the ruling

syphogrants are to elect the governor and "to manage and
48Utopia, p. 211/25-28.
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provide that no one sit idle. ft49

Hythlodaeus observes that even

the scholars pursue their studies in the spirit of obedience.
He comments that new subject matter was readily learned by
intelligent and mature scholars "who undertook to learn their
tasks not only fired by their own free will but acting under
orders of the senate. n50 In the Utopian commonwealth, then,
temperance is evident in the harmony that exists between the
officials and the city.

Hythlodaeus explains how the citizens

display filial endearment toward their superiors: "They are
1
The Utopians,
called fathers and show that character."5
as a people, display their temperance in various ways.

For

example, Hythlodaeus emphasizes that "they do not lightly go
to war,,,5 2 but do so only when unduly provoked.
The temperance manifested in the commonwealth as a
whole results from the proper relationship between reason
and appetite in the individual Utopians.

Advocating a

rational control of the senses in their philosophy, they
hold that "the senses as well as right reason aim at
-53
whatever is pleasant by nature. 1I
In following nature they
•

49Uto~ia, p. 127/2J-24.
50Uto~ia, p. 181/19-21.
51Uto~ia, p. 195/1-2.
52UtoQia, p. 201/4-5.
53ytOQi8, p. 167/10-12.
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follow the golden mean.

Realizing that the pursuit. of

excessive pleasure is spurious, they "take care not to let
a lesser pleasure interfere with a greater nor to follow
after a pleasure which could bring pain in retaliation. u54
The harmony in the commonwealth, then, comes from the harmony
within the souls of the individual citizens.
In the Utopia the virtues of justice, wisdom, courage,
and temperance have much the same meaning as they have in the
Republic.

The important difference is that in More's view

all the virtues should be manifested in all the citizens in the
state, whereas in Plato's view each citizen should manifest
primarily those virtues that are required for his function.
Other characteristics of the just man are not specifically
mentioned in the discussion of the moral virtues in Book IV
of the Regublic.

These characteristics will be considered in

the following chapter in connection with Socrates' description
of the philosophic nature.
The second major part of the Fegublic (The Origin and
Nature of Justice) seems to "end at the" close of Book IV.

In

his concluding words Socrates indicates that he intends to
consider the vices that corrupt the just soul and the just
state:

"Now that we have come to this height of argument I

seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form
54Utogia, p. 163/8-10.
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of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet
that there are some four among them that it is worth while to
take note of.".5.5

The discussion of the vices, however, does not

occur until the beginning of Book VIII.

The reader could well

omit the reading of Books V, VI, and VII without any loss in
continuity.

These three books, therefore, seem to constitute

a long digression.
At this point in the Republic the greatest difficulty
arises in attempting to analyze the overall structure.

At

the opening of Book V Socrates begins the discussion he had
promised at the end of Book IV.

However, Adeimantus stops

him abruptly and exhorts him to go back and take up the matter
of the community of wives, which he had passed over in the
discussion of the origin and nature of justice:

"We think

you are a slacker • • • and are trying to cheat us out of
a whole division [italics mine], and that not the least, of the
argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to
"get away with it" by observing thus lightly that, of course,
in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody
that the possessions of friends will be in common ... .5 6

Socrates

defers to the wishes of Adeimantus and pays back the "whole
division" he had excerpted from the earlier discussion.
question arises here whether the ·whole division," which
.5.5Rep. IV 445 C-D (Shorey, I, 421-23).
I,_ 427).
56Rep • IV 449 C (Shorey, I,.
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socrates pays back in Book V, concludes Part II (The Origin
and Nature of Justice) or begins Part III (The Imperative for
Justice).
There are good arguments for considering the beginning
of Book V as the beginning of the next major part (Part III)
of the structure.

First, the digression from the beginning of

Book V through Book VII seems to be complete and unified in
itself; Book VIII seems to follow logically upon Book IV.
Second, it is difficult to determine where the next major part
begins if not at the beginning of Book V.

It seems more

comfortable to assume that the beginning of a complete new part
would occur at the opening of a book.

This second argument

gains support from the fact that Book V, taken by itself, is
unified and coherent.
Within Book V is an extended sea metaphor, which can
be divided into three parts, corresponding to three "waves of
paradox."

Socrates likens himself to a sea-tossed man attempting

to swim his way over these three mighty waves.

He says,

"We, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea of
argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us
on its back or some other desperate rescue. n57

The first wave

of paradox starts near the beginning of Book V, in which, after
a brief introduction, the direction which the discussion will

57Rep • V 453 D (Shorey, I, 441).
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continue is decided.
457 C.

It extends from this point, 451 C, to

In this section Socrates compares the natures of men

and women and advances the idea that women as well as men should
be guardians in the ideal state.
The second wave of paradox begins with the following
transitional passage:
"In this matter, then, of the regulation of women,
we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our
paradox and have not been qui te swept a\'Jay by it in
ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must
have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the
argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what
it proposes is both possible and beneficial." "It is
no slight wave that you are thus escaping." "You will
not think it a great one," I said, "when you have seen
the one that follows. ff 5 tl . .
.
The second wave of paradox contains the proposition that wives
and children of the guardians shall be shared by all.
wave extends from 457 C to 467 A.

This

"The 'great third wave'

of paradox, the worst of all,,,59 begins after a short digression
on war and extends from 472 A to the end of Book V, 480 A.
It contains the proposition that in the ideal state philosophers
must be kings.
Despite these reasons for considering Book V as the
beginning of a new part of the whole structure of the
Republic, there are equally good reasons for believing that
Part III begins within Book V with the introduction of the
8
5 Rep • V 457 C (Shorey, I, 453).
59Rep • V 472 A (Shorey, I, 503).
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discussion of the third wave of paradox.

60

First, the matters

discussed in the first two waves of paradox logically fit into
the description of the ideal state, which has been continuous
throughout Book IV.

Before the first wave of paradox begins

in Book V, Socrates indicates that he is about to resume the
previous discussion:

"We must return • • • and say now what
61
perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there."
This statement refers to a point in Book IV where Socrates
passed over the subjects he now intends to consider:

• • •

other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession
of wives and marriage t and the procreation of children and all
that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the
62
proverbial goods of friends that are common."
Since it occurs
in Book IV, this statement foreshadows the matter discussed in
the first two waves of paradox in Book V--marital relations and
the rearing of children.

However, it makes no mention of the

matter discussed in the third wave, the proposition that
60The question as to whether Plato wrote the digression
in Book V through Book VII at a different time from the
remainder of the Republic need not be considered here. This
analYSis
analysis concerns only the logical divisions in the work and
not the historical facts of composition.
compOSition. For a discussion of
the arguments relating to interpolation of Books V-VII, see
Lewis Campbell, "On the Structure of Plato's Republic and
Its Relation to Other Dialogues," in Plato's RepubliC,
Republic, eds.
B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell (Oxford:
(OXford: Clarendon Press, 1894)
II, 1-11.
.
61
Rep. V 451 C (Shorey, I, 433).
62Rep • IV 424 A (Shorey, I, 331).
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philosophers must be kings.

Another reason for considering the

third wave of paradox as the beginning of the next part of the
whole structure is that the matter taken up here opens a
completely new dimension of the discussion.

Up to this point in

the dialogue, Socrates has described the just state as it should
exist if it were possible.

This description includes all the

details beginning with the origins of the state in Book II,

368 A, and continuing to the section that contains the third
wave of paradox in Book V, 472 C.
Between the second and third waves of paradox there
is a short digression on war (466 D-472 C).

This section

is only tenuously connected with the second wave of paradox.
The digression begins with Socrates' suggestion that he intends
to consider the question as to whether such an ideal state
could exist and in what way it could come into existence.

He

suggests that wars and the way in which they will be conducted
are too obvious for discussion. 63

However, since Glaucon wishes

to pursue the discussion, Socrates proceeds with what essentially
amounts to a digression, which serves as a transition between
the second and third waves.
At the beginning of the third wave, the discussion
changes from a consideration of the nature of the just state
end the just man to a consideration of how the just state could

63Rep • V 466 D (Shorey, I, 485).

~
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be realized.

.Glaucon admits that the state Socrates has

described would indeed be ideal if it were possible, but he
challenges Socrates to explain how it could come into being:
"The more such excuSes you offer • • • the less you will be
released by us from telling in what way the realization of this
polity is possible.

Speak on, then, and do not put us off.,,64

Socrates' answer to this challenge indicates that the
discussion to follow concerns a new aspect of the consideration
of justice and injustice:

"The first thing to recall, then,

• • • is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice
and injustice that brought us to this pass.- 65 This statement
signals a change from the discussion of the nature of justice
and injustice to a consideration of the imperative for
justice.
Although most critics who have written about the
structure of the

R~Qublic

divide the work at the beginning of

Book V, the conclusion reached in the analysis here is that the
logical division between Part II and Part III occurs within
Book V at the beginning of the third wave of paradox (471 C).
This conclusion is supported by a larger aspect of the overall
structure.

If the work is divided within Book V at the third

wave of paradox (and not at the opening of Book V), then
64 ReQ. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 50J).
65ReQ. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 50J).
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Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) and Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) can
be taken together as one logical unit, and Part III (V 471 DVII 541 B), Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B), and Part V (X 595 A-

621 D) can be taken together as another logical unit.

This

alignment of the whole work can perhaps be better understood
from the following diagram:
In this first half of the
work Plato states the
problems to be considered
in the entire dialogue
and defines justice and
injustice.

The first logical unit
Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) Prologue
Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) The
Origin and Nature of Justice
The second logical unit
Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) The
Imperative for Justice
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) The
Nature of Injustice

\, In this second half of
the work Plato investigate~
the causes and appraises
the results of justice
and injustice.

Part V (X 595 A-621 D) Epilogue
The analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), therefore,
can be considered as the beginning of the second half of the
entire dialogue.

In this part Socrates answers the question of

how justice is possible in both the state and man.

Part II,

which is referred to in this-' thesis as the imperative for justice,
will be discussed in the following two chapters.

Before

proceeding to that part, however, the first two sections of
Book V, which constitute the concluding portion of Part II
(II 368 A-V 471 C), must be considered.
If the first two waves of paradox are interpreted as
the conclusion to Part II instead of as the beginning of Part

P":,..·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
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III, the question may be asked why Plato chooses to pass over
marital and family relationships which Socrates mentions in
Book IV.

The conjecture given here is that Plato had

determined that it would be better to defer the consideration
of the relationship between man and the family until after he
had described the nature of man as an individual.

Socrates

suggests this reason when he resumes the discussion in Book V.
He admits that perhaps it would have been better to discuss the
matter earlier but concludes that "maybe this way is right,
that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn
go through \'Ji th the female, especially since you are so urgent • .,66
The female drama begins with the first wave of paradox
in Book V, 451 C.

This section contains one of the major

premises upon which Plato's communistic system rests.

Socrates

maintains that no essential difference exists between the nature
of man and the nature of woman.

Women, therefore, should

perform the same functions in the state as men.
importantly they, like men, should be guardians.

Most
Arguing

from the premise that function determines the nature of a
thing, he explains that the obvious physical difference is
not essential.

An essential difference would be, for example,

the difference that 'exists between the nature of a physician
and the nature of a carpenter.

Socrates explains "that a man

66 Rep • V 451 C (Shorey, I~ 433).

.. ------------------------------------------------------------------~
126

and a woman who have a physician's mind have the same nature •
• But ths.t a man physician and a man carpenter have
different natures. tt67
• •

After he has laid down the premise in the first wave
of paradox that men and women are by nature the same, Socrates
proceeds in the second wave, 457 C, to consider family
relationships.

Plato apparently sees some little good but

much more evil in the traditional institution of the family.
Socrates visualizes the ideal state as one big happy family,
but he thinks his ideal impossible to achieve without abolishing
individual families.

He reasons that if individual families

are retained, the members of one family grow
members of another.

.~part

from

He suggests that men possess wives and

children for the same avaricious reasons that they possess any
property:
It is not true, then, as I am trying to. say, that those
former and these present prescriptions tend to make them
still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting
the city by referring "mine fl not to the same but to
different things, one man dragging off to his own house
anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and
another doing the same to his own separate house, and
having women and children apart, thus introducing6~nto
the state the pleasures and pains of individuals?
This remark implies that a man owns whatever he possesses in
his own house, including women and children.
67ReR. V 454 D (Shorey, I, 443-45).
68ReR • V 464 C (Shorey, I, 477).

Socrates assumes
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that the elimination of private property would change the
prevailing attitude toward wives and children and would redirect
the positive attributes of family life into the larger unity
of the state.
~he

In such a state,.no matter whom a citizen meets,

will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father,

a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of
these. n69

With his plan Socrates hopes to retain the best

aspects of the institution of the family and eliminate the
worst.
In the

Utopi~
UtoQi~

More reflects a Christian attitude toward

the relationship between men and women and toward the family.
Characteristically, More agrees with Socrates in regard to the
similarity between men and women, but he rejects the implications
that Socrates draws from his assumptions.

The Utopian women

share many of the same responsibilities as the men.
at the same tasks.

They work

They go to war with their husbands.

consequently enjoy most of the same privileges.

They

For example,

the customs on mating and marital relationships ensure the
rights of both men and

women~

Their equal rights can

particularly be seen in the divorce law:

"It sometimes

happens • • • that when a married couple agree insufficiently
in their disposition and both find others with whom they hope
to live more agreeably, they separate by mutual consent and

69 Rep
ReQ • V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473).
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contract fresh unions, but not without the sanction of the
senate. H70 Women also receive the same education as men. This
privilege can be assumed from the fact that women are not
debarred from the priesthood and the priests are selected from
the elite group of scholars.
The Utopian women, however, hold a place in the family
different from the place of women in the ReQublic.
retain the traditional hierarchy in the family:
• • • rules the household.

The Utopians

"The oldest

Wives wait on their husbands,

children on their parents, and generally the younger on their
1
Without disrupting the traditional family relationelders."7
ships, the Utopians achieve Socrates' ideal that the state
should be one gigantic family.

A sharing between and among

families insures that "the whole island is like a single
family."7 2 In depicting Utopia as a huge family, Thomas More
might have been" influenced by Aristotle's criticism of the
Republic.

Aristotle sees the problem with Plato's family state

as an overemphasis on unity.

Nettleship has commented on

Aristotle's arguments and has added his own explanation:
Aristotle in his criticism of Plato's communism puts
the most obvious and far-reaching objection when he says
that Plato's fundamental fallacy is an exaggerated
conception of the virtue of unity. This criticism, however,

70y~opia, p. 191/1-5.
71Utopia, p. 137/30-33.
72
Utopia, p. 149/3-4.
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would be expressed more truly by saying that Plato has a
one-sided and defective conception of unity; he does not
realize enough that unity in human society can only be
obtained through diversity. The ideal state of society
would be one in which there was the greatest scope for
indivi?ual diversity, and in spite of that the greatest
unity. J
In his description of Utopia More seems to have heeded
Aristotle's comments, except those j.n regard to ownership of
private property.

In the Utopia as in the Republic private

property is identified as a source of disunity in the polity.
The difference lies in what Plato and More apparently think
the mass of men assume to be private property.

In the passage

quoted above (V 464 C, p. 123) Socrates implies that in the
ordinary Greek household women and children are looked upon
as property; therefore, he finds it necessary to establish
that men and women have the same nature.

Undoubtedly More

does not think it necessary to emphasize the point that
women have the same nature as men, for the era of Christianity
intervening between Plato's time and that of More had
established, at least theoretically, the position of women
as human beings instead of as property.

In Utopia, therefore,

private property is abolished, but the traditional family
relationship is retained.
In the Utopia, then, as in the Republic, unity is the
desired objective, but the means of achieving it are different.
73Nettleship, p. 180.

,

130
Plato destroys the traditional hierarchy in the family in order
to achieve unity through a hierarchy of classes among citizens.
In contrast, More retains the traditional hierarchy in the
family in order to achieve unity through equality among all
citizens.

Apparently, More thinks that Plato's scheme

would not achieve the desired objective.

To destroy the

family unit would be to destroy the love and harmony that
characterize the best families.
After his discussion of marriage and the family,
Socrates digresses to consider the conduct of war.

He

explains that the women guardians, like the men, must go to
war.

The children who are to become guardians also must ride

out to war as apprentices to learn their trade.

In Utopia

women go to war if they choose to join their husbands.

In

that case the whole family fights together "so that those
may be closest and lend one another mutual assistance whom
74
nature most impels to help one another."
That women and
children go to war in the Utopia is a striking parallel with
the ReRublic.

The parallel not only shows how More borrowed

details from Plato's work, but it also reveals how he
adapted incidents to suit his own purpose.
The assignment of responsibility for war in the Utopia
also parallels the Republic.
74Utogia, p. 211/4-6.

The citizens in the Republic say
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that "only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely,
who a~e to blame for the quarr~1.n75

The Utopians, likewise,

"know that the common folk do not go to war of their own
accord but are driven to it by the madness of kings. u76
The digression on war in the ReQublic concludes Part
II, which begins after the exordium in Book II (368 A) and
to the start of the third wave of paradox (V 471 C).

extend~

In Part II

Socrates answers the question about the origin and nature of
justice put to him by Glaucon in the exordium.

The philosophical

rudiments of his answer are basically the same as the
philosophical assumptions which underlie the Utopia.

In both

works these same theories about the origin and nature of justice
are either stated or assumed:

the origin of justice is in an

eternal and immutable law that does not originate in the
subjective opinions of men or in their laws or contracts; the
nature of justice is order and unity, and the nature of injustice
is disorder and disunity.
The differences between the Republic and the Utopia
in regard to the origin and nature of justice pertain chiefly
to the means of attaining similar ends.

Because More has his

own ideas about how order and unity might be achieved, he
arranges the parts of the structure of the Utopia in a
different order and with a different emphasis from the order
75Rep • V 471 B (Sho~ey, I, 499).
76utopia, p. 205129-31.
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and the emphasis in the structure of the Republic.

As will be

discussed in later chapters More's rationale for the ordering
of the parts of the structure of the Utopia is determined
primarily by his apprehension of the injustices in the
fundamental institutions in the nations of Europe, particularly
England.
The next chapter continues the analysis of the Republic
at the point (V 471 C) where Socrates extends the sea
metaphor and dives into the third and greatest of the three
waves of paradox.

This paradox, that the ruler of the ideal

state must be a philosopher, changes the dimension of the
discussion.

Now that justice has been defined in Part II

(II 368 A-V 471 C), Socrates begins to explain how justice
can be realized in the state and in the nature of man.
explanation constitutes Part III (V 471 C-VII 543 A).

This

;

-

~.---------------------------------------------------,
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CHAPTER V
IS JUSTICE POSSIBLE?
The Republic and the Utopia are likely to evoke
similar responses in the reader.

The ideal states described

by Plato and More would be desirable if they were possible,
but one wonders how citizens in any state could be induced
to act as justly and as wisely as the guardians in the
Republic and the citizens of Utopia.

Plato and More both

acknowledge that their descriptions of the ideal state arouse
such skepticism by representing it dramatically in the
characters of the dialogues.
In the Republic Glaucon responds to Socrates' description of the ideal state in the way one might expect of any
intelligent listener.

He admits that "if it could be realized

everything would be lovely,"

1

but he wonders how it could come

into actual existence.
Glauconts mild skepticism follows consistently from
the pragmatic explanation of the imperative for justice that
he feigns to believe in the exordium (II 357 A-367 E).
Summarizing the opinion of the multitude on the question,
Glaucon argues that men,of their own free will, are never just.
l Rep • V 471 C (Shorey, I, 501).
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They may appear to be just, but this appearance is prompted
by fear.

Justice comes into being in the state, therefore,

only when a powerful ruler imposes it upon men by force.
Glaucon supports his contention by telling the story
of the ring of Gyges.

A miraculous ring, he explains, was

found by a shepherd in the country of Gyges.

The shepherd

could make himself invisible or again visible simply by
turning the collet of the ring toward or away from himself.
With this unique power the peasant gained supreme power and
established himself as a tyrant.

From the story Glaucon

concludes that no man with such a ring would act justly;
any man would use it to gain power and to fulfill his desires.
After Glaucon finishes his argument, Adeimantus makes
the same point in another way.

He says that Glaucon's argument

gains support even from those who preach the desirability of
acting justly.

Such persons do not believe that justice is

good in itself; they believe that it is a means of acquiring
rewards and reputation.

He argues, further, that the multitudes

are also motivated by the expectation of rewards in the life
hereafter.

The poets, he says, teach that the gods can be

influenced by vows and supplications to reward those who have
acted unjustly during life.

Moreover, the poets describe the

life hereafter as a continuation of the sensual pleasures
enjoyed by the unjust here on earth.
The arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus taken

~ogether
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deny that justice is good in itself.

If it is good at all,

they maintain, it is the lowest of three classes of good.
A "good" in the highest class, as Socrates explains, "we love
both for its own sake and for its consequences, such as
understanding, sight, and health. tt2 A good in the second class
we desire for its own sake without regard for its consequences.
A good in the third and lowest class is sought only for its
consequences.
place justice.

This third and lowest class is where the multitude
They think that "it belongs to the toilsome

class of things that must be practiced for the sake of rewards
and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned
as an affliction. tl3

If justice belongs to the third and

lowest class of goods, man obviously does not seek it of his
own free will.

Rather, if he acts justly at all, he does so

through a motive of self-interest.

It is consistent, then,

for Glaucon to wonder in Book V about the plausibility of a
state where men are not coerced, and they seem to act justly
of their own free will.
In the ytoRia Peter Giles at the end of Book I and
the persona More at the end of Book II make skeptical remarks
similar to those of Glaucon.

Before Hythlodaeus describes the

ideal state, Peter Giles says that it would be hard to convince
2Rep • II 357 C (Shorey, I, 111).

3Rep • II 358 A (Shorey, I, 111).
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him that tta better-ordered people is to be found in that new
world than in the one known to

US.

H4

After Hythlodaeus describes

Utopia, the persona More says that "there are very many
features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for
me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of
seeing realized.~5
The skeptical comments made by Thomas More and Peter
Giles ironically support the pragmatic theory of the imperative
for justice, represented by Hythlodaeus' adversaries in Book I.
The opinions of the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's and of the
European kings and councilors imply the arguments advanced by
Glaucon in the ReQublic.

The lawyer, for example, does not

believe that justice is a good in itself.

He assumes that men

must be coerced by stringent laws, or they will prefer to steal
and to defy authority.

According to the lawyer, justice must

be imposed on the people by force.

The kings and their

councilors also act in the way Glaucon says any man would act
if he could make himself invisible and thereby escape reprisal
for his injustice.
In Part III (V 471 C-VII 541 B) and ina portion of
Book X of the Republiq, Plato answers the question as to how
justice can be established in the state and as to what motivates
men to be just.

In Part III Socrates outlines an alternative to

4Utopia, p. 107/25-26.

5Utopi~, p. 247/1-3.
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the deterministic theory that Glaucon argues for in the
exordium.

In Book X he offers an alternative to the description

of the life hereafter, which Adeimantus in the exordium attributef
to the poets.
The present chapter will consider Socrates' answer to
Glaucon's challenge, which is given in Part III (V 471 C-VII

541 B), but not his answer to Adeimantus' challenge, which is
given in Part V (Book X).

Although Thomas More's answer to

the question does not constitute a structural part of the
Q~opia,

the answer can be inferred from an analysis of Utopian

philosophical and theological opinions as they contrast with
those of the other peoples with whom they are compared.

In

this and in the following chapter More's explanation of the
imperative for justice is compared with that of Plato, but the
significance of More's ideas in the structure of the UtoQia
is not considered·fully.

This significance will be treated

below (Chapter XII), where the Utopians' religions are
discussed.
Socrates' answer to Glaucon's opinion begins with the
third wave of paradox in Book V, which begins Part III (V 471
D-VII 541 B).

Before revealing the paradox, however, Socrates

makes some preliminary remarks about the relation of the ideal
to the real.

These remarks, though brief, have a significant

bearing on the raison d'etre
Utopia.

of both the Republic and the

In a sense the reason for considering either work

1)8

seriously rests on the proposition that the ideal is more
real than the actual.

The rationale for creating an ideal

state rests on the assumption that there exists an ideal
form of justice itself.
By way of justifying the discussion just concluded,
Socrates explains the value of creating an ideal state.
Prompted by Glaucon's expressed doubt that the ideal state can
be realized, Socrates answers that because a just state does
not or cannot exist should not invalidate the existence of the
reality as a concept:

"A pattern, then, • • • was what we

wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice
and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just
man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to
injustice and the completely unjust man."

6 He asks Glaucon

whether a painter would be "any the less a good painter, who,
after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and
omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture,
should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for
such a man to exist.,,7
In More's work Hythlodaeus draws the picture of Utopia"
after being prompted by Peter Giles's skeptical remark.
Hythlodaeus' answer to Peter Giles suggests that More may
have intended to draw the perfect picture suggested by
6Rep. V 472 C (Shorey, I, 505).
7Rep • V 472 D (Shorey, It 505).
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socrates in his answer to Glaucon:

"I do not wonder • • •

that it looks this way to you, being a person who has no picture
8
at all, or else a false one, of the situation I mean."
Perhaps
More's idea for the fiction that the ideal. state exists in a
land beyond the sea was prompted by Socrates' further remark:
"If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been
constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,
or now are in some barbaric region far beyond our ken, or
shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention
that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will
be realized when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the
state."9

This statement of Socrates shows in another way

the difference in the stylistic methods of Plato and More.
Plato suggests that an ideal state may exist in some barbaric
region, and More pretends that an ideal state does exist in
such a region.

Plato's theory of poetry would have precluded
10
the fictional method adopted by More.
The description of an ideal state, then, is good even
if it cannot be realized.

.-

Neither Plato nor More, however,

8utoQia, p. 107/17-19.
9ReQ • VI 499 C (Shorey, II, 65).
10This difference in aesthetic theory was discussed
briefly in Chapter I. For a more complete discussion of the
significance of More's fictional pretense, see the article by
Harry Berger, Jr., "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World
and Green World," Centennial ReView, IX (1965), 44.
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considers only the ideal.

Both works answer the question of

how a present state can be transformed into the ideal state.
In the Republic Socrates begins his answer in the discussion that
constitutes the third wave.

He maintains that the realization

of justice in the state requires that philosophers become
kings or kings turn to philosophy.

This

propos~tion

follows

logically from Socrates' previous description of the nature
of justice.

If creating order among the parts of the state

produces justice, then the attainment of justice begins with
the placement of the best rulers in the ruling part of the
body politic.

The best rulers, as Socrates goes on to

explain, are the philosophers.
This simple proposition, which Socrates calls the worst
wave of paradox, needs much amplification.
to analyze the philosophic nature.

He therefore proceeds

This analysis (V 471 D-

VI 501 E) constitutes the first of two major sections of Part
III (V 471 D-VII 541 B).

In the second major section (VI 502

A-VII 541 B) Socrates explains how the philosophic nature must
be nurtured.
In analyzing the philosophic nature, Socrates says it
must first be determined "whom we mean by the philosophers, who
we dare to say ought to be our ruler~.hll

Defining the meaning

of philosopher in a broad sense, Socrates explains that an
11 Ren • V 474 B (Shorey, I, 511).
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indiscriminate love of wisdom marks the generic character of
the philosopher.

He then compares the philosopher's love of

wisdom with other kinds of indiscriminate love.

The lover of

wine, for example, loves all kinds of wine, and the lover of
honor loves all kinds of distinctions.

This all-inclusive love

must precede any discrimination among the objects sought by
the lover.

The philosopher in the generic sense, therefore,

loves all kinds of intellectual pursuit.
Socrates does not indicate how many of the citizens of
the republic are philosophers in this generic sense.

In Utopia,

however, practically all of the citizens possess this basic
requisite of the philosophic nature.

Explaining how the

Utopians spend much of their leisure time in intellectual
pursuits, Hythlodaeus indicates that fla great number of all
classes • • • both males and females, flock to hear the lectures,
some to one and some to another, according to their natural
inclination. ,,12

From the ranks of the Utopians, the syphogrants

select an elite group of schplars, who nl earn thoroughly the
various branches of knowledge. n13
In the

Republi~

Socrates makes a further distinction

between the lover of all wisdom and the lover of a special
kind of wisdom.

To love every kind of intellectual pursuit

12UtoQia, p. 129/6-8.

13u~o~~~, p. 131/38-39.
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is not enough to become a true philosopher.

The true

philosophers are "those for whom the truth is the spectacle of
which they are enamoured.,,14

Those who search for truth dis-

tinguish themselves from others who follow intellectual pursuits
by the fact that they try to understand the underlying principles,
or "forms," behind appearances.

"Forms" are the elements of

unity in the various objects which we apprehend by the senses.l'~
Socrates' explanation of what he means by forms points up
Plato's continual search for unity in multiplicity:

"And in

respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and
all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in
itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with
actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves
everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects." 16
Justice is one of various kinds of forms.

Because he

can apprehend these forms behind the appearances of things, the
true philosopher is distinguished from the man who possesses
only right opinion.

To explain this difference, Socrates

compares the man who possesses only right opinion, as distinct
from true knowledge, with a dreamer:

"Is not the dream state,

whether the man is asleep or awake, just this:
14ReQ • V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517).
15Nettleshlp, p. 197.
16
ReQ. V 476 A (Shorey, I, 517-19).
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of resemblance for identity?"17
The true philosopher, then, can apprehend the form of
beauty, whereas those who have only right opinion can "delight
in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything
that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable
of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful
in itself.,,18

The true philosopher can also apprehend the

form of justice, whereas the man with right opinion thinks that
justice takes on many shapes, as determined by separate acts
of individual men.

He does not see, as does the philosopher,

that justice is always and everywhere one and' the same.
In this section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III (V 471 DVII 541 B) Socrates does not explain why the philosopher desires
to know the forms of truth, beauty, and justice, nor how he
develops the desire to know.

He merely assumes that the

philosopher naturally desires to apprehend "forms."

In Section

II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III, Socrates discusses the
question of why and how the philosopher desires to know true
justice or beauty.
If one accepts the premise that the philosopher naturally
apprehends "forms," however, Socrates' conclusion follows.

This

conclusion is the proposition contained in the third wave of
paradox.

The man with true knowledge of the "form of justice"
17geQ • V 476 C (Shorey, I, 519).
18ReQ • V 476 B (Shorey, I, 519).
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should rule the state instead of the man who sees only
appearances.
An understanding of what Socrates means by "forms" is

central to an understanding of the comparison between the
Republic and the UtoQia in regard to the imperative for justice.
His use of the concept corresponds to the concept "universal"
as it came to be used later in scholastic philosophy.

During

the Middle Ages the argument over whether universals had
objective existence outside of the minds of men became the
central problem of philosophy.

The denial of the existence

of universals grew from the voluntarism of Duns Scotus and the
nominalism of William of Ockham and gave rise to disputes
among various religious orders and institutions in Europe. 19
The attitude toward universals that underlies the
Utopia is ambivalent.

The Utopians apprehend absolute truth,

beauty, and justice behind the appearances of objects, but
they display their characteristic dislike for speculation as
to whether "universals" exist in nature.
their skeptical attitude:

Hythlodaeus explains

So far are they from ability to

speculate on second intentions that not one of them could
see even man himself as a so-called universal--though he
was, as you know, colossal and greater than any giant, as well
19For a concise discussion of the controversy see
Josef Pieper, Scholasticism, tr. Richard and Clara Winston
(New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 109-36.
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as pointed out by us with our finger."

20

In this passage

More does not necessarily deny the existence of universals.

It

does indicate, however, More's reaction to the Schoolmen's
obsessive concern with the question. 21
Despite what Hythlodaeus says about the Utopians'
inability to see "man himself as a so-called universal,"
they strive to apprehend absolute truth, beauty, and justice
behind the appearance of objects.

Just as Socrates identifies

the true philosopher by his love of truth, the Utopians regard
the contemplation of truth as the highest of all pleasures:
"To the soul they ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which
is bred of contemplation of truth.,,22
The Utopians are also distinguished from other peoples
by their ability to see true beauty and not to be deceived by
appearances:

"While they consider it a sign of a sluggish and

feeble mind not to preserve natural beauty, it is, in their
judgment, disgraceful affectation to help it out by cosmetics.fl 23
Considering righteousness more beautiful than fine clothes,
gems, and honors, the Utopians all wear the same kind of plain
garments, and "gold and silver, of which money is made, are so
20utoQia, p. 159/31-35.
21For a discussion of this reaction, see Surtz, The
Praise of Pleasure, pp. 87-118.
22Utopia, p. 173/12-13.
23utopia, p. 193/21-24.
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treated by them that no one values them more highly than their
true nature deserves. fl24 The Utopians use gold, for example,
as a symbol of slavery.
The most effective example of the distinction the
utopians make between appearance and reality occurs in the episode
of the Anemolian ambassadors.

The Anemolian dignitaries come to

Utopia in fine robes and gold adornment with the assumption
that their trappings enhance their moral worth.

Thomas More

evidences his ironic genius in contrasting these characters
to the Utopian child, who in its simple way sees the "form"
of beauty behind the appearance.

The child sets the proper value

on the trappings when he says, "Look, mother, what a big booby
is still wearing pearls and jewels as if he were yet a little
boy!"25
The Utopians also contrast with the Europeans in that
they see one form of justice behind the multiplicity of men's
actions.

Law and order reigns in Utopia despite its few laws.

Because they are not distracted by minute interpretations of
codes of law, the Utopians see the principle behind the law.
The Europeans, on the other hand, manipulate laws because '
they cannot see the absolute nature of justice:
In consequence men think either that all justice is only
a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty

24gt~Qia, p. 151/18-20.
25Utopia, p. 155/33-34.
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of kings or that there are at least two forms of it:
the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit
only for the common sort and bound by many chains so that
it can never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of
kings, which,as it is more august than that of ordinary
folk, is also far freer so that everythin is permissible
to it--except what it finds disagreeable. 26
Because the Utopians can discern the true nature of
beauty and justice behind the appearance of objects, they
have little need for rulers.

While other nations seek

Utopians to rule them, the Utopians function harmoniously with
few leaders selected democratically from their own ranks.
Significantly, however, the leaders are selected from the
elite group of five hundred scholars:

"It is out of this

company of scholars that they choose ambassadors, priests,
tranibors, and finally the governor himself.,,27
The Utopian system of selecting leaders shows how
subtly More adapted material in the Republic to suit his
purposes.

The method of selecting leaders from the elite group

of scholars implies

~hat

have been elected because

the governor and the other officials
th~y

possess the philosophic nature.

This method of electing officials was not practiced in the
Europe of More's time nor in the Greece of Plato's

time~

Socrates points out in a passage to be discussed below that
in present society the multitude ridicules the true philosopher
26UtOQia, p. 199/10-17.
27UtOQia, p. 133/5-8.
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and shuns him as an outcast.

In the republic, as well as in

Utopia, the citizens respect and obey the philosopher.
Socrates' identification of the true philosopher
brings Book V of the Republic to a close.

In the beginning of

Book VI he describes the ethical side of the philosophic
nature.

He enumerates traits which the just man would have

and which naturally proceed from the love of truth
and from the four moral virtues of justice, wisdom, courage,
and temperance.

A true and not a sham philosopher will be

concerned with the pleasures of the soul and "will be indifferent
.
28
to those of which the body is the instrument."
Possessing
a spirit of truthfulness and a "reluctance to admit
falsehood,.,2 9 he will be of a liberal spirit. That is, he
will have a ·'mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the
contemplation of all time and all existence," and he will not
"deem this life of man a thing of great concern. n30 A man
with this kind of mind will be just and gentle and not unsocial
and savage.

Socrates summarizes the nature of the philosopher

as one who is "by nature of good memory, quick apprehension,
magnificent, gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice,
bravery and sobriety.,,3 1
28 Rep • VI 485 D (Shorey, II, 9).
29Reg. VI 485 C (Shorey, II, 7).
3ORe12. VI 486 A (Shorey, II, 9-11).
3 1Rep. VI 487 A (Shorey, II, 13).
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These specific traits of the philosophic nature, in
addition to the four moral virtues discussed in the previous
chapter, are possessed by the Utopians, with some variation.
The Utopians, for example, seek primarily the pleasures of the
soul, but they are not indifferent to those of the body:
"The pleasures which they admit as genuine they divide into
various classes, some pleasures being attributed to the soul
and others to the body.,,3 2 Although they admit both kinds
of pleasure as genuine, "they cling above all to mental
pleasures, which they value as the first and foremost of all
33
pleasures."
As a result of their moral virtues, the Utopians
have a spirit of truthfulness and a reluctance to admit falsehood.

In contrast to the situation in Europe, where flattery

wins political preferment, in Utopia flattery brings no
political advantage.

In fact, -the man who solicits votes to

obtain any office is deprived completely of the hope of holding
any office at all.,,3 4
The next trait mentioned by Socrates also characterizes
the Utopians.

Having minds habituated to thoughts of grandeur,

they regard the contemplation of truth as the appropriate
concern of man.

They believe that "as much time as possible

3 2Utopia, p. 173/9-12.
33Utopia, p. 175/34-35.
34utopia, p. 193/37-39.
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should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted
to the freedom and culture of the mind.,,35

Consequently,

they have no inclination for such idle pastimes as dicing and
hunting.

Their minds and spirits have been cultivated so that

they deem this life of man a thing of no great concern:

"Almost

all Utopians are absolutely certain and convinced that human
bliss will be so immense that, while they lament every man's
illness, they regret the death of no one but him whom they see
torn from life anxiously and unwillingly • .,3 6
The Utopians' virtues make them just and gentle and not
unsocial and savage.

In contrast to the savage Zapoletans, who

are "fearsome, rough, and Wild,,,37 they show gentleness in all
their actions.

For example, they are sociable toward strangers.

Although few foreigners make their way to Utopia, those who
come are treated with special favor.

At the common meals,

"the finest of everything is distributed equally among the
halls according to the number in each, except that special
regard is paid to the governor, the high priest, and the
tranibors, as well as to the ambassadors and all foreigners. n38
The Utopians also have good memories and quick
35UtoQia, p. 135121-23.
36UtoQia, p. 223/21-24.
37UtoQia, p. 207/12-13.
38UtoQia, p. 141/13-17.
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apprehension.

They evidence these traits particularly in their

ease in learning the Greek language.

Hythlodaeus observes that

"they began so easily to imitate the shapes of the letters, so
readily to pronounce the words, so quickly to learn by heart,
and so faithfully to reproduce what they had learned that it was
a perfect wonder to us.u39

Their diligence chiefly explains

the Utopians' quick grasp of the Greek language.

Hythlodaeus

comments that he did not expect them to learn so quickly.

"But

after a little progress, their diligence made us at once feel
sure that our own diligence would not be bestowed in vain. u40
ThUS, the Utopians' good memories and powers of quick apprehensio
result from their virtues.

In Book I Hythlodaeus had made the

point that although they exceed the Europeans in neither brains
nor resources, their commonwealth is more wisely governed and
happily flourishing than the nations of Europe. 41
That intellectual prowess follows from virtuous conduct
in the Utopia indicates an important difference in the philoso.phies of Plato and More.

Whereas Plato emphasizes the point that

virtuous behavior will naturally follow from a fully developed
rational faculty, More implies a reversed procedure.

In

Plato's philosophy virtue follows knowledge; in More's
philosophy knowledge follows virtue.
39Utopia, p. 181/14-17.
40Utopia, p. 181/12-14.

41Supr~, p. 110.

This difference will be
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discussed in greater detail below.

It is mentioned here

to suggest the reason why the Utopians display more virtues
than Socrates mentions in the Republic.
In addition to the moral virtues and the traits that
proceed from them, the Utopians possess virtues and traits that
are not specifically Christian, but they resemble the theological
virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
suffice by itself for the

Because reason does not

investigatio~

of true happiness,

the Utopians believe that faith and reason must work together:
"They never have a discussion of philosophy without uniting
certain principles taken from religion as well as from
philosophy, which uses rational arguments."42

Although a

variety of religions have arisen in Utopia, all the Utopians
hold that "there is one supreme being, to whom are due both
the creation and the providential government of the whole
world.,,43
world. ft43
The Utopians also display the virtue of hope.

Besides

intelligence and the sweetness which comes from the contemplation of truth, the Utopians consider a good conscience and hope
as two genuine pleasures of the soul:

"To these two are

joined the pleasant recollection of a well-spent life and the
sure hope of happiness to come." 44 Fora Utopian to die
42utopia, p. 161/32-:35.
161/32-.35.
43~topia, p. 217/19-21.
43J:J.topia,
44utopia, p. 173/13-15.
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without hope is a mark of disgrace and causes melancholy
silence in the other Utopians.

On the other hand, "when men have

died cheerfully and full of good hope, no one mourns for them,
but they accompany their funeral with song, with great affection
commending their souls to GOd.,,45
The Utopians exercise also the virtue akin to
Christian charity.

This is evident in their generosity and

in their compassion for others.
share their food supply:

For example, they generously

"Though they are more than sure how

much food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they
produce far
own use:

more grain and cattle than they require for their
they distribute the surplus among their neighbors." 46

Deriving pleasure from their compassion, they say that it is
"praiseworthy inhumanity's name that one man should provide
for another man's welfare and comfort--if it is especially
humane (and humanity is the virtue most peculiar to man) to
relieve the misery of others and, by taking away all sadness
from their life, restore them to enjoyment, that is, to
Pleasure. tt47
Just as the virtue of charity is closely associated
with the beatitudes in the Christian religion, so it is also
45UtoQia, p. 223134-37.
46UtoQia, p. 117/8-12.
47Utopia, p. 163135-39.
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in Utopia.

The Utopians show their charity, compassion, and

mercy by caring expertly for the sick and infirm; they have
erected four hospitals in the city of Amaurotum.

The customs

and institutions of Utopia cultivate the virtues of the citizens.
For example, they are not permitted to grow accustomed to the
butchering of animals, ttby the practice of which· they think that
mercy, the finest feeling of our human nature, is gradually
tt48
killed Off.
Humility is a virtue practiced by a special group of
Utopians but respected by all the citizens.

A class of holy

men, called Buthrescae, performs the tasks which others find
odious.

The attitude of the Utopians toward these men shows

their high regard for those who humble themselves:

"The more

that these men put themselves in the position of slaves
the more are they honored by all."49
Piety is a special virtue of some of these men, who
comprise one of two schools in their class.

The one school

rejects the pleasures enjoyed by others, especially matrimony.
The other school works just as hard as the first, but those in
it prefer matrimony to celibacy.

The Utopians regard the
latter school as saner but the former as "holier.,,5 0
48

UtoQia, p. 139/18-21.

49UtoQia, p. 227/2-3.
50UtoQia, p. 227/17.
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The Utopians also display other virtues closely allied
to those already mentioned.

Although not specifically named,

these additional virtues can be inferred from the general
attitudes and behavior of the Utopians.

They show tolerance

in their open-minded acceptance of new ideas and their
hospitality toward strangers.

perseverancE
They show patience and perseverance

in suffering offenses from their enemies before going to war. 51
Their thrift and industry are shown in the way they maintain
their houses and public roads in good repair.
The Utopian characteristics that correspond to the
Christian virtues are not mentioned by Socrates in the ReQublic.
Significantly, this omission points up an important difference
in the philosophies underlying the two works.

In the ReQublic

Socrates assumes that virtue will follow naturally from
knowledge of the forms of virtue.

The Utopians, on the other

hand, hold that unless men shape their characters by habitually
good acts, knowledge of virtue is irrelevant.

This important

difference between the two works will be treated in greater
detail in the next chapter in connection with the analysis of
Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B)
of the ReRublic.

In that section Socrates explains how

justice and the other forms of virtue relate to knowledge of
the form of the good.

Here, however, it is necessary to

51 Utopia, p. 201/34-35.
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consider the next question raised by Adeimantus.
After Socrates describes the qualities of the philosophi
nature, Adeimantus logically calls his attention to the actual
condition of philosophers in the world.

Adeimantus admits that

the description of the philosophic nature is fine in theory,
but he observes that those who are called philosophers are
either useless or scoundrels.

This observation prompts

Socrates to explain the reasons for the low reputation of
philosophy and to suggest the changes that would be necessary
to reconcile the ideal philosopher with the real world.

This

explanation (VI 487 B-VII 501 E) continues to the end of
Section I (V 471 D-VI 501 E).
Socrates first contends that philosophers are useless
in the present state because the multitude can neither
understand nor appreciate the philosophic nature.

To explain

his point, he employs the traditional ship of state metaphor.
He describes a shipmaster who surpasses all the other members of
the crew in height and strength, but he is slightly deaf and
blind, and his knowledge of navigation ·'is on a par with his
sight and hearing.,,5 2 The riotous and unruly crew care neither
for exercising nor learning the art of navigation.
they desire to seize control of the ship.

After his description

of such a mutinous ,ship, Socrates asks rhetorically:
2
5 Rep • VI 488 B (Shorey, II, 19).

Nevertheless,

"With
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such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot
would in very deed be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler,
a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this
fashion?,,53

Adeimantus agrees, and Socrates explains that

what he has described is "the exact counterpart of the relation
54
of the state to the true philosophers!'
He th~n concludes
that one should not blame the finer spirits for their uselessness,
but rather flthose who do not kno\'J how to make use of them. ,,55
The shipmaster's situation in the Republic parallels the
situation of Hythlodaeus in the Utopia.

Hythlodaeus is one of

the finer philosophic spirits who realizes that he would be
considered an idle babbler if he attempted to exercise his
wisdom on behalf of the state.

The attitude of the lawyer and

the other guests at Cardinal Morton's home confirms his judgment.
Because Hythlodaeus realizes that his advice would be wasted
on such ignorant people, he refuses to offer his services as
a councilor to any king.

Echoing Socrates' comments about the

misunderstood philosopher, he summarizes his reasons for
rejecting the nersona More's·· suggestion that he become a
councilor:
53ReQ • VI 488 E (Shorey, II, 23).
54Rep • VI 489 A (Shorey, II, 23).
55Rep • VI 489 B (Shorey, II, 25).
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By this approach • • • I should accomplish nothing
else than to share the madness of others as I tried to
cure their lunacy. If I would stick to the truth, I
must needs speak in the manner I have described. To
speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part of
a philosopher, but it is certainly not for me. 56
That More had Plato's shipmaster in mind when he
conceived the character of Hythlodaeus cannot, of course, be
insisted upon too strongly.

In writing the UtoQia, More used

many sources and adapted them to suit his purposes.

The fact

that the Rersona More takes Hythlodaeus for a ship captain,
however, may have been suggested by Plato's analogy.

Indeed,

Peter Giles significantly mentions that Hythlodaeus is a
ship captain like Plato.

In the beginning of Book I the

persona f10re tells Peter Giles, "My guess was not a bad one.
The moment I saw him, I was sure he was a ship's captain."
Peter Giles answers, "But you are quite mistaken • • • for his
sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses
or, rather, of Plato. fl57

Hythlodaeus, then, represents in the

Utopia the condition of all true philosophers in the less than
ideal state.
After Socrates explains why true philosophers are
useless, he points out why others who once had the potential
for philosophy become corrupt.
themselves corrupt him:

The philosopher's gifts

"The most surprising fact of all is

56Utopia, p. 101/5-9.
57Utopia, p. 49/34-37.
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that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to
corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from
PhiIOSOPhy.,,5 8 This surprising fact happens because the best
natures fare worse than inferior natures under conditions
of nurture unsuited to them.

Socrates charges that the

Sophists have formed the corrupt opinions of the multitude
with their teachings.

Such opinions inevitably corrupt the

young and inexperienced man with a potential for philosophy.
Socrates explains how this corruption occurs.

Any

youth who is handsome and talented receives constant flattery
from the unthinking crowd.

This flattery brings out in the

youth the vices of pride and vain ambition.

Socrates asks by

way of explanation, "Will his soul not be filled with
unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable
of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, and
thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty
pride and void of sense?fl59

From these vices of pride and

vain ambition an unwillingness to work inevitably follows.
Socrates continues, "And if -to a man in this state of mind
someone gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that
he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way
to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it
58Reg • VI 491 B (Shorey, II, 31).
59ReQ • VI 494 C (Shorey, II, 45).
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will be easy for him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the
midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings?,,60

Pride,

vain ambition, and an unwillingness to work, all of which result
from flattery, chiefly corrupt the philosophic nature.
This corruption is most unfortunate because the
potential philosopher is capable of the greatest evil.

Socrates

uses an interesting image of a flowing stream to describe this
misfortune:

"And it is from men of this type that those spring

who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and
the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into
that channel, but a small nature never does anything great
t o a man or a C1"t y. ,,61

In the UtoQia Thomas More also uses an image of a
stream to describe the ruler's potential for good or evil.
In Book I he urges Hythlodaeus to offer his wisdom to some
great monarch.

He explains that Hythlodaeus could thereby

accomplish great good because "from the monarch, as from a
never-failing spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil
62
over the whole nation."
Because the Utopians realize this potential for evil
in the nature of a powerful man, they take adequate precautions
60
61

ReQ. VI 494 D (Shorey, II, 45) •

ReQ. VI 495 B (Shorey, II, 47).
62Ut OQ18,
"
p. 57/16-18.
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to guard against a tyrant rising among them.
explains how they guard against conspiracy:

Hythlodaeus
"To take counsel

on matters of common interest outside the senate or the
popular assembly is considered a capital offense.

The object

of these measures, they say, is to prevent it from being easy,
by a conspiracy between the governor and the tranibors and
by a tyrannous oppression of the people, to change the order
of the commonwealth.,,63
Because the Utopians realize that a man with a
potential for good can become worse than an inferior man,
they punish the crimes of their own citizens more severely
than they do those of slaves taken from other countries:
"Their own countrymen are dealt with more harshly, since their
conduct is regarded as all the more regrettable and deserving
a more severe punishment as an object lesson because, having had
an excellent rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not
be restrained from crime.,,64

The practice in Utopia, as

described in Book II, contrasts with the practice in Europe,
as described in Book I.
~re

In Europe the rich and powerful, who

the greatest evildoers, perform their villainy with

impunity, while the poor and indigent workers are punished
severely for petty theft.
63Utopia, p. 125/1-6.
64
utopia, p. 185/26-30.
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The vices identified by Socrates as the source of
corruption in the philosophic nature are the same as those
of the rich and powerful Europeans.
corruption in Europe.

Pride chiefly causes the

The noblemen and sycophants in

Book I, with the exception of Cardinal Morton, display this
vice in their actions.

Hythlodaeus most explicitly identifies

pride as the source of corruption, however, in his peroration
at the conclusion of Book II.
a deadly viper:

He likens this vice to

"This serpent from hell entwines itself

around the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in
preventing and hindering them from entering on a better way of
life.,,65
In addition to being corrupted by pride, Europeans are
corrupted by greed in the same way as the philosopher in the
Republic.

Hythlodaeus' account of the council of the French

king gives an example of men who unscrupulously go to war
because of their greed for wealth and power.

The same

motivation prompts the anonymous king to enslave his
people by manipulating the laws.
The third vice identified by Socrates is also a major
source of the sad state of affairs in Europe.

Socrates'~ays

that the young man corrupted by flattery will be unwilling
to work.

Hythlodaeus points out that the idleness of the
65

.
UtoQia, pp. 243/39-245/2.
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noblemen and their attendants accounts for the thievery in
England and the warlike mentality of the French.

In England

the retainers of noblemen, because they have no useful trades,
must turn to stealing when their masters fallon hard times.
In France the practice of retaining idle mercenaries is the
chief cause of war.

Soldiers, good for nothing except fighting,

crowd and beset the whole country.

The king and his councilors,

therefore, must seek out pretexts for war in order to keep the
idlers busy.
In the Utopia, then, the vices of pride, vain ambition,
and sloth have corrupted the states of Europe in the same way
that Socrates says that the philosophic nature is corrupted.
Furthermore, the royal favorites and councilors in Europe
fawn and flatter their betters like Socrates says the Sophists
corrupt all youth with a potential for philosophy.
In contrast to Europeans, Hythlodaeus himself and
the Utopians have no desire for wealth, fame, or'honor.
do not flatter, nor are they ,affected by flattery.

They

Moreover,

in Utopia all the citizens work at some task, in contrast to
other nations where many sit idle.
After explaining how the Sophists corrupt the finer
spirits, Socrates describes the results of this corruption.
ecause those who ought to follow philosophy have deserted
her, a multitude of pretenders rush in to claim the name of
"philosopher."

The true philosopher, therefore, "remains
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quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing
aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust
and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness,
is content if in any way he may keep himself free from
iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take
departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the
66
end comes."
In the Utopi§ Hythlodaeus specifically uses this image
of the lonely, forsaken philosopher seeking refuge in a storm
to justify his unwillingness to serve as a councilor.

With

this image he answers Thomas More's suggestion that he use
an indirect approach in order to turn kings from their
erroneous ways:
Plato by a very fine comparison shows why philosophers
are right in abstaining from administration of the
commonwealth. They observe the people rushing out into
the streets and being soaked by constant showers and
cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain.
They know that, if they go out, they an do no good
but will only get wet with the rest. 67
Socrates goes on to explain that because of the low
state of philosophy, the true philosopher will never accomplish
anything very great unless he finds a state adapted to his
nature:

~In

such a state only will he himself rather attain

his full stature and together with his own preserve the
66Rep • VI 496 E (Shorey, II, 55).
67Utopia, p. 103/16-21.

165
common weal. tt68
The kind of commonwealth that Socrates suggests as
necessary for the philosophic nature has obviously been found
by Hythlodaeus in Utopia.

Realizing that no state outside

Utopia suits his philosophic spirit, Hythlodaeus has returned
to Europe only temporarily in order to inform others of the
wonderful island in the new world.

He explains that he

"lived there more than five years and would never have wished
to leave except to make known that new world ... 69
After the pessimistic description of the causes and
results of the corruption of the philosophic

n~turet

Plato

concludes the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III
(V 471D-VIII 541 B) with the hopeful declaration that the
creation of the ideal state may indeed be possible if the
changes he has suggested are implemented.

The multitude, he

says, can be persuaded to accept the philosopher-king if the
pernicious effect of the Sophists' teaching can be eradicated.
In order to change the present state into the ideal state, it
--

would be necessary to begin with a clean slate and to change
the constitution after the pattern set dO\,ln in the description
of the ideal state.

After such a constitution had been

formulate~

the continuity of the state would require administrators with
the same philosophic nature as the founders.
68Rep • VI 497 A (Shorey,1 II, 55).
69Utopia, p. 107/20-22.
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In the UtoQia Hythlodaeus also suggests that a change
in the basic structure of society would be necessary to effect
reforms in Europe.

It would be necessary to abolish the

present system of private property and to begin anew with the
system of the Utopians.

He believes that "there is no

hope • • • of a cure and a return to a healthy condition as
long as each individual is master of his own property.n70

By

following this remark with his description of the ideal state,
Hythlodaeus implies that Europe must reform itself by following
the model of Utopia.

The founding of Utopia follows Socrates'

suggestion that a clean slate is the necessary requisite of
the foundation of a new order.

Utopus, the founder, conquered

a "rude and rustic people" and brought them ftto such a .
perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now superior
to almost all other mortals. n71

Though it has had few laws,

the commonwealth has scarcely changed in justice and happiness
since its beginning, for wise customs, laws, and institutions
have insured that subsequent administrators would have the
same wisdom as Utopus.
Wisdom and justice not only in the founders but also
in the subsequent administrators, then, is the necessary
requisite of both Plato's and More's ideal states.

70UtOQi~, p. 105/37-39.
71UtoQia, p. 113/5-7.
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ReQublic Socrates declares that the realization of the ideal
polity is difficult, yet not impossible.

In the ptopia

Hythlodaeus goes beyond Socrates' hopeful declaration.

He

vouches to have seen the ideal state in existence.
The next question which follows from Socrates'
declaration is how the philosophic nature is

de~eloped.

Socrates points the way to the next section of the dialogue:
"This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what
remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies
and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form
a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take
up each study.u7 2 The discussion of these matters continues
up to Book VIII and constitutes Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B)
of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B).
The question of how the philosophic nature is developed
involves a discussion of Plato's theory of knowledge and a more
explicit treatment of the relationship between knowledge and
virtue.

It is in regard to these aspects of man's nature that

the differences of the underlying philosophies of the Republic
and the UtoQia most clearly reveal themselves.

These matters

as they relate to the question of the imperative for justice
will form the basis of discussion in Chapter VI.
72Rep • VI 502 D (Shorey, II, 77).

CHAPTER VI
THE SANCTION FOR JUSTICE
A sanction for justice in the ideal state must account
for man's most basic aspirations.

In the Regublic and in the

Utogia the establishment of the sanction rests on the premise
that man naturally seeks justice and that through reason he
comes to know the true ,justice behind the appearance of
individual men's actions.

The two works differ significantly,

however, in regard to the sanction itself.

In the ReQublic

to know the form of justice is alone a sufficient imperative
for acting justly.

In the UtoJ2.ia there 1s implied an added

necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul and in
rewards and punishments in the life hereafter.
Plato bases the sanction on one of his most fundamental
tenets--the idea that correct action invariably follows correct
knowledge.

Man's proper function, reason, leads him to live

the moral life.

The ,rationale for the assumption that the

rational life and the moral life are almost identical comes to
a focus in the second section (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III
(V 471 D-VII 541 B).

In the foregoing chapter the assertion,

was made that in the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part
III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) Socrates affirms'without explanation
that by nature the true philosophic spirit apprehends the form
168
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of justice.

.

In the remaining section of Part III he explains

why the philosopher naturally prefers justice over injustice
and how he develops the rational faculty, which apprehends
justice.
Socrates maintains that the philosopher will know
justice and therefore act justly through a rational
apprehension of the form of the good.

The idea of good is

the end of 1ife--the supreme object of all desire and
aspiration.

With the realization of this supreme object, the

philosopher comes to know justice and the other absolute forms,
such as truth and beauty.

Socrates explains that for the

philosopher flthe greatest thing to learn is the idea of good
by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful
and beneficia1."1· The problem, however, as Socrates admits, is
that we have no adequate knowledge of the idea of good.

He

attempts, therefore, to describe the nature of the good by
~egation

and analogy.
He begins his explanation by appealing to experience.

It can be seen, he maintains, that all men strive for something
which
~hich
good
~ood

they think beneficial.

He describes the form of the

as that "which every soul pursues and for its own sake

~oes
does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but
~et
yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequate1y."2

l Rep • VI 505 A (Shorey, II, 87).
2Rep • VI 505 E (Shorey, II, 91).

170

socrates then attempts to distinguish between the real good
and the other objects of men's desires.

Most men, Socrates

observes, mistake various apparent goods for the true form
of the supreme good.

He says that neither of the two

common opinions about the nature of the good are correct:

"The

multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits
intelligence or knOwledge • .,3

The finer spirits are mistaken

because they cannot identify the exact knowledge of what is
the ultimate good.

They are "finally compelled to say that
it is the knowledge of the goOd. n4 Those who mistake pleasure

for the good are also confused because they must admit that
men enjoy bad as well as good pleasures.
In the Utopia the treatment of man's aspiration
toward the highest good is more subtle than Socrates' treatment
in the Republic.

Hythlodaeus introduces the subject by

making the startling disclosure that the Utopians regard
pleasure, if not the highest good, as least akin to the
/'

highest good:

"As it is, they hold happiness rests not in every

kind of pleasure but only in --good and decent pleasure.

To such,

as to the supreme good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself,
to which the opposite school alon~ attributes hapPiness."5

In

3Rep. VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89).

4gep • VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89).
5Utopia, p. 163/18-21. For a discussion of More's
intention and method in the Utopians' philosophy of pleasure,
see Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure, esp_ pp. 1-22.
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the subsequent discussion of the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus
reveals by degrees that the Utopians have a more comprehensive.
understanding of pleasure than the meaning intended by
socrates.
Hythlodaeus explains that the Utopians admit as
genuine two kinds of pleasures--those of the
the soul.

bo~y

and those of

The highest are those of the soul, to which they

"ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which is bred of
contemplation of truth. fl6
described by

The Utopians, like the finer spirits

Socrates, associate intelligence, and therefore

knowledge, with the supreme good.

Their understanding of the

supreme good, however, goes beyond that of the finer spirits
because they identify the object of knowledge.
truth is the object of the soul's contemplation.

They say that
Those

Utopians who realize the highest pleasure of the soul, therefore, have achieved what Socrates identifies as the object of
the philosophic pursuit.

For as he says in Book V, "the

truth is the spectacle" of which the true philosopher is
enamored. 7
Unfortunately for our comparison, truth and the idea
of the good are basic concepts which do not admit of simple
definitions.

It is difficult to discern from the context of

6Utopia, p. 173/14-15.

7Rep. V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517).

172
either the Republic or the Utopia how the ultimate truth
differs from the ultimate good.

Socrates says that the good

is the source of truth, but he also describes the good in a
way that seems to differ little from his implied meaning of
truth.

In Book V, when he identifies the distinguishing

mark of the philosopher as the love of truth, he explains this
characteristic as a perception of the objective form behind
the appearance of objects.

Then in Book VI he explains the

same kind of perception in relationship to the knowledge of
the good:
ftto be ft of many beautiful things and
We predicate "to
many good things, saying of them severally that they ~,
and so define them in our speech • • • And again, we
speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and
merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that
we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each
as a single idea or aspect, assuming ig to be a unity
and call it that which each really is.
If, then, the Utopians' understanding of the highest
good is not identical with that of Socrates, it is at least
compatible with it.

By explaining that the contemplation of

truth is the highest pleasure, More does not oppose Socrates'
idea that the objective good is the supreme object of our
aspirations.

At first it appears that the Utopians have

assented to a low estimate of the supreme good, but as
Hythlodaeus gradually reveals their understanding of pleasure,
it becomes apparent that they have an idea of the supreme

8Rep • VI 507 B (Shorey, II, 97).
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good not unlike that of Socrates.

Further similarities between

the idea of good in the two works become evident as the
philosophy and the theology in each work are subsequently
revealed.
Although Socrates admits that he cannot define the
good precisely, he attempts to describe some of its characteristics.

Besides being that which every man strives for, the good

is the condition of all knowledge.

It is the source of the

knowledge of justice, honor, and everything else that is known.
In order to explain this characteristic of the good Socrates
makes an analogy between the visible world and the invisible or
intelligible world.

He likens the good in the intelligible

world to the sun in the visible world.

The sun gives light to

the eye as the good gives knowledge to the intellect:

"As

the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects
of reason, so is this [the su~ in the visible world to vision
and the objects of vision.":

Socrates extends the metaphor and

compares the inadequate light of the moon and stars to the
clear and fulsome light of the sun:

"Whe~

the eyes are no

longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day
~alls
ralls

but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is
blunted and they appear almost blind. nlO Socrates then explains
9Hep. VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103).
10Hep • VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103).
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how the good functions in the intelligible world as the source
of all knowledge:

"This reality • • • that gives their truth

to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the
knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive
it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as
known. n

11

Another characteristic of the good is its creative and
sustaining force in the world.

In explaining this function

Socrates continues his analogy between the power of the sun
and the power of the good.

In the same way that the sun provides

generation and growth to visible objects, the good gives being to
and enlightens invisible objects:

"The objects of knowledge

not only receive from the presence of the good their being
known, but their very existence and essence is derived to
them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. H12
There are, then, three characteristics of the good
mentioned by Socrates.

The good is that toward which the soul

naturally aspires; it is the condition of knowledge and truth
in the world and in the minds of men; and it is the creative
and sustaining power of the universe.

These characteristics

seem to be the same as those attributed to God.
11ReR. VI 508 E (Shorey, II, 10)-105).
12ReQ • VI 509 B (Shorey, II, 107).
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however, does not identify the idea of good with the nature
of God.

He never makes it clear how the good differs from

God, but he refers to them as two different concepts.

He

mentions God, for example, in his description of the tales told
to the guardians in their musical education.

Not mentioning

the idea of the good in that section of the dialogue (II 377

A-383 C), he says that God cannot change and that He is the
source of good but not of evil in the world.

Conversely, in

his discussion of the idea of the good in Book III, he never
refers to the nature of God.

Thus it would seem that God and

the idea of the good are similar, but not identical.
Socrates' explanation of the idea of good has many
points of likeness with the Utopians' ideas about God.

It

must be noted in discussing the Utopians' theological views
that they are considered by Hythlodaeus, and obviously by Thomas
More, to be incomplete and in some cases defective.

Until

Hythlodaeus and his party came to Utopia, the people had not
known of Christianity anA therefore could not be expected
to have arrived at the fullness of religious truth.

As a

result of their incomplete knowledge, some Utopians "worship
as god the sun, others the moon, others one of the pianets. u13
This practice can be accounted for by the explanation that the
Utopians have, without benefit of Christian revelation, arrived

13utoRia, p. 217/8-9.
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at their beliefs through reason.

The Utopians, therefore,

worship that source of light to which their individual rational
faculties have directed them.
The Utopians significantly worship the same objects
used by Socrates to explain the ineffable nature of the good.
Just as Socrates pOints out the sun's superiority to the hight's
luminaries as a source of light, some Utopians prefer to worship
the sun and others the moon or planets.

Socrates, of course,

with his superior rational faculty, knows that the sun is not
itself the form of good.

Likewise, the greater number of

Utopians do not worship visible objects:

"By far the majority,

and those by far the wiser, believe in nothing of the kind but
in a certain single being, unknown, eternal, immense,
inexplicable, far above the reach of the human mind, diffused
throughout the universe not in mass but in power. u14
Although the wiser Utopians realize that the supreme
being cannot be known completely, they can know about him
through his works.

They ascribe to him, as Socrates does to

the idea of good, the creating and sustaining power in the
universe:

"To him ,alone they attribute the beginnings, the

growth, the increase, the changes, and the ends of all things
as they have perceived them.,,15

The Utopians, then, have come,

with the aid of reason, to believe in the existence of a single
14UtoPia, p. 217/11-15.
15utopia, p. 217/15-17.
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being who has many of the same characteristics ascribed by
Socrates to the form of the good.
In the Republic Socrates next considers the process
by which the philosopher comes to apprehend the form of the
good.

All men by nature seek to apprehend the good but the

philosopher realizes the desire more than ordinary men.
assumption underlies the concluding

This

passage in Book VI in

which Socrates describes the four stages of intelligence through
which the mind must pass in proceeding from the visible world
of appearances to the intelligible world of reality.

He assigns

a name and value to each stage in a hierarchical order:
"Intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the
second; assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture. H16
A particular man can attain more knowledge of the idea
of good according to the level that his soul reaches in one of
the four stages of intelligence.

At the lowest level the soul

deals only in appearances and images.

Progressing from this

level, the soul sees more of reality at each successive stage
until it reaches the summit of the intellectual stage where
the reality of the form of the good can be apprehended fully.
The soul's natural desire to advance from the lowest to the
highest stage of intelligence can be discerned from observing
16Rep • VI 511 E (Shorey, II, 117).
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the intention and the methodology of the students of geometry
and other sciences:

"The very things which they mould and

draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water,
these things they treat in their turn as only images, but
what they really seek is to get sight of those realities
which can be seen only with the mind.,,17

The soul, then, has

a natural propensity toward the form of the good; it is not
drawn on primarily by pleasure or other attendant benefits
which result from the apprehension of the good.
This explanation of the soul's progress from
appearances to the knowledge of the form of the good accounts
for the sanction for justice in Socrates' philosophy.

Once

the soul knows the form of the good, it cannot be content with
any lesser reality, nor will it choose to act in a base or
evil manner.

The ascent from ignorance to knowledge, therefore,

parallels the ascent from vice to virtue.

Since the knowledge

of the good is the source of all other knowledge, the soul
that apprehends the form of good must necessarily also
apprehend justice.

As the soul that knows good will not

commit evil, likewise the soul that knows justice will not act
unjustly.

Thus, Socrates reasons that the knowledge of the

form of justice is the sanction for justice.
Since only the ideal philosopher can attain to the
17Rep • VI 510 E (Shorey, II, 113).
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highest level of the highest stage of reason or intellect,
justice in the state depends upon the degree to which the
king, or ruler, becomes the ideal philosopher.

On the one

hand, of course, the ideal is never realized perfectly, and
on the other hand it is continually being realized.

Hence

Socrates does not say that the perfect state is.possible,
but he does say that a more perfect state than any now
existing is possible if a philosopher can be found to rule it.
The most important point in which More's philosophy
deviates from that of Plato is in regard to the sanction for
justice.

In the

Utop~

the connection between reason and

virtue is not inseparable as it is in the Republic.

Although

following reason is an essential part of acting virtuously,
the power of reason cannot attain to the knowledge of the
ultimate reality.

The Utopians put emphasis on the necessity

for faith as well as reason.

Therefore, they maintain that

unless a man assents to certain basic beliefs that are part of
the Utopian religion, he will not act justly.

In order to

insure the continuance of justice in the commonwealth, Utopus
has insisted that every citizen be required to believe in the
immortality of the soul and in eternal reward or punishment
for behavior in this life.

This belief, therefore, must

be shared by all the citizens:
After this life, accordingly, vices are ordained to be
punished and virtue rewarded. Such is their belief, and
if anyone thinks other\'Jise, they do not regard him even

~
F

------------------------------------------------------~
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as a member of mankind, seeing that he has lowered the
lofty nature of his soul to the level of a beast's
miserable body--so far are they from classing him among
their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat as
worthless if it were not for fear. 1tl
As this passage indicates, the sanction for justice comes
from a belief in basic tenets of religion.

Although the

utopians arrive at their religious beliefs through reason,
they do not, as Socrates does, think that they can come to know
exhaustively the nature of the ultimate reality through reason.
In the concluding section of Book II, Hythlodaeus
explains how the religious beliefs of the Utopians are the
sanction for justice in the commonwealth.

The importance of

this section in the structure of the Utopia will be discussed
in detail in a later chapter.
The sanction for justice, then, differs in More's work
from the sanction in the Republic insofar as the institution
and maintenance of justice in Utopia depends upon the citizens'
expectation of eternal rewards or punishments.

It should not

be overlooked, however, that in the Republic Socrates affirms
.-

that in the afterlife all men will receive rewards or
punishments.

He treats this matter at the. conclusion of Book

X, where he answers the challenge advanced by Adeimantus in
the exordium.

This answer, contained in the myth of Er, will

be discussed in the next chapter.
18
Utopia, p. 221/33-39.
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Adeimantus in Book X differs from his answer to Glaucon's
pragmatic assertions as they relate to justice and injustice
in this life.

Prior to Book X, Socrates makes no appeal to

rewards and punishments in the afterlife as a sanction for
justice in this life.

In the structure of the whole work,

the myth of Er functions as a coda or addendum to the main
argument of the first nine books.
In the first nine books Socrates argues that, even for
a nonbeliever in the immortality of the soul, justice is to be
preferred over injustice.

In Book VII, therefore, he answers

Glaucon's and Thrasymachus' arguments on their own terms.

He

wishes to demonstrate that man will freely choose justice over
injustice if he truly knows the real distinction between the
two.

Furthermore, the distinction can only be made by the

philosopher who has fully developed his rational faculty and
therefore can apprehend the form of the good.

To hold that

the absolute good is the object of the philosopher's knowledge
directly opposes Glaucon's statements in the exordium.

Glaucon

had denied that man naturally strives for the idea of an
absolute good and had insisted rather that good is relative
insofar as it is the "self-advantage which every creature by
its nature pursues asoa goOd.,,19

t

From this theory of man's

basic aspirations, it follows that if man is to act justly he
19Rep • II 359 C (Shorey, I, 117).
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must be coerced by fear of reprisals.

The main argument of

Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) refutes Glaucon's assertion by
showing that true knowledge leads the philosopher to choose
good of his own free will.
Since the sanction for justice in Utopia rests on the
premise that rewards and punishments can be

exp~cted

after

death, the Utopians minimize the necessity for force or fear
of reprisals in this life as an inducement for men to act
virtuously.

The Utopians, who act justly with few punitive

measures to coerce them, contrast with the English thieves
described by the lawyer in Book I, who will not act justly
despite the threat of the death penalty.

Even Cardinal

Morton wonders why the death penalty is an ineffective sanction
for justice.

He asks Hythlodaeus what other way there can be

to punish thievery:

"What force and what fear, if they once

were sure of their lives, could deter the criminals?"20

The

..

Utopians and the citizens of the republic give witness to
More's and Plato's denial that force or fear of punishment in
this life is a necessary inducement to virtue.

They rather

affirm that man will act justly without coercion if he is'
properly nurtured.
After the discussion of the form of the good that
closes Book VI of the Republic, Socrates next explains how
the rational faculty of the philosopher is nurtured in order
20
Utopia, p. 73/4-5.
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that he may attain the highest stage of intelligence.

Socrates'

explanation occurs in Book VII, which constitutes the remaining
portion of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B).
Socrates begins his explanation with the famous parable
of the cave, which portrays in another way the four stages of
intelligence.

The parable also shows that the regrettable

condition of education must be improved if philosophers are
ever to be nurtured.
Socrates describes a cave in which men are shackled to
fixed spots and able only to view shadows flashed on a wall
before them.
earth:

The scene represents the condition of man on

"This image, then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a

whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed
through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light
21
of the fire in it to the power of the sun."
A man fortunate
enough to be released from his shackles so that he may ascend
to the outside world will be dazzled by the light of the sun.
Such a man will be like the philosopher who catches a glimpse
of the form of the good.

Then, if the man goes back into the

cave he will be an object of ridicule:
Do you think it at all strange • • • if a man returning
from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men
cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if,
while still blinking through the gloom, and before he
has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing

..

21

Rep. VII 517 B (Shorey, II, 129).
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darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms or elsewhere to
contend about the shadows of justice or the images that
cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions
of these things2~n the minds of those who have never seen
justice itself?
In the Utopia Hythlodaeus describes no·thing similar to
Socrates' allegory of the cave.

In a sense, however,

Hythlodaeus himself represents the philosopher who leaves the
cave and catches a glimpse of the light of the sun.

He has

previously left the prison which is Europe and has gone to
Utopia where he has seen true

j~stice.

He balks at entering

into European politics because he thinks that he would be unable
to convince those \'lho have seen only the shadows of justice.
The lawyer at Cardinal Morton's, for example, typifies the
condition in Europe.

He wrangles about the appearance of

justice, but he has no comprehension of its true form.

Like

the philosopher described by Socrates, Hythlodaeus feels quite
out of place in the company of the lawyer and his kind.
Furthermore, Socrates draws a conclusion from the
allegory which has relevance to the debate on councilorship,
a prominent motif in Book I 'of the p'topia.

Socrates recognizes

that an inevitable problem will arise whenever a philosopher
reaches the stage where he can apprehend the form of the good.
Once out of the cave, any man will be naturally reluctant to
return.

If no one who has seen the sun can be induced back
22Rep • VII 517 D (Shorey, II, 131-32).
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into the cave, however, no one will be capable of ruling the
state.

Consequently, those with the desire to lead have

not the wisdom, and those with the wisdom have not the
desire.

Socrates explains why neither of the two classes of

men can bring about the ideal state:

flthe one because they

have no single aim and purpose in life to which all their
actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others,
because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing
that while still living they have been transported to the
Islands of the B1est.,,23

Socrates concludes that the dilemma

can be solved only if the one who has seen the light, namely,
the philosopher, is forced to return to the cave.

There he

must take his rightful position as ruler, however distasteful
it may be.

This conclusion seems to contradict the opinion

Socrates expresses earlier in Book VI, when he says that the
philosopher in the present state must necessarily retire
from the affairs of men. 24 On one hand, then, Socrates says
that the philosopher should avoid political affairs, but on
the other hand, he says that-the philosopher must become
involved in the affairs of men.

This is only an apparent

contradiction, however, for Socrates speaks in the one
instance from the psychological viewpoint of the individual
23ReQ • VII .519 C (Shorey, II, 139).
24Repe VI 496 E (Shorey, 11,55).'
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and in the other as the founder of the ideal state.
In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodaeus represents Socrates'
viewpoint in Book VI of the Republic and Thomas More his viewpoint in Book VII.

Hythlodaeus is reluctant to offer his

services as a councilor to a European king because he has had
a glimpse of the true form of justice in Utopia..

The dilemma

for Europe, however, is that unless philosophers like
Hythlodaeus can be induced to become involved in political
affairs, the kingdoms are doomed to be ruled by men who lack
wisdom.

Thomas More recognizes the dilemma and espouses a

position essentially the same as that of Socrates when the
latter speaks from the viewpoint of the founder.

More urges

Hythlodaeus to combine the wisdom of the philosopher with the
practicality of the ruler.

He insists that a dichotomy need

not exist between philosophy and politics.

He urges Hythlodaeus

to eschew academic philosophy in the court of kings and to
adopt the kind of philosophy "more practical for statesmen,
which

kno~Js

its stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and

performs its role neatly and·~ppropriately."25
In Book I of the Utopia, then, Hythlodaeus and Thomas
More separately represent the two positions espoused by Socrates
in two different books of the Republic.

Significantly, More,

the author, thereby dramatically suggests that the betterment
25utopia, p. 99/13-16.

187
of conditions in Europe is yet a long way off.

It should be

also noted, in respect to the structure of the UtoQia, that the
debate on counci10rship is subordinate to the main theme.

The

determination of the moral duty of the philosopher is essentially
a question of justice.

The significance of this question in

the structure of the Utopia will be discussed again in a
later chapter.
Besides portraying the four stages of intelligence, the
parable of the cave in the ReQub1ic points up the pitiable
condition of men on earth and raises the question of how men
can escape from the world of shadows to the sunlight of the
world above.

In the remainder of Book VIr Socrates outlines

the kind of education that would prepare the philosopher to
traverse the distance from darkness to light.
The rigorous and prolonged educational system begins
approximately at the age of fifteen with the study of arithmetic and continues to the age of fifty when the philosopher
learns the science of dialectic, by which he comes to apprehend
the form of the good.

In successive stages and at prescribed

ages, the student advances through the studies of geometry,
solid geometry, astronomy, harmoniCS, and finally dialectics.
These studies are included in some measure for their utilitarian
value but primarily because they lead the soul to the
comprehension of the good.
In Utopia the education of the scholars is not explained

,
t
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in detail.

Hythlodaeus mentions, however, that the scholars

study music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and dialectic,
subjects included in the education of philosophers in the
republic.

The Utopians have developed their ability to a degree

that puts them on a par with the ancients:

"In music, dialectic,

arithmetic, and geometry they have made almost the same
discoveries as those predecessors of ours in the classical
world. n26
Although Hythlodaeus does not describe fully the content
and purpose of these studies, he indicates that the Utopians
exhibit a more pragmatic attitude toward their education than
that prescribed by Socrates.

In the Republic, for example,

arithmetic is necessary for military science, but its primary
purpose is to provoke reflection and thought.

Geometry aids

in the conduct of war in dealing with formations of troops.
The student of geometry, however, should have pure knowledge
as his objective:

"For geometry is the knowledge of the
·27
eternally existent."
The Utopian scholars, as has been
indicated, concern themselves with ultimate questions, but
they also have interest in the utilitarian aspects of their

education.

Hythlodaeus describes their objective:

"Thus,

trained in all learning, the minds of the Utopians are
26

Utopia, p. 159/22-25.

27Rep. VII 527 B (Shorey, II, 171).
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exceedingly apt in the invention of the arts which promote the
advantage and convenience of life."28

The Utopians' practical

objectives- lead them to more experimentation than Socrates
would advocate in his educational philosophy.
The difference between the theoretical emphasis of
Socrates and the experimental approach of the Utopians can be
observed best in their respective attitudes toward astronomy.
Socrates includes astronomy in his education because it compels
the

so~l

to look upward to heavenly things and away from the

things of earth.

The object of astronomy should be the

study of the movements of "real speed and real slowness in true
number and in all true figures both in relation to one another
and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain."29
Socrates does not think that astronomy should include plotting
the movements of heavenly bodies.

His attitude toward such a

practice becomes apparent as he continues, "These can be
apprehended only by reason and thought, but-not by sight."JO
Socrates has particular scorn for those who look for signs in
the heavens.

It is absurd, he maintains, "to examine them

seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute
truth. flJ1 In this criticism Socrates apparently has in mind
28UtoQia, p. 18J/25-27.
29ReQ • VII 529 D (Shorey, II, 185).
JO Rep • VII 529 E (Shorey, II, 185).
J1 Rep • VII 5JO A (Shorey, II, 185).
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those who confuse astrology with astronomy.
The Utopians' study of astronomy is contrary to Socrates'
prescription, for they are concerned with the actual movements
of heavenly bodies:

"They have ingeniously devised instruments

in different shapes, by which they have most exactly comprehended
the movements and positions of the sun and moon. and all the
other stars which are visible in their horizon. fl32 The
Utopians, however, do not examine the stars to find in them the
"absolute truth."

They are not astrologers:

"Of the agreements

and discords of the planets and, in sum, of all that infamous
and deceitful divination by the stars, they do not even dream. fl3 3
The Utopians also show their pragmatism and
experimentalism in other studies.
for the physical sciences.

They have great respect

They predict weather by

observation of physical phenomena.

They regard the

knowledge of medicine "as one of the finest and most useful
branches of philosophy:tt 34

Their emphasiS on morals in

philosophy also suggests an approach to life more practical than
theoretical.
The stress on utilitarian education in the Utopia, in
contrast to theoretical studies in the Republic, reflects in
32Utogia, pp. 159/38-161/3.
3>UtOgia, p. 161/3-6.
34Utopia, p. 183/11-12.
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another way the underlying

contrary assumptions in the two

works about the sanction for justice.

Plato continually

emphasizes the development and the power of reason; More, the
development of the will through the practice and habit of
virtuous action.
In the Republiq the theoretical education becomes
complete with the study of dialectic.

This discipline fully

develops the philosopher's reason, through which he finally
comes to know the form of the good.

In explaining what

dialectic means, Socrates returns to his analogy between the
visible and the intelligible worlds:
When anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse
of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find
his way to the very essence of each thing and does not
desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature
of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the
intelligible, as the~Qther in our parable came to the
goal of the visible. J5
Dialectic is not a body of knowledge; it is a process of
inquiry that attempts systematicallY to determine what
each thing really is.

The students of philosophy through

the method of dialectic develop the discipline that will
enable them "to ask and answer questions in the most
scientific manner.,,36

Dialectic, then, is the copestone of

the entire educational system in the ReQublic •

.?5 Reg •

VII 532 B (Shorey, II, 197).

36Rep. VII 534 E (Shorey, II, 209).
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In the Utogia Hythlodaeus unfortunately does not
accompany his mention of dialectic with an explanation of how
it is practiced.

Apparently, however, the process is akin to

that described by Socrates as the discipline in which questions
are asked and answered in "the most scientific manner."

That

the Utopians follow this practice may be surmised from the
inquiries they make in the part of their philosophy which
deals with morals.
soul.

They ·'inquire" into the nature of the

They "ask" whether the name good can be applied to

the body and to external gifts as well as to the soul.

They

"discuss" and "debate" the way true happiness may be achieved. 37
The use of interrogative diction to describe the Utopians'
method of study indicates that they conduct their search for
truth through a process of discussion and debate.

The science

of dialectic, however, in the Utogia is neither explained nor
emphasized.

It is not the final objective in the educational

system toward which every other subject aims.

Since the

development of reason is not the overriding consideration in
their education, the Utopians do not emphasize dialectic to
a greater extent than they do more utilitarian studies.
Despite the difference in content and emphasis in the
educational systems in the two works, in both the best
education is reserved for those who have demonstrated the

37Utopia, p. 161/17-25.
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competence to achieve the highest level.

In the Republic the

potential leaders must possess other qualities in addition
to those required of the ordinary guardians.
they must have quick apprehension:

Most important,

"They must have • • • to

begin with, a certain keeness for study, and must not learn with
difficu1ty.t.3 8 They must also have "a good memGry and
doggedness and industry in every sense of the word. u39
Those who are marked out for the scholarly education
in Utopia must have almost the same qualities of character as
those described by Socrates.
all the Utopians.

Industry is a characteristic of

This can be seen particularly in their

intellectual efforts: "In their devotion to mental study they
40
are unwearied. f '
From such citizens they select the scholars.
The scholars are "the individuals in whom they have detected
from childhood an outstanding personality, a first-rate
intelligence, and an inclination of mind toward learning." 41
The inclusion of the requirement for "an outstanding
personality" in this passage is significant.
--

It suggests again

the emphasis put on good habits and good behavior.

It is, of

course, assumed in the ReQub1ic that the philosopher will have
38ReR • VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211).
39Rep • VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211).
40Utopia, p. 181/2.
41Utopia, p. 159/8-10.
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a pleasing personality, but the omission of this trait in
Socrates' selective criteria reflects his overriding concern
for the intellectual capabilities of man's nature.
Socrates further exhibits his emphasis on reason in
another criterion he sets down for the selection of leaders.
He suggests that telling the truth is less important than
distinguishing between the true and the false.

This suggestion

is apparent in his distinction between a voluntary lie and an
involuntary flasehood:

"Likewise in respect of truth • • •

we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul
that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own
self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully
accepts the involuntary falsehood and 1s not distressed when
convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of
ignorance as insensitively as a Pig.,,42
This distinction is particularly interesting because
Thomas More makes a similar one in his prefatory letter to
Peter Giles, but he reverses the valuation of the two kinds of
errors.

In insisting upon his sincerity, Thomas More writes

to Peter Giles that he includes in the Utopia only those
facts that he knows to be true:

·Just as I shall take great

pains to have nothing incorrect in the book, so, if there is
doubt about anything, I shall rather tell an objective
falsehood than an intentional lie--for I would rather be honest

42

Rep. VlI 535 E (Shorey, II, 213).
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than wise."43
wise.,,43

Whereas Socrates stresses the importance of

knowing the difference between true and false, Thomas More
puts greater emphasis on telling the objective truth.
The reliability of More's remark, of course, can be
challenged since we know that the events described in the
utopia are not factually true.

Such a challenge, however, can

be applied to innumerable passages in More's writings since he
continually mixes ironical and straightforward remarks.

This

remark and others will receive more discussion in a later chapter
where More's irony is discussed specifically.
In the Republic the description of the education to
be given to the philosophers brings to a close Book VII and
also concludes Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the entire
dialogue.

Socrates returns in his final remarks to the pOint

where he began the discussion of the imperative for justice in
Book V.

Returning to Glaucon's original query in Book V as to

whether the ideal state is possible, Socrates reiterates the
..

prescriptions which he called in Book V the "third wave of
paradox":
Well then • • • do you admit that our notion of the
state and its polity is not altogether a day-dream, but
that though it is difficult, it is in a way possible
and in no other way than that described--when genuine
philosophers, many or one, becoming masters of the
state scorn the present honours, regarding them as
illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the
43Utopia, p. 41/33-35.
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honours that come from that above all things, and
regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable
thing, in the service and ~ijintenance of that reorganize
and administer their city?
In the Republiq, then, justice is possible if the
rulers are philosophers.

In that event, they would apprehend

the difference between right and wrong, just and unjust.

It

follows in Plato's philosophy that once the rational faculty
in man perceives this distinction, just and virtuous action
invariably follows.

The sanction for justice, therefore,

depends upon the proper development of the rational faculty
in both the man and in the state.

In the Utopia the sanction

for justice derives not only from the development of the
rational faculty in the leaders but also from the belief in the
immortality of the soul and in eternal rewards and punishments.
The next question for consideration is whether it is
more beneficial to the state and to the individual to follow
justice or injustice.

44

Rep. VII 540 D-E (Shorey, II, 231-33.
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CHAPTER VII
THE JUST AND THE UNJUST LIFE
After considering the origin and nature of justice in
Part II (II )68 A-V 471 C) and the imperative for justice
in Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Plato next explains why
justice rather than injustice is the happiest condition of
existence for the state and for the individual.

This explanation

constitutes P?rt IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) in the structure of
the entire dialogue.

In this part Plato argues for the

superiority of justice by revealing the basic causes and the
insidious results of injustice.

In the Utopia More portrays

the causes and results of injustice before and after
describing the ideal state.

He treats the subject of injustice

in Europe most thoroughly in Book I and again in summary fashion
in the peroration at the conclusion of Book II.
In both works the unjust state shows itself to be most
despicable because it contrasts sharply with the ideal state.
In the Utopia, however, More reverses the order of contrast
used by Plato in the Republic.

Plato first describes the

logical development of the ideal state and then the various
stages iri its disintegration.

More~

on the other hand, first

depicts the corrupt states of Europe and then the ideal
commonwealth of Utopia.
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It is interesting to speculate whether More might have
planned originally to follow Plato's order in depicting the
best before the worst examples of political organisms.

Since

he presumably wrote Book II before Book I, he may have
intended to follow Plato's example more closely.

The question

of the order of composition of the UtoQia, however, is too
complex to be discussed parenthetically.

It will be

considered in greater detail in the next chapter.
Although More reverses Plato's order of contrast, he
accomplishes the same objective:
justice over injustic9.

showing the superiority of

Because More's method of dramatic

representation differs from Plato's logical analysis, however,
the parallels between Book I of the Utopia and Part IV (VII
543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic seem less obvious than they

really are.

Plato describes the corruption of the ideal state

in Books VIII and IX in the same logical manner in which he
analyzes the
V 471 C).

devel~pment

of the state in Part II (II 368 A-

He does not give a historical account of the

way states or individuals actually have been kno\'Jn to
disintegrate.

Rather he logically analyzes the causes and the

process of disorganization of the state and of the individual
and describes four hypothetical stages of corruption between the
best and the worst.
In Book I of the

~toJQia

More also reveals the insidious

nature of injustice, but his method differs from that of Plato.

~-.-----------------------19-9----------------------~
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More does not attempt to analyze the process of disintegration
or to predicate progressive stages of injustice.

He rather

attempts to reveal the actual conditions in Europe through a
fictional pretense that the events described are real.

Indeed,

many of the situations and circumstances described in Book I
have been traced to actual events and conditions in More's
time.

Book I, however, is no more historically accurate than

Book II.
~tORia

Unquestionably, it helps in understanding the

to have an awareness of the particular historical

situations to which allusions are made.

But one should not

mistake the Utopia for a sustained political or religious
diatribe on specific abuses in Europe.

The artistic purpose

of the work taken as a whole transcends any specific reform
the author may have intended in the particular anecdotes
within either book.
In Book I of the Utopia More achieves the same
artistic objective as that achieved by Plato in Books VIII and
IX of the Republic.

,He forces assent from the reader that the

injustice in Europe is pitiable, especially in comparison with
the justice of Utopia.

He accomplishes this end by arranging

specific examples of corruption in a total picture of injustice.
A comparison of More's portrayal in Book I and

Plato'~

logical

analysis in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic
reveals that the causes and the results
works are similar.

or

injustice in both

~---------------------------20-0--~----------------------'
~

In Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the ReRub1ic
socrates answers G1aucon's third challenge as stated in the
exordium.

G1aucon argues the advantages of injustice over

justice by describing a hypothetical case in which he compares
the perfectly unjust man to the man who embodies justice.

The

unjust man, while gaining a reputation for justice, does what
he pleases and lords it over weaker men.

In contrast, the

just man, reviled and persecuted, is blamed for injustice.

In

such a case, G1aucon concludes, the life of the unjust man is
obviously happier and more beneficial than that of the just.
That Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) constitutes the
answer to this challenge is indicated by Socrates at the
opening of Book VIII.

He begins by summarizing what has

transpired up to this point in the dialogue.

He then indicates

that the discussion which follows concerns the question of the
relative advantage of justice and injustice.

He hopes to show

that justice is more advantageous than injustice by describing
the various stages of corrupt men and governments that proceed
from the disintegration of the best man and the best state.
He explains his purpose:

"In order that, after observing the

most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and
complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and
pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of
the possessor.H 1
lRep. VIII 545 A (Shorey, II, 241).

~----------~----------------2-0-1--------------------------~
In observing the most unjust condition of a man and of
a state, Socrates answers in another way Thrasymachus' argument
as stated in Book I.

Socrates shows that a man who lives in

accordance with Thrasymachus' theories of justice would
actually be the most unhappy and miserable of all creatures.
Thus Books I, VIII, and IX have a common motif.

(In depicting

injustice in Book I, More telescopes the essential elements of
these three books of the

~eQublic.)

Socrates begins his narration of the process of disorganization by identifying the source of corruption in the
ruling class.

He maintains that there exists a ··simple and

unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution
takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension
arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself,
however small it be, innovation is impossible."

2

This

corruption of the ruling class results from an inevitable
decay that comes to everything in the visible world.

Even an

ideal state, therefo're, would eventually become corrupt.
Corruption begins, for example, when the guardians miscalculate
the propitious time to marry and beget children.

Socrates

explains that when the guardians flbring together brides and
bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be well-born
or fortunate ••,3

Thus Plato attributes the corruption in the

---------------------------.------_._---._.----------._-_._--------.-------2Ree • VIII 540 D (Shorey, II, 245).

3Reeo VIII 546 D (Shorey, II, 247).
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ruling class to hereditary imperfections brought about by
astrological influences.
'.

In the QioQia the source of corruption is likewise
shown to emanate from the ruling element in the state.

The

£ersona More, at the beginning of Book It implicitly assigns
responsibility for the corruption in Europe to the character
of the ruler:

"From the monarch, as from a never-failing

spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole
4
nation."
There is no suggestion, however, that the corruption
of the monarch or the state results from unpropitious breeding.
Indeed, it can be assumed from the practice in Utopia that
breeding has little or nothing to do with the causes of
justice or injustice.

In Utopia marriages are not arranged

in order to produce future leaders of the state.

The Utopiens

freely choose their marriage partners and their officials.
Moreover, the criterion for the selection of officials does not
depend upon blood lines.

This difference in regard to breeding

reflects More's democratic tendencies in contrast to Plato's
preference for an aristocracy.
Socrates attributes a whole train of abuses to the
unpropitious begetting of children.

He describes the symptoms

of the first stage of corruption which follows from
unpropitious breeding.
4

Injustice in the body politic starts

Utopia, p. 57/16-18.
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with avarice in the rulers.
wealth, power, and honor.

They begin to exhibit a love of
The desire for wealth, particularly

in the form of private property, grows out of a compromise
of the principles upon which the ideal state is founded.
The gold and silver classes, instead of remaining above the
petty squabbles of the bronze and iron classes, become
embroiled in their disputes:
When strife arose • • • the two groups were pulling against
each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and
the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver,
and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor
but by nature rich in their souls, were trying to draw
them back to virtue and their original constitution,
and thus, striving and contending against one another,
they compromised on the plan of distributing and taking
for themselves the land and houses, enslaving and
subjecting as perioeci and serfs their former friends
and supporters, of whose freedom they had been guardians,
and occupying tgemselves with war and keeping watch over
these subjects.
Socrates calls this first stage of corruption timocracy.
In the timocratic man or in the timocratic state, the spirited
~lement rather than the rational element takes control.

A man

with a spirited element dominant in his soul naturally seeks
--

honor in contrast to the philosopher who seeks truth and
wisdom.

The timocratic man and the timocratic state, there-

fore, prefer war to peace.

Socrates explains that the timocratic

state differs from the aristocratic or ideal state chiefly
"in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has

5Rep • VIII 547 B (Shorey, II, 249).
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of this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of mixed
strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited
and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for
peace, and in honouring the stratagems and contrivances of
war and occupying itself with war most of the time."6

After

considering the timocratic man and the timocratic state,
Socrates proceeds in the remainder of Book VIII to show the
further disintegration of the ideal state.

Oligarchy,

democracy, and tyranny follow timocracy as the three advanced
stages of evil and injustice.
Thomas More does not arrange the details of the picture
of injustice and evil in Europe in Book I of the Utopia in
accordance with a principal of progressive evil.

Rather, as

will be discussed in greater detail below, he fits the parts
into an arrangement which represents a more static condition
of injustice.

Nonetheless, he portrays the causes and results

of three of Plato's stages of corruption--timocracy, oligarchy,
and tyranny.

The evils of democracy, however, are conspicuously

absent from More's picture.
In describing the sources of evil and injustice in
Europe, Hythlodaeus does not specifically label the kinds of
corrupt governments as does Socrates.

He does, however,

identify those sources of corruption mentioned by Socrates as
6Rep • VIII 548 E (Shorey, II, 251).

205
symptomatic of the timocratic state.

The overriding concern

'for war and the fear of wise men are common evils in Europe
which account for its deplorable condition.
The description of the French king's council suggests
that European rulers accept war and its stratagems as a
customary condition of existence.

The king and councilors

do not even consider the question of the justice or injustice
of war.

They rather take for granted their intention to

appropriate to themselves as much land as possible whether
justly or unjustly.
Hythlodaeus also suggests that councilors in general
have a basic distrust of wise men.

Early in Book I he explains

that those who are unduly impressed with their own importance
and who are concerned with their rank at court will hardly
welcome wise or clever men into their midst:

"If anyone,

when in the company of people who are jealous of others'
discoveries or prefer their own, should propose something which
he either has read or done in other times or has seen done in
other places, the listeners behave as if their whole reputation
for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they would
deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could lay
hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries of
others."?
?UtoQia, pp. 57/39-59/6.
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then, Hythlodaeus does not hypothesize

a first stage in a process of corruption of the ideal·state,
as Socrates does in the

Repub1\~.

He points out, however, that

the states of Europe show the same evils as symptoms as
Plato's timocratic state.

He also ascribes to Europe the evils

of oligarchy, the next stage of corruption described by Socrates.
Socrates explains that an oligarchy is a state based
on property qualifications: "The rich hold offic~ and the
poor man is exc1uded. lt8 Those in ruling positions seek to
maintain and augment their power and wealth by perverting the
laws in their own favor, "for first they invent ways of
expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end.,,9
Laws perverted in such fashion must be enforced by terror.
The ruling class must particularly promulgate by force the
basic law which prescribes ownership of private property as a
prerequisite to hold office.

This law, Socrates explains,

"they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting
to that they establish their government by terrorization."lO
In a government thus established, the rich landowners
become wealthier and more powerful, and the poor become
poorer.

This condition comes about from the practice of
8Hep • VIII 550 C (Shorey, II, 261).
9Rep • VIII 550 D (Shorey, II, 261).

~"
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10Rep. VIII 551 B (Shorey, II, 263).
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buying and selling.

Thrifty and acquisitive men take the

means of sustenance from those with a spendthrift nature.

In

an oligarchic state a loss of goods results in a loss of means
of livelihood.

Thus the class of idle paupers increases.

socrates likens the idlers and malefactors in the city to
drones in a beehive.

He explains that the presence of

drones is a symptom of an oligarchic state:
• • • that wherever you see beggars in a

flIt is plain, then,

city~

there are

somewhere in the neighbourhood concealed thieves and cutpurses
and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. flll
The oligarchic state is unjust primarily because the
presence of two classes violates the principle of unity.
drones wage continual war on the rich.

The

The result is that

"such a city should of necessity be not one, but two, a city
of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and
always plotting against one another. fl12
The characteristic evils of an oligarchy are, then,
a ruling class based'on property qualification, a perversion
of laws with enforcement by terror, and a pauper class that has
a parasitic effect on the body politic.

Hythlodaeus describes

similar symptoms in the state of Europe in Book I of the
gtopia.
11Reg • VIII 552 D (Shorey, II, 269).
12Rep. VIII 551 D (Shorey, II, 265).
12Reg.
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The condition of England, as depicted in the episode
at Cardinal Morton's house, closely resembles the oligarchy
defined in the Republic.

The English ruling class derives its

power from the ownership of land.

Hythlodaeus castigates the

practice of those noblemen and abbots who constantly enclose
more and more property in order to graze their sheep.

He

points out how the avarice of the rich results in the
oppression of the poor:

"Consequently, in order that one

insatiable glutton and accursed plague of his native land may
join field to field and surround many thousand acres with one
fence, tenants are evicted • .,13
Not only do these rich landowners provide no productive
service to their country; they also gather around them a class
of idle retainers.

Hythlodaeus uses a drone metaphor similar

to that used by Socrates to describe the noblemen and their
attendants:

"Now there is the great number of noblemen who

not only live idle themselves like drones on the labors of
others, as for instance the tenants of their estates whom they
fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for that is
the only economy they know of, being otherwise so extravagant
as to bring themselves to beggaryl) but who also carry about
with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have never learned
a trade for a livelihood • .,14 Because these idlers have no
13Utopia, p. 67/14-16.
14Utopia, p. 6315-11.
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trade, they turn to begging or stealing when their masters
die or fallon hard times.

The rich landowners, as a

consequence, exact harsh punishments in order to enforce
the unjust laws.

Such a law is that which prescribes the death

penalty for stealing sheep.

England, then, with its two classes

of rich and poor constantly warring against one another,
resembles the oligarchic state described by Socrates.
Furthermore, the anonymous king and his councilors
(More probably had England in mind here) betray the vices of
Plato's oligarchic man.

They display their passion for wealth

in the ways they plot to heap up treasures at the expense of
the people.

Moreover, most of their ingenious fund-raising

methods involve a perversion of the law.

One councilor, for

example, reminds the king "of certain old and moth-eaten laws,
annulled by long non-enforcement, which no one remembers being
made and therefore everyone has transgressed. M15 By reviving
the law, the king can reap a rich harvest:

MThe king should

exact fines for their transgression, there being no richer
source of profit nor any more honorable than such as has an
outward mask of jUsticet M16 _
Although More portrays the evils of timocracy and
oligarchy in Book I of the Utopia, he conspicuously omits
i5Utopia, p. 9315-7.
i6Utopia, p. 93/7-10.
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the evils of democracy, the third stage of corruption in the
Republic.

This omission indicates More's deviation from

-

Plato's political philosophy.

Not only are the evils of

democracy absent from the picture of injustice in Book I,
but Utopia, as portrayed in Book II, manifests the obverse
side of the democratic vices described by Socrates.Socrates explains that the ruling elements seek honor
in a timocracy and wealth in an oligarchy, but the citizens
of a democracy seek freedom above all else.

Unfortunately

they confuse freedom with license.

They think of freedom as

the fulfillment of sensual desires.

Thus, in a democratic

man, the lowest or appetitive part of the soul overthrows
reason, the highest part.

This reversal in the soul of man

corresponds to the overthrow of the wise man by the drones
in the state.

When drones control the state, every man can

do as he pleases instead of performing the task suitable to
his nature.

As a result of this confusion of tasks, equals and

unequals are treated alike.
The lack of distinction between equals and unequals
destroys the hierarchical order, which is essential to
justice.

In the place of the three classes in the aristocratic

state--leaders, guardians, and tradesmen--there arise in a
democracy three classes of a different kind.
are the most numerous, become dominant.
the frenzied behavior of the drone class:

The drones, who

Socrates describes
"The fiercest part
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of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder
swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a
buzzing and tolerates no dissent, so that everything with
slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a
state."l?

This class inevitably produces the capitalists

who cleverly acquire money from the rest.

These capitalists,

the second class, supply money to the drones so that in effect
a few wealthy men indirectly control the state.

Those who till

the land and have little property make up the third class.
This lowest element of society shares in the wealth only
"to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in
distributing to the people what they take from the well-to-do,
to keep the lion's share for themselves. H18 The equality in
a democracy, therefore, is an illusion.

Actually three unequal

castes exist, and the distinctions among them are based on the
worst possible criterion:

a particular man rises above the

others to the extent that his appetites become dominant.
In Utopia the evils Socrates ascribes to a democratic
state have been avoided, although the Utopian commonwealth is
basically a democracy.

The basis of Utopian administration is

democratic insofar as the people elect the governor and the
ruling syphogrants.

The citizens are also equal in most

l?Rep. VIII 564 D (Shorey, II, 315).

18Rep • VIII 565 A (Shorey, II, 317).
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respects.
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The equality of the Utopians is different, however,

~,

:,'

from that described by Socrates as characteristic of a
democratic state.
property.

The Utopians share equally their goods and

They also have equality of opportunity; any citizen

may be elected to public office or may be selected to advance
to the class of scholars.

The other citizens have the

opportunity to select a trade of their choice consonant with
the needs of the whole state.

Moreover, the Utopians base

distinctions among citizens on merit, not on political influence
'."

~

or power.

Regardless of function, however, all citizens

share equally in the material advantages of the whole state.
Utopian equality is particularly evident in the
administration of justice.

Jurisprudence in Utopia directly

contrasts with that practiced in England.
punishes equals and unequals alike.

The English law

Hythlodaeus points out

that the number of murders in England is greater than it
otherwise would be because the law makes no distinction
between the crime of theft and that of murder:

"Since the

robber sees that he is in as-as'- great danger if merely condemned
for theft as if he werewere' convicted of murder as well, this
single consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise he would only have robbed. fl19 The Utopians, on the other
hand, prescribe punishment to suit individual crimes.
19Utopia, p. 7517-10.

They
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punish adultery with the strictest form of slavery, and "for
all other crimes there is no law prescribing any fixed
penalty, but the punishment is assigned by the senate
according to the atrocity, or veniality, of the individual
crime. n20
Because the Utopians have a proper understanding of
the end of man and the nature of justice, they do not confuse
freedom with license.

They do not feel that following one's

inclinations is in itself freedom.

They think, on the contrary,

that a man who indulges his appetites without regard to reason
is more apt to bring suffering upon himself than to achieve
freedom.

Their attitude toward pleasure gives evidence of

this understanding of freedom.

They follow only good and

beneficial pleasures, because npain they think a necessary
21
consequence if the pleasure is base."
Freedom for the
Utopians pertains not to the appetites but to the rational

r

part of man's nature.

The constitution itself "looks in the

first place to this sole object:

that for all the citizens,

.-

as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible
should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted
to the freedom and culture of the mind.
20UtoRia, p. 191/22-26.
21UtoRia, p. 177/36-37.
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It is in the latter
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that they deem the happiness of life to consist.

u22

The essential difference, then, between Utopian
democracy and that described by Socrates relates to the concepts
of freedom and equality.

The Utopians adhere to the concept

of freedom that Socrates ascribes to the aristocratic
state and not to the license that he thinks is the evil of
democracy.

The Utopians, like Socrates, think that freedom

for all the citizens can be achieved when each man does as he
ought, as determined by reason, and not when each is allowed
to do as he pleases.

They believe also that all the citizens

should share equally material, intellectual, and social
advantages but that the law should not punish equals and
unequals alike.
Although More evaluates democracy differently from Plato
he displays the same attitude toward tyranny.
tyranny is the worst stage of corruption.
Socrates points out
results in tyranny.

~hat

In both works

In the ReQublic

the process of disintegration eventually

Injustice reigns completely in a tyranny

because the hierarchical order of nature is completely reversed-the worst elements rule the best.

Being the last stage of

corruption, tyranny incorporates all the evils of the other
three stages.

Like the timocratic man, the tyrant "is always

stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of a
22Utopia, p. 135/20-24.
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leader.,,2 3
~nsatiab1e

The tyrant, like the oligarchic man, has an
lust for gold.

This lust motivates him to waste

the resources of the people.
lust enslaves the people:

Socrates explains how the tyrant's

"And also that being impoverished

by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their
daily business and be less likely to plot against him.- 24
Finally, like the democratic man, the tyrant has an unquenchable
.

desire to gratify all his sensual appetites.
inhibition, as a man in a dream:

He acts without

"When under the tyranny

of his ruling paSSion, he is continuously and in waking
hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from
no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the paSSion
that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in

u~most

anarchy

and 1aw1essness.,,25
After describing the nature of the tyrant and the
manner of his life, Socrates devotes the remainder of Part IV
(VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) to showing why tyranny is inferior in
all respects to the ideal state.

This explanation at the same

time answers the question of-why justice 1s more beneficial'
than injustice.

Socrates first argues that tyranny ironically

results in the opposite of those ends for which it arises.
23ReR • VIII 566 E-567 A (Shorey, II, 323-25).

24~eR. VIII 567 A (Shorey, II, 325).
25R~Q. IX 575 A (Shorey, II, 349).
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Instead of being free, rich, and secure from fear, the tyrant
as well as the state he rules is enslaved, poor, and fearful.
The tyrant is a slave instead of a free man because there is
no order in his soul.
reason.

His appetites completely rule his

Similarly, in the tyrannous state, the dictator and

his sycophants eliminate or subjugate the finer spirits.
Socrates describes the inevitable slavery of a tyrant and the
state he rules:

"If then • • • the man resembles the state,

must not the same proportion obtain in him, and his soul teem
with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most
reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part,
the worst and most frenzied, plays the despot?H26

The tyrant

and his state are also poor instead of rich because he and his
subjects constantly crave to satisfy their insatiable appetites.
Such anarchy and lack of order result in a city and a man full
of terrors and alarms.

Soorates draws the obvious conclusion

that since a tyrant and his city are enslaved, poor, and
fearful, they are not happy but wretched.
Socrates maintains further that the life of the just man
is more pleasurable than the life of the tyrant.

He begins his

explanation with the proposition that there are three kinds of
pleasure corresponding to three types of men:

flAnd that is

why we say that the primary classes of men also are three, the
26

Rep. IX 577 C-D (Shorey, II, 359).
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philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the
lover of gain. • • • And also that there are three forms of
pleasure, corresponding respectively to each. n27

Socrates

then goes on to argue that the philosopher, in the course of
his experience, has inevitably enjoyed the lower pleasures,
but the lover of victory and the lover of gain have never
tasted the highest pleasure.

He concludes that since the true

philosopher invariably chooses the love of wisdom over the
other two lower pleasures, this kind of pleasure must be the
best.
Socrates maintains even further that pleasure other
than that of intelligence is merely an illusion.

To explain

his meaning, he cites the example of some people who call
pleasure the neutral state that results from the cessation of
pain or pleasure.

He explains that true pleasure cannot be

mere relief from pain, nor can true pain be cessation of
pleasure.

He bases this argument on the premise that "both

pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion. n28
Since a state of quietude, and not a state of motion, results
from the cessation of pain or pleasure, it follows that
quietude is a state neither of pleasure nor of pain.

Furthermore,

that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot be both pleasure

27Rep • IX 581 C (Shorey, II, 373-75).
28Rep • IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383).
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and pain.

From this rather contrived argument Socrates draws

this conclusion:

"This is not a reality, then, but an

illusion • • • • in such case the quietude in juxtaposition
with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the
pleasure pain.,,29
Socrates compares the tyrant and the state he rules
to the true philosopher-king and the ideal state in
regard to freedom, wealth, fear, and pleasure.
the tyrant is shown to be the loser.

On all counts

At the end of Book IX,

the contrast between the best and the worst state is
completed.

The inescapable conclusion is that justice is

more beneficial than injustice in both the state and the
individual.
In the Utopia Thomas More reverses the order of the
contrast between the worst and the best.
be drawn, however, is the same.

The

conc~usion

to

Book I depicts tyranny as the

most wretched form of government.

The nature of tyranny,

however, must be abstracted from Hythlodaeus' remarks about
various conditions in Europe-.

Each state mentioned by

Hythlodaeus displays some characteristic of the tyrannical
nature described by Socrates.

Slavery is the condition of the

people portrayed in the narrative of the conversation at
Cardinal Morton's house.

The French king and his councilors

29Rep • IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383-85).
29ReR
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represent the tyrannical characteristic of warmongering.

The

anonymous king and his councilors exhibit the greed of tyrants
and the unscrupulous means they will employ to fulfill their
desires.

In true tyrannical fashion they exploit the people

and pervert the laws.

The councilors betray their natures

by their consent to the famous statement of
amount of gold is enough

Cra~sus:

"No

for the ruler who has to keep an

army.n3 0
The accumulation of these various vices in the men and
the states they control gives a total impression of Europe
as one vast tyranny.

In referring to the anonymous king,

Hyth10daeus epitomizes this impression with the image of a
prison:

"To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of

pleasure and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations
of all around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but
of a jai1."3 1
In Book I of the Utopia, then, Thomas More portrays a
tyranny which resembles in its basic elements the tyranny
described in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) of the

~epub1ic.

He presents this picture in preparation for the description
of the ideal state in Book II.

In Book II he paints the

antithesis of the defects that have emerged from the

30Utopia, p. 93/38-39.
3 1Utopia, p. 95/37-39.
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dialogue in Book I.

In contrast to the slavery, war, and misery

of Europe, there are freedom, peace, and happiness in Utopia.
The contrast is particularly significant in regard to
"the matter of pleasure."

Unlike the kings and councilors in

Book I, who seek the gratification of their appetites, the
Utopians seek only legitimate pleasures.

The Utopians class

as spurious pleasures those which the Europeans mistake for
genuine, such as desire for gold, honor, and nobility.

Like

Socrates, they consider the pleasures of the mind as the
highest:

"To sum up, they cling above all to mental pleasures,
which they value as the first and foremost of all pleasures. n32
Although in their definition of other kinds of pleasure
the Utopians agree with Socrates about the highest kind of
pleasure, they display characteristic unconcern for his fine

distinctions.

For example, they have no interest in the

kind of demonstration which Socrates attempts in arguing that
pleasures other than, those/ of intelligence are illusions.
Thomas More has the ninth book of the Republic in mind, no
doubt, when he has Hythlodaeus describe the Utopian attitude
toward pleasure to be derived from a healthful state of the
body:
They think that it is of no importance in the discussion
whether you say that disease is pain or that disease is
accompanied with pain, for it comes to the same thing
either way. To be sure, if you hold that health is either
32Utopia, p. 175/34-35.
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a pleasure or the necessary cause of pleasure, as fire
is of heat, in both ways the conclusion is that those who
have permanent health cannot be without pleasure.))
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic, then,
provides

~

number of significant parallels with the Utopia.

In Book I of the Utopia More condenses Plato's entire
discussion of the process of corruption of the ideal state,
contained in Books VIII and IX of the Republic.

The pictures

of corruption, though different in the arrangement of parts
and inclusion of details, are similar in their essential form.
The contrast between justice and injustice that is
completed at the conclusion of Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B)
of the

E~RUblic

concludes Socrates' answer to the challenges

which Glaucon presents in the exordium.

Prior to Book X

Socrates has described the nature of justice and has shO\.,n
that the life of justice is more beneficial than the life of
injustice.

Moreover, he has argued in behalf of justice

without reference to the promise of rewards and punishments
after death.

In Book X, which constitutes Part V of the entire

dialogue, Socrates addresses--himself to the challenges raised
by Adeimantus in the exordium.
Adeimantus presents arguments similar to two of those
advanced by Glaucon.

He corroborates Glaucon's theory of a

deterministic sanction for justice and of the advantages of

33Utopia, p. 175 I 13-19.
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1njustice over justice.

He maintains first that men praise

justice not for its own sake, but for "the good repute with
mankind that accrues from it.·' 34

Further, they hope not only

to gain a reputation among men but also to gain a good
standing in the sight of the gods.

To substantiate their

argument, such persons cite the tales told by the poets in
which the gods favor the just with sensual delights.

Adeimantus

points out that even the worthy Homer and Hesiod teach such
doctrines.

Adeimantus argues next that to act unjustly is

easier and more pleasant than to act justly.

He again bolsters

his argument with an appeal to the authority of the poets.

The

poets teach that a man can live unjustly on earth and yet gain
rewards from the gods in the afterlife.

Their teachings are

particularly insidious because they "make not only ordinary
men'but states believe that there really are remissions of
sins and purifications for deeds of injustice. tr35 They also
teach conversely that even the just may be punished because
"terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.,,3 6
Although Adeimantus-Adeimantus·· states in another way two of his
brother's arguments, he raises two issues which Glaucon does
not consider.

First, he maintains that the poets are

responsible for the false teaching about justice.
34ReQ. II 363 A (Shorey, I, 129) •
35Rep. II 364 E (Shorey, I, 135) •

..

,

l
to
~.
~.

lt

36~eQ. II 365 A (Shorey, I,.135).
I,_135).
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the role of the poets, Adeimantus reveals that they advise
striving for the appearance rather than the reality of justice.
He cites what the poets teach about this matter:
The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise
seem so, not assets, they say, but liabilities, labour
and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself
a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then
since it is "the seeming," as the wise men show me, that
"masters the reality" and is lord of happin~ss, to this I
must devote myself without reserve.)?
reserve.)7
Secondly, Adeimantus asserts that in the afterlife the gods do
not reward and punish according to whether men have been just
or unjust on earth.

Rather, the unjust can continue their

delightful and pleasurable course in the world below, if they
observe special rites and functions prescribed by the poets
and the soothsayers.

With this second point Adeimantus denies

man's responsibility for his moral action.
Socrates answers the two issues raised by Adeimantus
in Part V (Book X) of the entire dialogue.

In the first half

of the book (595 A-605 C) he explains why the poets must be
banished from the ideal state.

In effect, Socrates undermines

the legitimacy of the poets'--authority which Adeimantus in the
exordium attempts to establish.

Socrates maintains that the

poets cannot be credited as teachers, for they deal in
appearances rather than in truth.

He insists that even the

renowned Homer cannot be allowed a hearing:

37
37ReQ
ReQ • II 365 C (Shorey, I, 137).

"Shall we, then,
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it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,
are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things
they 'create,' and do not lay hold on truth?"3

8

The first

half of Book X, then, pertains to the poets themselves and to
the reasons why they are not creditable teachers.

They

are banished because they are deceivers.
In the second half of Book X (608 C-621 D) Socrates
offers an alternative to the doctrine about the afterlife
taught by the poets.

In this last section of the whole dialogue

Socrates takes up the question of the immortality of the
soul, a question which he has conspicuously avoided up to this
point.

In contrast to Adeimantus' description of the tales

told by the poets in which the unjust continue after death in
sensual delights, Socrates relates the story of Er.

The myth

makes the point that unless a man has through a virtuous life
learned to choose wisely between good and evil, he can expect
a life of torment and pain in the world below.

By telling

this story, Socratei directly confutes Adeimantus' implicit
assumption that men need not-be responsible for their actions.
The place of the myth of Er in the structure of the
Republic parallels the position of the discussion of religion
in the Utopia.

Both works conclude with the affirmation of

the belief in a life hereafter and the promise of rewards and
38Rep • X 600 E (Shorey, II, 441).
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punishments after death.

As was mentioned in the last chapter,

however, the belief in rewards and punishments after death is
a more integral part of the structure of the Utopia because
such belief is the basis for the sanction for justice.

In the

Republic, on the other hand, Socrates does not insist that
belief in rewards and punishments in the life hereafter is
necessary as a sanction for justice.

He maintains, rather, that

the knowledge of the form of justice attained in this life is
a sufficient imperative.
In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to
reveal how Plato unifies the parts of the structure of the
~

Republic through the development of the theme of justice.

At

i'
I:

,~

the same time the ideas contained in the various structural

t

parts have been compared and contrasted with analogous ideas

c

~'.

in the Utopia.

rL
~:

~.

f

This method of comparison and contrast has

subtly suggested the ways in which Thomas More has adapted
many of Plato's notions in his creation of the Utopia.

The

remaining chapters attempt to explain how More has arranged
~"

his ideas in the different parts of his structure and how
he has unified the parts through the theme of justice.

The

chapters reveal that, although not a slavish imitation of the
Republic, the Utopia follows the contours of Plato's work in
its basic form.

CHAPTER VIII
THE COMPOSITION OF THE UTOPIA
A study of the structure of the Utopia can appropriately
begin with a consideration of the order in which the books
were composed.

It is generally accepted that Thomas More wrote

the second book before the first, the chief grounds for this
theory being a letter written by Erasmus to Ulrich von Hutten
in 1519.

Erasmus remarks that More "had written the second

book at his leisure, and afterwards, when he found it was
required; added the first off-hand.
inequality in the style."

1

Hence there is some

This statement apparently has

contributed to a rather widespread assumption that the UtoQia
is a fractured work.

Many commentators, writing with this

assumption, discuss either the first or the second book to the
exclusion of the other.
Ordinarily Book II receives most attention.

As Russell

Ames has observed, "The 'Utopian' second part seems to dominate
the mind whenever Utopia ismentioned.·r2 Yet the literary
excellence of the first book has not gone unnoticed.
Hexter, in particular, has remarked upon the excellent

1The Egistles of Erasmus, p. 398.
2Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia, p. 4.
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literary quality of Book 1. 3
Hexter has also helped our understanding of More's
composition of the whole work.

His analysis, however, tends

to confirm the impression that the Utopia, as a whole, lacks
unity.

He hypothesizes that More wrote the dialogue of counsel

in the first book as an afterthought and that its subject matter
is distinct and almost unrelated to the subject matter in Book
II.

He impugns the organic unity of More's work succinctly:
The part of Utopia that More composed first is itself a
consistent, coherent, and practically complete literary
work. This implies--what I believe to be true--that in
More's original intent the first-written part of Utopia,
probably completed in Antwerp, was a finished work, that
only after he returned to London did he feel impelled to
add anything to it, that the published version of Utopia
falls into two parts which represent two different and
separate sets of intention on the part of the author,
the first embodied in the finished book he carried back
from the Netherlands, ~he second in the additions he
later made in England.

Although Hexter does not set out specifically to show the lack
of unity in the Utopia, he assumes that because Book I was
written at a different time and under different circumstances
than Book II, the work as a.whole lacks unity.

3More 's Utopia:

To support

The Biography of an Idea.

4 Ibid ., p. 28. Hexter has published his theory of the
composition of the Utopia in this book as well as in the
Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia. His theory is
more fully developed in his earlier work. In this chapter,
therefore, it will be necessary to refer to both the earlier
treatment (1952) and the Yale edition (1965) as the discussion
requires.

".....
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his conclusions, he presents considerable evidence, some of
which will be examined presently.
Many critics have argued that the liQRublic also lacks
unity.

They contend that the middle section, Books V-VII, was

later inserted between Books IV and VIII in what was originally
a complete work and that the philosophical content and tone
of the later addition reveal a progression in Plato's thought
and in his art.

In an essay in which he argues for the unity

of the Republic, Lewis Campbell summarizes this critical
opinion and explains that those who argue against the unity
of the Republic use the following evidence to support their
theory:
They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions
to V-VII in the concluding books, VIII-X, as compared with
the frequent and distinct allusions in VIII-X to I-IV,
and have further observed that the references to I-IV
which occur in the central portion, V-VII, have more the
appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle
continuity which binds together I-IV, or VIII-X, when
taken separately. A. Krohn also dwells on the difference
of tone and philosophical content between V-VII on the
one hand and I-IV and VIII-X on the other.)
Campbell argues that although some inequalities can be found
in the structure of the
masterpiece of unity.

~eRublic,

the work as a whole is a

He states his conclusion:

The unity of the ReRublic as a literary masterpiece
hardly needs defence. Each part has its own climax of
interest, and in spite of the intentional breaks and
digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a

.5~., p. 11.
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continuous rise and fall,--as in a tragedy,--pervading
the whole work. 6
Our analysis of the Republic in the foregoing chapters
supports Campbell's conclusion.

In the remaining chapters our

intention will be to argue that More's work as a whole, like
the Regublic, is essentially unified and coherent despite
.
some inequality in tone and style. Before p~esenting the
positive argument in support of the Utopia's unity of

.

structure, however, it seems appropriate to consider some of
the evidence supporting the position that the Utogia is a
fractured work.
Because J. H. Hexter is probably the most influential
contributor to the general impression that the Utogia lacks
unity, part of his argument will be considered in some detail.
Having ingeniously reconstructed More's historical milieu, he
concludes that Erasmus' statement about the reversed order
of composition is not precisely correct.

Hexter argues

that some portion of Book I, namely, what he labels the
introduction (Utopia, pp.

47~55),

must have been written at

the same time as Book II.
In developing his argument, Hexter traces More's
activities between the time he apparently began writing the
Utopi~

and the time he finished it.

He surmises that when

More returned to England from his trip to the Netherlands, the
61.!2.!.£., p. 11.
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uppermost problem in his mind was the decision of whether or
not to enter the King's service as a councilor.

According

to Hexter, when More decided to write Book I, he had already
completed Book II.

Thus he had Book II in the back of his

mind as he thought over his decision:
As he pondered his decision, we may surmise, More
remembered his literary creation, Raphael Hythlodaeus,
somewhat amorphous still as he appeared in the Introduction
and Discourse, not really fully characterized in the little
book about Utopia that was almost finished • • • More
thus set.Hythlodaeus up as the protagonist of a dialogue
about counsel, a dialogue in which the perplexities coursing
through his own mind were worked over in ~ exchange of
views among Hythlodaeus, Giles, and More.
Hexter then reconstructs how More wrote the remainder of
Book I in separate portions as he encountered specific problems
relating to his decision:

"How much further he got before he

was again diverted we cannot say.

At some point, however, he

became acutely aware of another dimension of the problem about
counsel. f ,8

However accurate this reconstruction of More's state

of mind may be, Hexter

con~eys

an impression of the UtoQia as

a loosely structured, episodic narration of More's personal
history.
Bexter's theory that the debate on councilorship
forms the central core of the subject matter in Book I has
been very influential.

David Bevington, for example,

7utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvi.
8Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvii.
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essentially agrees with Hexter that More's personal dilemma
shaped the subject matter and form of Book I, although he
disagrees with Hexter's theory that the character Hythlodaeus
represents the author More's state of mind. 9

He maintains that

both Hythlodaeus and More as persona represent the tension
which existed in the mind of More as the author!

Bevington,

in fact, interprets both books of the Utogia in terms of the
problem of councilorship.

After analyzing the ambivalent

attitude in Book I, he sees the same ambivalence in Book II:
The description of the island of Utopia in Book II deals
similarly with the problem of the philosopher in deciding
whether or not to participate in a government. The
respective stands of nersona More and of Hythloday are
merely tfB obverse of their previous positions concerning
tyranny.
Although both Hexter and Bevington maintain that the
debate on councilorship dominates the subject matter in Book I,
neither explicitly states that it is the theme.

In fact,

few critical articles deal specifically with the theme of Book
I.

The neglect of this important literary aspect of the Utogia

suggests a widespread bewilderment as to the exact nature of
the theme in Book I.

Without specifically describing the

theme, critics commonly assume it to be councilorship.

At any

rate, Hexter seems to have this intention when he writes that
9"Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides to the Question,"
Studies in.~hilology, LVIII (July, 1961), 496-509.
lOIbl-d., pp. 508 - 509 •
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Book I "is a tight-knit dialectic exploration of the problem.
of counseling princes in sixteenth-century Europe."ll
My purpose is· not to discount the importance which
Hexter and Bevington attach to More's personal dilemma.

Both

argue convincingly that the debate on councilorship reflects
a real problem that More was pondering at the time he wrote
Book I.

It is my intention, however, to explain why

councilorship should not be assumed to be the dominant theme
of Book I.

The debate on councilorship is subordinate, rather,

to the theme of injustice.
The insistence here that the debate on councilorship
is not the theme of Book I arises from the three following
considerations:

first, the actual exchanges between the Rersona

More, Peter Giles, and Hythlodaeus on the question of whether
the philosopher should enter a king's service does not pervade
the diSCUSSion, as does the theme of injustice, but it recurs
at relatively infrequent intervals; second, the "dialectic
exploration" is not "tight-knit," or a f'close argument, II
as Hexter maintains;12 and third, the point at issue in
the debate, namely, the duty of a good man in an evil
environment, is subordinate to the theme of justice.
In relation to the total length of Book I, the debate

11~topia, Introduction, p. xx.
12Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxviii.

~--------------------------------~
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on councilorship itself is only a small portion.

The exchanges

of views which specifically relate to counseling occur at three
junctures, which comprise about one-fifth of the entire book.
That is, roughly 220 lines out of 1100 pertain to the
question of whether Hythlodaeus should become a king's councilor.
The interspersed anecdotes narrated by Hythlodaeus--the dialogue
at Cardinal Morton's and the two kings' council meetings--are
only tenuously connected to the question.

The other four-fifths

of the book relates in one way or another to injustice.
The debate itself is neither tightly knit dialectic
nor a close argument.

Hythlodaeus' answers to Peter Giles's

and Thomas More's urgings to become a councilor are desultory
and maundering qua answers.

This is not to say that the

artistic merit of the book suffers as a result.

The casual

nature of the conversation adds to the realistic effect and
provides a framework within which the theme of injustice can
be developed.

/

.

The first segment of the debate (55/15-59/17) contains
two exchanges.

Hythlodaeus responds first to the arguments

of Peter Giles and then to those of Thomas More.

Peter Giles

suggests that Hythlodaeus could be of great service "by
entertaining a king with this learning and experience of
men and places.·t i)

Furthermore, he adds that Hythlodaeus

l)utopia, p. 55/18-19.
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,

could profit himself as well as his relatives.

Answering in

a characteristic manner, Hythlodaeus retorts to only one part,
and that the least important, of the argument offered by Peter
Giles.

The mariner does not feel obligated to help his

relatives since he has previously given them everything he
owned.
Peter Giles then reasserts one of his previous pOints
and adds another reason not mentioned previously.

He repeats

that Hythlodaeus could make himself more prosperous.

More

importantly, he opines that the philosopher could profit
other people "both as private individual~ and as members of
the commonwealth. tl14 In his reply Hythlodaeus objects to the
logic that his condition could be made prosperous by a way his
soul abhors but fails to acknowledge the most important of
Giles's reasons--that his services should be rendered to help
other people.
Hythlodaeus' evasion of the main issue prompts Thomas
More to reassert Peter's point.
sense of duty.

He appeals to the philosopher's

Praising Hythlodaeus' learning and experience,

he reminds him of his obligation to make some monarch follow
"straightforward and honorable courses.,,15

Again avoiding

the real issue, Hythlodaeus does not directly answer More's
14Utopia, p. 55/37-38.
15Utopia, p. 57/16.
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Suggestion that he has a moral duty to become a king's councilor;
instead he uses the opportunity to point out the injustice in
the character of kings and their councilors.
describes the warlike nature of kings:

He first

"In the first place

almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in pursuits of
war--with which I neither have nor desire any acquaintance-rather than in the honorable activities of peace, and they
care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may .win fresh
kingdoms than how they may administer well what they have got."16
As an argument against becoming a councilor this
statement is spurious on two counts.

First, Hythlodaeus does

not say tlall monarchs" are concerned with war.
·almost all."

He says

Why, then, does he not offer his services to one

of those monarchs who are not concerned with war?
more important, the statement begs the question.

Second, and
Giles and

More presumably know already that many kings and their councilors
are bent on war and conquest.

For this reason, they urge

Hythlodaeus to attempt to effect a change in the habitual
behavior of such warmongers.-- Hythlodaeus, however, does not
attempt to show why he could not influence the opinions
of those in high places.

Ironically, he proceeds to relate a

story that proves just the opposite, i. e., his account of his
debate at the home of Cardinal Morton.

57/25-30.

16
UtoQia, p. 57/25-30.
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If councilorship
counci10rship is taken as the theme of Book I,
Hyth1odaeus' narration of his dialogue at Cardinal Morton's
Hythlodaeus'
table must be considered a long digression.

He tells the

story ostensibly to show that kings' councilors cannot be
swayed by sage advice.

If the anecdote proves anything about

councilors, it shows that at least one important royal
councilor readily accepts good advice.

The Cardinal, Lord

Chancellor of England, displays his wisdom and open-minded
attitude in his reaction to Hythlodaeus'
Hyth10daeus' arguments about

,

),

penal justice.

Of those present, it is he who first recognizes

the virtue of Hythlodaeus'
Hyth10daeus' remarks.

He agrees that the

philosopher's theories should be tried in practice.
The narration of the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's
table, then, is largely inappropriate as a rebuttal of the
Rersona More's argument on counseling.

By telling the anecdote,

Hyth10daeus avoids the point that More makes about his duty
Hythlodaeus
to be a councilor, and he proves,
if anything, that some
,,'
kings' councilors apparently are not concerned primarily
wi th war and money.

He also" shows that Cardinal Morton, a

royal councilor, could be swayed by a convincing argument.
Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the episode
at Cardinal Morton's house develops the theme of injustice.
The episode at Cardinal Morton's table also points up
the problem of irony that confronts us throughout both the .

.

i

,

;:

[iQpi~ and the Republic.

One cannot be sure that More intends

~-.----------------~
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the irony in the Cardinal 110rton incident.

In the Republic

the handling of the character of Cephalus, for example,
raises the question of Plato's intention.

In the opening of

the Republic Cephalus, displaying great satisfaction at the
prospect of engaging Socrates in serious philosophical discussion,
expresses regret that only occasionally does he have the
opportunity to talk with a person of Socrates' wisdom and
intelligence.

Yet as soon as Socrates pursues the question

of justice raised by Cephalus, the old man hurries off to
sacrifice to the gods.

Thus Cephalus, like Cardinal Morton,

displays behavior contrary to the ostensible role assigned to
him in the dialogue.
Indeed, the irony that runs through both the

Republi~

and the Utopia explains in part why so many interpretations
can be given for any particular passage in either work.

If

one reads the episode at Cardinal Morton's house as ironic,
it becomes increasingly evident that More does not wish to
stress the logic of Hythlodaeus' argument against becoming a
councilor.

.-

If the episode is not ironic, one must draw the

conclusion that More's forensic prowess deserted him in the
creation of his most famous work.

(After all, More as a judge

would not have accepted Hythlodaeus' story as strong evidence.)
An examination of the remainder of the debate on councilorship
tends to support the former conclusion:

-More is not

primarily interested in putting an airtight case for staying

~------------------------------~
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out of politics into the mouth of his main character.
After Hythlodaeus t narration of the dialogue at
Cardinal Morton's, the Qersona
persona More resumes the debate on
councilorship (85138-87/25).

Indicating in this short passage

that the story about Cardinal Morton does not answer the main
point of his argument, the Rersona More restates the main
point with the following curious remark:
Even now, nevertheless, I cannot change my mind but must
needs think that, if you could persuade yourself not to
shun the courts of kings, you could do the greatest good
to the common weal by your advice. The latter is the
most important part of your duty as it is the duty of every
good man. Your favorite author, Plato, is of opinion that
commonwealths will finally be happy only if either
philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy.1 7
The remark is curious because Hythlodaeus has not at any time
up to this point in Book I mentioned Plato as his favorite
author.

How then does his recent acquaintance, Thomas More,

know that he prefers Plato to other authors?

This anomaly

raises some interesting questions about the order of composition,
-'

to which we will return after further considering the logic
of the debate on

councilorsh~p.

In addition to the question of composition raised by
More's remark, his invocation of Plato's authority focuses the
theme on the real issue of the debate.

Appealing to the

prescription Plato lays
lays.down
,down for philosophers in the Republic,
he exclaims:

nWhat a distant prospect of happiness there will

I7utopia, p. 87/7-13.
17Utopi8,
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if philosophers will not condescend even to impart their
to kings! tl 18

In this statement the Qersona More

to Socrates' insistence in Book VII that the philosopher
moral duty to render his services to the state.

Socrates

explains that the philosopher must surrender his own happiness
for the common good:
Th~ law is not concerned with the special happiness of
any class in the state, but is trying to produce this
condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting
the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,
and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit
which they are severally able to bestow upon the community,
and that it itself creates such men in the state, not
that it may allow each to take what course pleases him
but with a view to uiing them for the binding together
of the commonwealth. 9

Hythlodaeus, however, does not meet the issue of the
moral duty of the philosopher.

Instead, he repeats his

previous assertion that kings cannot be changed.

He, too,

significantly invokes the authority of Plato in support of his
position:
But, doubtless, ~lato was right in foreseeing that if kings
themselves did not turn to philosophy, they would never
approve of the advice of real philosophers because they
have been from their youth saturated and infected with
wrong ideas. T2~s truth he found from his own experience
with Dionysius.
.
Again his answer misses the real issue--namely, the
".

!

lf.

18UtoPia, p. 87/13-15.
19Rep • VII 519 E-520 A (Shorey, II, 141).
20
..
Utopia, p. 87/18-23.

~--------------~------------~
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duty of a good man in an unjust society.

Furthermore, it

contains a distortion of Plato's meaning in the Republic.
Instead of defending the right of the philosopher not to
serve the king, Hythlodaeus simply maintains that kings must
change themselves if they are to change at all.

Although

Hythlodaeus refers in his statement to Plato's experience
with Dionysius, he distorts Plato's meaning in the Republic,
for Socrates never suggests that kings will ever turn to
philosophy of their own accord.

He makes it clear that one

does not turn to philosophy without a rigorous intellectual
training, which it is the responsibility of the philosopher
founders of the state to provide.
But Hythlodaeus insists, as the core of his argument,
that kings and their councilors are by nature corrupt.

To

support this contention, he imagines two hypothetical situations
in which the French king and an anonymous king are sitting
in council with their advisors.

Hythlodaeus ostensibly tells

these two stories to show how ineffective he or any good man
would be in changing the politics of kings and their councilors.
When considered as arguments against being a councilor, however,
these anecdotes, like the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's table,
must be considered digressions.

Moreover, these anecdotes

again beg the question.
Both anecdotes assume a prior acquiescence in the
main point that Hythlodaeus tries to establish--namely, that
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kings and councilors are by nature corrupt and cannot be
changed.

Hythlodaeus first places himself in a hypothetical

situation with a king and his councilors who are "bent on
war."

It would be folly, no doubt, to attempt to persuade such

men not to go to war when they have specifically assembled in
order to plan strategy.

But the situation described would not

convince an objective listener that a wise councilor who had
been urging peace over a period of years could not have
prevented the king and his councilors from meeting in the
first place.
The same criticism can be made of the story about the
anonymous king.

He and his councilors have met in session to

determine ways of separating the people from their money.

One

cannot help wondering, however, why a wise councilor would
wait until the decision to pervert the laws had already been
made before urging a just fiscal policy.
The two hypothetical council meetings, then, show merely
that one should not try to change a king and his councilors
--

after their opinions are formed, not that a wise man cannot
influence kings under any circumstances.

However, although

these two anecdotes are not convincing proofs of a philosopher's
being ineffective as a king's councilor, they are effective
examples of the injustice which exists in the states of Europe.
Significantly, these spurious arguments do not convince
the persona More.

He insists upon the point made previously
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in the argument, that Hythlodaeus misunderstands the role of
the councilor.

Explaining that the effective councilor does

not, as Hythlodaeus suggests, blurt out unpopular opinions
that surely must fallon deaf ears, the persona More urges a
more prudent course:

"But there is another philosophy, more

practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself
to the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and
21
appropriately."
Reaffirming the point he has made from the
start, he insists upon the moral obligation of the philosopher:
"If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if
you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long
standing, yet you must not on that account desert the
commonwealth.

You must not abandon the ship in a storm because

you cannot control the winds."22
Hythlodaeus, however, remains unconvinced.
insists that he would be ineffective as a councilor.

He again
Finally

he indirectly answers-More's point of moral obligation, but
his argument is weak.

He points out that his own moral

well-being would be put in jeopardy by association with evil
kings and councilors.

This danger, he explains, results from

the incorrigible nature of councilors:

"Moreover, there is

no chance for you to do any good because you are brought among
21

ytopia, p. 99/13-16.

22utopia, p. 99/31-35.
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colleagues who would easily corrupt even the best of men
before being reformed themselves.,,23
This argument is weak because it forces a conclusion
which undermines Hythlodaeus' general position.

If evil

councilors can corrupt philosophers, change of character is
in fact possible.

But Hythlodaeus has insisted that he could

not effect change in evil kings and councilors.

To reconcile

these two positions, it must be insisted that evil can change
good but that good cannot change evil.

This conclusion,

however, is inconsistent with the examples of the Utopians.
Dealing with other peoples obviously does not corrupt the
Utopians.

Conversely, their examples persuade such persons as

the Anemolian ambassadors to see the truth about gold and fine
trappings.
Under close examination, then, the arguments of
Hythlodaeus are not convincing.

The debate on councilorship

at the end of Book I remains unresolved.

This unresolved issue,

as Bevington suggests, probably reflects More's state of mind
at the time of writing Book -I.

But More has a larger purpose

than simply portraying his own personal dilemma in a dramatic
dialogue.

Rather he wishes to give a total picture of

tyranny and corruption in a realistic setting that would
contrast sharply with the ideal justice portrayed in Book II
23UtqQia, p. 103/9-11.
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Although at the time he wrote the dialogue in Book I, he may
have already written Book II, this does not in itself prove
that he did not specifically write Book I in order to serve
as a startling contrast to Book II.

He found the debate on

councilorship a convenient and realistic framework in which to
paint his portrait.
Although the foregoing has been an argument against
Hexterts conclusions about the central focus in Book I, it
should not be construed as an attempt to refute his argument
for the reconstruction of the order of composition.

The

remark made by the Qersona More in Book I that Plato is
Hythlodaeus' favorite author, however, raises an interesting
question about this matter.

This anomaly suggests an alternate

possibility to the order hypothesized by Hexter.

From his

thorough analysis of the text and the circumstances surrounding
its composition, Hexter draws the following conclusion:
Summarizing the above analysis of the structure of UtoQia,
we suggest as erobable the following sequence of, composition:
N th 1 d
SBook I Introduction, pp. 46-5B ~. 46-54].
BOOk II Discourse on Utopia, pp. 110-2)6.
e er an s
Book I Dialogue of Counsel includJng the
London
Exordium, pp. 5B-I0B [leg. 54-lOB]. 2
Book II Peroration and Conclusion, pp. 2)6-46.

c

Although the essential order of composition which Hexter
reconstructs is not questioned here, the following analysis
suggests reasons to suppose that More wrote the concluding

24U~oRia, Introduction, p. xxi.
~·;,.·
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section of Book I (specifically 103/32-109/36), not at the
same time as Book I, as Hexter says, but at the time he wrote
the discourse in Book II.

The chief argument for proposing

this variation in the order proposed by Hexter is that More's
statement about Hythlodaeus' preference cannot be explained
very convincingly in any other way.
Various possible answers suggest themselves to explain
the inconsistency of the persona More's remark about Hythlodaeus'
favorite author.

If the whole question of the unorthodox order

of composition had never been raised, a likely conjecture
could be that More included the information about Hythlodaeus'
preference in an earlier draft of the Utopia.

If such were

the case, this omission in the final manuscript suggests that
Hythlodaeus' references to Plato might have been more extensive
in the earlier draft.

But speculation about the possible form

of such a draft is idle in the absence of an extant manuscript.
Without conjecture about the implications of the reversed
composition, one might consider two other explanations.
Possibly the nersona More derived his notion about Hythlodaeus'
preference for Plato from a statement made by Peter Giles
at the opening of Book I.

There Peter Giles indicates that

Hythlodaeus is fino bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek.'25
Or it could be that Hythlodaeus has let his preference for Plato
25Utopia, pp. 49/39-51/1.
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be known in some of the unrecorded conversation that the
Rerson~

More as narrator does not choose to relate.

For instance,

in the introduction before the dialogue on councilorship, he
remarks, "After we had greeted each other and exchanged the
civilities which commonly pass at the first meeting of
strangers, we went off to my house." 26. Then a few paragraphs
later More refers to other tales told by Hythlodaeus:

"What

he said he say in each place would be a long tale to unfold
and is not the purpose of this work.,,27

Can we assume that

Hythlodaeus mentioned his preference for Plato in the initial
civilities that passed among the three men or in part of the
narrative not reported by More?
Neither of the above explanations is satisfying; both
seem to betray a lack of dramatic sensibility on More's part.
It is unlikely that More as author would have had }\lore as
character conclude that Plato is Hythlodaeus' favorite author
simply on the basis of Peter Giles's casual remark that the
philosopher prefers Greek to Latin authors.

It would also be

unwarranted to assume that Hythlodaeus talked about his
philosophical preferences while exchanging civilities or
while narrating the less interesting part of his travels.
dramatic technique demonstrated in other aspects of the

26gtopia, p. 51/25-27.
27UtoQia, p. 53/30-31.

More's
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gtopia argues against such insensitivity.
The most plausible explanation is suggested by a reverse
order of composition.

•

In writing his first book last, More

could have inadvertently presumed upon information already

~.

presented in the latter part of the work.

This raises the

question of where in the latter part of the text the Qersona
More could reasonably have been assumed to derive the notion
that Plato is Hythlodaeus' favorite author.

Hexter's theory

of the order of composition would certainly be strengthened if
Hythlodaeus' preference for Plato were found to be stated in
the parts of the text which Hexter says were written in the
Netherlands.

In that case, the Qersona More's reason for

assuming Hythlodaeus' preference in the dialogue in Book I
would not be difficult to surmise.

It could be assumed

that in writing Book I after Book II, More as author simply
forgot that he could not presume upon information given in the
parts already written.
An indication of Hythlodaeus' admiration for Plato does
occur in the middle of the discourse in Book II.

Here

Hythlodaeus lists the great books which he took on his voyage.
He mentions that the Utopians "received from me most of Plato's
works, several of Aristotle's, "as well as Theophrastus on plants,
which I regret to say was
28

muti~ated

Utopia, p. 181/33-35.

in parts." 28

This implied

rr
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preference for Plato might be the explanation for the persona
More's assumption in Book I.

If this passage were indeed written

earlier than the statement in Book I, it might serve, in the
absence of any other theory, to explain More's atypical lapse
from his sustained pose of dramatic verisimilitude.
This explanation, however, does not win immediate
acceptance.

The same objection applies here as was suggested

in rejecting the theory that More could have surmised
Hythlodaeus' preference from Peter Giles's casual remark at the
opening of Book I.

In both cases the persona More would be

making an assumption'about Hythlodaeus' philosophical preference.
Although there would be greater reason to assume a preference
from Hythlodaeus' reading list than from Peter Giles's general
remark about Hythlodaeus' Greek scholarship, the fact remains
that, prior to More's assumption, Hythlodaeus states a preference
for Plato neither in Book II nor in Book I.
The place in the text where Hythlodaeus gives the '
strongest indication that he prefers Plato occurs in the final
section of Book It namely, the exordium.

Almost at the beginning

of this final section Hythlodaeus remarks that when he considers
all the evils associated with private property, "I become more
partial to Plato and less surprised at his refusal to make
laws for those who rejected that legislation which gave to all
an equal share in all goods. 1. 29
29Utopia, p. 105/4-7.
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This expressed preference would corroborate Hexter's
general theory if it had occurred in the portions which he
says were written first.

$upposedly, however, the exordium

was written at the same time as the dialogue in Book I.

In

the order of composition, therefore, Hythlodaeus' statement of
preference occurs after the gersona More's assumption of
Hythlodaeus' preference.

But what if the exordium were

written earlier, together with the discourse in Book II?

Then,

in the order of composition, Hythlodaeus' statement of
preference would have occurred prior to the gersona More's
assumption of preference •. Moreover, other evidence from the
text supports the supposition that the exordium may have been
written as an introduction to Book II before the dialogue in
Book I.
Hexter advances two main reasons for supposing that the
exordium might have been written at the same time as the
discourse in Book II.

distinct change in subject
in Book I:

/

First, the exordium represents a
m~tter

and style from the dialogue

"We can only be quite sure that it is a section,

that from the breakpoint at which Hythloday veers onto the
problem of property to the end of Book I we are dealing with
a homogeneous piece of writing without an internEl break.")O
Second, the exordium contains a reference to Hythlodaeus'
)OMore's Utogia:

The Biography of an Idea, p. 22.
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five-year residence in Utopia.

This same reference occurs in

the introductory section to Book I and the discourse in Book II,
both of which sections were supposedly written at the same time.
Thus it would be reasonable to suppose that the exordium was
also written earlier along with the introduction and the
·1

discourse.
After offering these two arguments for supposing the
earlier composition of the exordium, Hexter rejects them.

He

reasons that if the dialogue were excerpted from Book I, the
exordium would not follow logically upon the introduction.

He

argues that flspecifically there is one bit of action that
becomes unintelligible if More wrote the conclusion to Book I
in the Netherlands before working out the dialogue ... 31 The
"bit of action" referred to occurs at the end of the exordium
when the three men go in to eat dinner in preparation for
Hythlodaeus' discourse on Utopia.
statement:

The narrator makes this

"So we went in and dined.

We then returned to the

same place, sat down on the same bench, and gave orders to
the servants that we should not be interrupted. o32 Hexter
raises a pertinent question:

"Now if it was necessary to come

back after dinner ·to hear Raphael tell about Utopia, what had
the three men been talking about all morning?o33

He then

31Jbid., p. 23.
32UtoQia, p. 109/32-34.
33~10re'
33~lore' s UtoRi"Cit . The BiograQhy of an Idea, p. 23.
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concludes that if this statement about the dinner break were
written before the dialogue in Book I the whole morning
referred to becomes an "artistic blank."3 4
Although Rexter's argument is credible, there are
equally good reasons for drawing the opposite conclusion.

One

need not maintain that the morning referred to in the exordium
would be an artistic blank if the dialogue of council were
not later inserted between the introduction and the exordium.
In fact, it is difficult to explain how Rythlodaeus could
have narrated all that he was supposed to have narrated in a
morning's talk, since, according to Rexter, the introduction
was written first.

The Rersona More tells us in the

introduction that Hythlodaeus had related a number of other
adventures before proceeding to the description of Utopia.

In

the paragraph which Hexter maintains closes the introduction,
More comments, ftWhat he said he saw in each place would be
a long tale to unfold and is not the purpose of this work ••• 3.5
If what Hythlodaeus saw in each place was at all comparable
to what he saw in Utopia, it would have easily filled up at
least a morning's talk.

Indeed, it is questionable whether he

could have told all that he saw in addition to relating his
dialogue on councilorship.

The dinner break, then, does not

3.5UtoRia, p • .53i31-32.

253
necessarily preclude the possibility that the composition of
the exordium could have followed immediately after that of the
introduction.
The more important question however, is whether the
exordium logically follows upon the introduction.

Hexter

argues that the introduction to Book I concludes with the
passage beginning "What he said he saw in each place • • • • fl36
At this juncture Hexter maintains that the dialogue can be
excerpted and the discourse in Book II can be inserted without
any evident strain on continuity.
to the exordium.

Let us apply this same test

If the exordium originally followed the

introduction, would the strain on continuity be too great?
Suppose the exordium as More originally wrote it started with
the paragraph that begins, "As a result, when in my heart I
ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions of the
Utopians •• • • "37

If we excise the initial transitional

phrase, "As a result," there is no more reason to suppose that
More passed from the introduction to the beginning of Book II
than to suppose that he passed from the introduction to this
point in Book I, except that the two preceding paragraphs also
appear to be a part of the exordium.
Closer reading reveals, however, that these two

36UtOPi~, pp. 53/30-5516.
37Utopia, p. 103/32-33.

~------------------------2-5-4----------~----------~
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paragraphs are characterized chiefly by their transitional
The first of the two, beginning "For this reason,
38
refers to the previous discussion on
Plato • •• ,"

nature.

councilorship; the second, beginning "Yet surely, my dear
More, to tell you candidly my heart's sentiments.

. . , 039

introduces the subject matter of the exordium--the injustice
of private property and the justice of communism.

It must be

acknowledged that neither of these paragraphs following upon
the introduction would provide a smooth transition.

But if we

assume that the paragraphs were written specifically to weld
i.

together the dialogue and the exordium, the transitional nature
of the paragraphs becomes evident.

After all, in writing the

Utopia in a discontinuous sequence, .More must have worked over
a number of transitional links to make the parts fit together.
There appear, then, to be no better reasons for
supposing that the opening of Book II rather than the exordium
originally followed upon the introduction to Book I.

Further-

more, there are other reasons to support the supposition that
the exordium was written before the dialogue.

First of all,

the subject matter of the exordium is more closely associated
with the discourse in Book II than with the dialogue in Book I.
In the exordium of Book I Hythlodaeus gives his most eloquent
38UtoQia, p. 103/16.
39Utopia, p. 103/24~
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panegyric on communism and his impassioned tirade against
private property.

The praise of communism occurs again in

Book II, whereas communism serves only to contrast with the
ownership of private property in Book I.

The benefits of

communism are nowhere mentioned in Book I until the exordium.
With the exception of the break for dinner considered above,
there appears to be no evidence in the exordium which
presupposes the foregoing dialogue.

In the dialogue, however,

More's statement about Hythlodaeus' favorite author, Plato,
seems to presume upon Hythlodaeus' stated preference in the
exordium.
A second reason, relating to the character of Peter
Giles, reinforces the supposition that the exordium was written
before the dialogue.

Peter's statement in the exordium

seems curiously inconsistent with More's description of him
in the introduction to Book I.

In the introduction Peter Giles

is described as an astute conversationalist.

Thomas More

says, "In conversati6n he is so polished and so witty without
offense that his delightful society and charming discourse
largely took away my nostalgia."40

If we pass to the

exordium from the introduction, this description of Peter
remains consistent.

Disregarding the dialogue that intervened

between the introduction and the exordium, we see in the
40

.
Ut opla, p. 49/11-13.
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following statement of Giles his friendly attempt to draw out
the tale which Hythlodaeus promises in the introduction:

"It

would be hard for you to convince me that a better-ordered
people is to be found in the new world than in the one known
41 This statement can be considered polite and
to us."
consistent with Peter's character only if we disregard the
foregoing dialogue.

But in light of Hythlodaeus' castigation

of the governments and institutions of Europe in the dialogue,
Peter's remark either is extremely naive or is meant to bait
Hythlodaeus in a way that seems inconsistent with Peter's
character.
~

The author More, of course, may have intended to be

,t
~

ironical.

f

He may have been poking fun at his friend Peter.

At least the passage must be read this way on the assumption
~

that the exordium was written after the dialogue.

I

,
'.

Otherwise,

'

Peter's statement seems to indicate that he has not understood
Hythlodaeus' virulent attack on the injustice in Europe.
Unless more external evidence is uncovered, it cannot
be determined exactly how More put together the parts of the
Utopia.

Obviously, no argument based strictly on the text is

likely to prove conclusively that the exordium was written
earlier or later than the dialogue in Book I.

But if the

exordium was not written before the dialogue, some other
41Utogia, p. 107/24-26.
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theory must be found to explain why the persona More assumes
that Hythlodaeus' favorite author is Plato.
Whether the exordium was written before or at the same
time as the preceding part of Book I is an interesting question
of the genesis of a literary masterpiece.

The awareness that

More wrote his work in a discontinuous fashion also alerts the
reader to the possibilities of anomalies in the structure.
There is a danger, however, in this kind of analysis.

It

may lead to unwarranted assumptions about the overall structure
of the whole work.

It should not be assumed that because More

wrote various parts of his work at different times or because
he inadvertently overlooked some details in linking the parts
of the structure together, these facts in themselves prove the
lack of unity in the Utopia.

Though it is necessary to dissect

a work in order to get at its meaning, there is danger in
dissecting one part from the other without recognizing how each
fits into the organic whole.

Therefore, in the following

chapters we shall attempt to show why the Utopia is a
unified organism despite its reversed order of composition and
the

in~qualities

in its style.

I

l~.

CHAPTER IX
UNJUST LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
The commentaries of More and his contemporaries, written
to accompany the text, contain penetrating insights into More's
style and the meaning of his work and are useful in an analysis
l
of the theme and structure of the Utopia.
More's own observations and those of his humanist friends differ in many
significant respects from modern studies.

Many critics, for

example, miss More's characteristic Renaissance intention
in writing the Utopia.

One school holds that More wrote his

work as an idyllic fantasy ora humanist jeu d'esprit.

Another

attributes to More a profoundly serious intention and interprets
the work as a political manifesto. 2
More's contemporaries, on the other hand, make it clear
that he has a dual purpose:

he wrote the Utopia both to

lThese letters and poems are printed in the Yale
edition, pp. 3-45.
2Representative of the school of criticism that consider
the Utopia a jeu d'esprit areW. E. Campbell, More's Utopia
and His Social Teaching (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd.,
1930); and Christopher Hollis, St. Thomas More (London: Burns
and Oates, 1961). Representative of the school of criticism
that considers the Utopia a political treatise are Ames,
Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia; Kautsky, Thomas More and
His UtoQia; and Arthur E. Morgan, Nowhere Was Somewhere (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19~6).
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instruct and to delight.

William Bud~ makes this comment at

the opening of his letter to Thomas Lupset:

"lowe you really

immense thanks, Lupset, most learned of young men, for having
handed me Thomas More's Utopia and thereby drawn my attention
to what is very pleasant reading as well as reading likely to
be profitable.,,3

Gerhard Geldenhauer expresses- the same

opinion in his prefatory poem:
pleasant?

"Reader, do you like what is

In this book is everything that is pleasant.

you hunt what is profitable?

Do

You can read nothing more

profitable. ,,4
In the UtopiB;. More treats me.tters of ultimate
significance, yet he avoids the tedious rhetoric of a formal
political or philosophical treatise.

To read the

Utopi~

without seeing both its serious and its humorous aspects is,
in fact, to miss the full dimension of the work's greatness.
One way in which More manages to be serious but not tedious is
by the adoption of a conversational style.

Writing about their

joint conversation with Hythlodaeus, More remarks in his letter
to Peter Giles, fiThe nearer my style came to his careless
simplicity the closer it would be to the truth, for which
alone I am bound to care under the circumstances and actually
do care.,,5

More's comment suggests the reason why the theme

r

3Utopia, p. 513-~.
4Y~.oI2ia , p. 31/3-5.
5UtoQ~a, p.

39/13-15.
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and structure of the Utogia are difficult to perceive.

One must

trace Hythlodaeus' discourse through the many digressions and
abrupt transitions characteristic of casual conversation.
Although Plato also purports to record conversation in
the ReQublic, he reveals no conscious attempt to sustain a
pretense of verisimilitude.

In fact, as was indicated

earlier (Chapters III and VII), Plato has a low regard for an
art which attempts merely to imitate actual occurrences.

In

Book X of the Regublic he criticizes poets as well as painters
for this practice.

Such imitators, Socrates explains, are three

stages removed from truth.

In contrast to Plato, More suggests

that his method of imitating conversation makes his style
closer to the truth.
That More's art of imitation resembles that of a
painter is noted by more than one of his contemporaries.
Peter Giles writes to Jerome Busleyden, uWhen I contemplate
the same picture as painted by More's brush, I am affected
as if I were sometimes actually living in Utopia itself. u6
John Desmarais remarks in his letter to Peter Giles that our
knowledge of Utopia is owing to "the very learned More whose
pencil has very skillfully drawn it for us. u7

These observations

suggest that the form of the work can be apprehended visually.

6Utopia, p. 23/3-5.
7Utopia, p. 29/8-9.

261
One should, therefore, look for patterns of images and other
techniques of painting in the composition of the work.
More's method of comparison and contrast (1) highlights
various parts of the structure and (2) sets one part off
from another.

William Bud~ in particular reveals that he

apprehends More's use of this technique by commenting in his
letter to Thomas Lupset on the contrast between the injustice
in Europe and the justice in Utopia.

,

In the first part of the letter Bude explains the causes
and results of unjust conditions in Europe.

Learning and

weighing the laws and institutions of Utopia has alerted Bude
to injustice elsewhere.

Because the whole human race is driven

by an anxiety for wealth, legal and civil arts and sciences
are used to enact methods of embezzling money rather than to
effect justice.

Observing that the Europeans pervert justice

by adhering to the letter instead of the spirit ·of the law,
Bude emphasizes that justice is least in evidence, ironically,
in those nations where law and lawyers have the greatest
authority.

He points out that lawyers commonly manipulate the

law and "prey like hawks on unadvised citizens. H8

Bud~ts use

of a beast image to emphasize the behavior of unjust lawyers
is particularly significant because More also uses beast
imagery in Book I to reinforce his theme of injustice (e. g.

,-------------------------,---,--------------_._-------------------------------------------._---.--------------_.--------------------8Utopia, p. 7/15-16.
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the man-eating sheep, pp. 65/38-67/2, and the idle drones,
p. 63/5-15).
/

Bude also observes that in Europe the great number of
laws does not bring justice to the citizens.

Noting the

disparity between legalism and true justice, he compares the
injustice which proceeds from merely interpreting the letter
of the law to the justice which should proceed from the
spirit of the law of the Gospel:
Anyone with a spark of intelligence and sense would admit,
if pressed, that there is a vast difference between true
equity and law as expressed in canonical censures (at
present and for a long time past) and between equity
and the law as expressed in civil statutes and royal decrees,
just as there is a vast difference between the principles
of Christ, who established the moral law, and the conduct
of His disciples and the opposing doctrines and tenets
of those who regard the golden heaps of Croesus an~ Midas
as the ultimate goal and the essence of happiness.
,
In the first half of his letter, then, Bude gives in
his own words opinions about injustice in Europe which More
portrays through his fiction in Book I of the ptopia.

,

Bude

/

observes that the European lawyers substitute strict laws and
strained interpretations for. true justice.
means the advantage of the stronger.

For them justice

He identifies the

sources of injustice in men's greed, avarice, and pride.
I

These

insights reveal that Bude sees the thematic lineament of More's
first book.

Neither he nor any of the other commentators

remarks on the debate on councilorship in the first book.
9
Utopia, p. 7/30-39.
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,
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Their omission is in striking contrast to the emphasis that this
subject receives in modern critical studies.
The injustice in Europe described in the first half of
Bude's letter prepares for his contrast with the justice in
Utopia.

Indicating that justice prevails among the Utopians

because they have not perverted the law, he

spe~ulates

on what

would happen in Utopia to the legal books which occupy much of
the time of European lawyers:

"You would see that interminable

array of legal tomes, engrossing the attention of so many
excellent and solid intellects even until death, viewed as
hollow and empty and therefore consigned to bookworms or used
as wrapping paper in shops.u 10
Perceiving that the meaning of the Utopia arises from
the contrast between European injustice and Utopian justice,
Bude observes ironically that the Utopians who have not had
benefit of Christian revelation are in fact more Christian than
the Europeans who profess to be Christians.

After identifying

the divine principles of the Utopians--equality, love of
peace and quiet, and contempt of gold and silver--Bude wonders
what would happen should Europe adopt such principles:
Would that the great and good God had behaved as benignly
with those regions which hold fast and cling to the
surname of Christian derived from His most holy name!
Beyond the shadow of a doubt, avarice, the vice which
perverts and ruins so many minds otherwise extraordinary
IOutopia, p. 11/21-25.
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and lofty, would depart hence once or all, and the
golden age of Saturn would return. l1
Bude's extraordinary letter not only incisively
interprets the content of the Utopia, but its form also
corresponds to that of the Utopia itself.

Like the Utopia

it divides into two parts with the first part linked to the
second by a method of comparison and contrast.

The whole is

then unified by a comparison of the injustice in Europe with
,
the justice in Utopia. Bude, therefore, must have recognized
the unity of the Utopia in order to imitate its structural
unity in his own style.
The unity of the Utopia is perceived also by Peter
Giles.

He comments on More's craft:

"He has noted the sources

from which all evils actually arise in the commonwealth or
from which all blessings possiblW could arise, all quite unknown
to ordinary folk; or the force and fluencW of his discourse by
which in pure Latin style and forceful expression he has united
numerous topics.,,12

In this observation Giles not only praises

the unity of the Utopia but

~lso

points to the contrast that

exists between the evil in Europe and the goodness in Utopia.
The tone as well as the content of the letters in the
parerga indicates subtle appreciation of the Utopia.

The

letters of all except Erasmus sustain the fiction that Utopia
l1Utopia, p. 11/31-36.
12Utopia, p. 23/12-16.
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actually exists in some remote region of the globe.

This

pretense corroborates the irony in the work itself.

By

professing that Utopia exists when he and his readers know that
it does not, More effectively satirizes his European audience.
He magnifies the injustice in Europe by feigning to believe
in the existence of Utopia in the same way that Socrates
magnifies the ignorance of the Sophists by pretending to know
nothing himself.
Utopia are ironic.

In this sense both the Republic and the
More creates the tone of the Utopia as

a whole by the use of specific ironic sallies throughout the
work.
The title page itself, for example, contains an ironic
commentary on the entire work.

The full title is accompanied

by the caption "A Truly Golden Handbook."

Although such a

caption is not uncommon in literature, the choice of the word
golden may indicate that More intends to poke fun at his own
effort to write a serious work.

In light of what follows, the

meaning of the caption is ambivalent.
obvious:
book.

The surface intention is

the word golden suggests the intrinsic worth of the

More, however, does not use the word in this sense

anywhere else in the Utopia.
in a pejorative sense.

Throughout the work gold is used

In fact, gold becomes a symbol of

pride, greed, and superficiality.

As will be discussed in

greater detail below (Chapter XI), More as author particularly
assigns this symbolic meaning to gold in Book II (pp. 1.51/4-

~~--------------~
~--------------~
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159/ 2 ).

Thus, if we apply to the caption the meaning of

gplden conveyed in the body of the work, we must conclude that
More is wryly labeling his own effort as the appearance rather
than the reality of truth.
Whether More intends this irony or not does not alter
the fact that gold is used in two senses.

It may be more than

coincidence that Plato uses the word in the same double sense in
the Republic.

Employing golden with its usual connotation

in the Phoenician tale told at the end of Book III, Socrates
specifies thQti the founders must inform the citizens that the
best men in the state have been fashioned beneath the earth
from gold, the most precious element.
pejoratively elsewhere in the Republic.

Gold,however, is used
For instance, Socrates

forbids the guardians to possess gold because of its corrupting
influence.

Suggesting the two meanings of the word at the

conclusion of Book III, Socrates explains that the guardians'
inner gold must remain uncontaminated:

"Gold and silver, we

will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods
always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of
men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate
that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold,
since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the
multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied.,,13
13Rep • III 416 E-417 A (Shorey, I, 311).

~----------------------~------------~~
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It cannot be claimed, of course, that the idea for the
irony in the UtoQia's caption comes directly from the ReQublic,
but More's usage of the word gold reveals in another way how
much his thought and that of Plato run in similar patterns.
In the following analysis of the theme and structure
of the

Utopi~

an attempt is made to read the work in light of

the cogent observations of More's contemporaries.

It is helpful,

for example, to approach the overall structure with Peter Giles's
suggestion in mind that More's art resembles that of a painter.
The unity of the work reveals itself clearly when one observes
how the theme that runs through Book I directly contrasts with
the theme in Book II.
in Europe.

Book I depicts the condition of injustice

In this picture More exposes the causes and results

of a perverted concept of justice.

This dark study of evil and

corruption conditions the viewer for the clear bright colors
which More uses in his picture of Utopia in Book II.

From

this contrast arises the inescapable conclusion that justice
is superior to injustice in every respect.
This method and objective, as was discussed in the
earlier chapters, is analogous to Plato's basic plan in the
Republic.

In the Republic Socrates argues for the advantage of

justice over injustice by following his description of the
ideal state with an analysis of the causes of injustice.

The

theme of injustice in Book I of the Utopia develops within the
framework of the dialogue of counsel.

Two major parts (55/15-

,,;=--------------------------2-6-8--~---------------------,
~

t

85/37 and 85/38-103/23) of the first book are marked off from
each other and from the introduction (47/8-55114) and the
exordium (103/24-109/36) by the debate between Hythlodaeus
on one hand and More and Giles on the other.

The specific

exchanges on councilorship (55/15-59/17, 85138-87125, 97/39-

103/23) serve

as frames within which the major theme of the

book is focused.

Including the introduction and the exordium,

therefore, the first book divides into four parts, which
can be identified in the text as follows:
Part I (4718-55/14)

Introduction

Part II (55/15-85/37)

Frame One: the first debate on
councilorship and the dialogue at
Cardinal Morton's house

Part III (85/38-103/23)

Frame Two: the second debate on
councilorship, the French king's
and the anonymous king's false
notions of justice, and the concluding debate on councilorship

Part IV (103/24-109/36)

Exordium

In Chapter II it has been indicated how the introduction
to the UtoQia parallels the introduction to the geQublic in regar
to the place, occasion, and -characters of the dialogue.

In the

present chapter, the introduction will be discussed primarily
as it functions in the UtoQia itself.

In this first part of

the structure, More sets the stage for the dialogue, introduces
the main characters, and suggests the main theme and 'the
controlling literary device.

These functions can be discerned

in three separate segments of the introduction.

,~
,

~

.'
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In the first brief section (47/8-47/33) More, the author
places himself as narrator in a realistic historical setting.

More is in Flanders as a commissioner of King Henry VIII, having
been sent there to negotiate a commercial treaty with the
representatives of Charles, Prince of Castile.

The fact that

the envoys are real historical personages serves More's ironic
intention by predisposing the reader to accept the authenticity
of the fiction which follows.
The first section (47/8-47/33) also reveals some
traits of the narrator that have a bearing on the theme of the
story he relates.

His interest in justice and the affairs of

state can be surmised from the high purpose of his diplomatic
mission to Bruges. 14 He further evidences his high regard for
law and diplomacy in his praise of Charles's spokesman by
commenting that Georges de Themseche is "most learned • • • in
the law and consummately skillful in diplomacy by native
ability as well as by long experience."1 5
This praise of Charles's chief representative is
noteworthy because it indicates criteria by which More, the
author, judges excellence throughout the remainder of the work.
14More 's m~ssion was to settle a basic disagreement on
the validity of the commercial treaty of 1506. For details
see Utopia, p. 295, and E. Surtz, "St Thomas More and His
Utopian Embassy of 1515," Catholic Historical Review, XXXIX
(1953), 272-97.

15UtOPi~, p. 47/28-30.
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As will be discussed in the ensuing chapters, he has great
respect for law but a low regard for legalism.

He identifies

good laws with justice but insists that too many petty laws
bring about injustice.

He admires the combination of learning

and experience, for he has little regard for theories and
abstractions that have not been tested by experience.
In the next segment of the introduction (47/34-51/21)
the narrator explains the occasion of the dialogue and describes
the characters of the other two main participants.

A recess

in the negotiations at Bruges has allowed him to make a visit
to Antwerp, where one day he meets his friend Peter Giles
in conversation with the

philosopher~explorer

Hythlodaeus.

He describes Peter Giles and Hythlodaeus.

They both

combine learning and experience, but their backgrounds and
personalities are quite different.

Their similarities and

differences fit them appropriately for the dialogue
which follows.
Peter Giles is a scholar and a gentleman.

Among his

many other virtues, he possesses a wise simplicity in nature
and polish in conversation, qualities that make him an excellent
intermediary in the dialogue between Hythlodaeus and the
persona More.
Hythlodaeus has gained experience from his voyages as
a mariner and as an explorer.
like most sailors.

He has not, however, traveled

Peter Giles significantly observes that
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"his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of
16
Ulysses or, rather, of Plato."
With this mention of Plato,
Giles implies that Hythlodaeus has not visited remote regions
merely as a curiosity seeker.

Rather, he has journeyed as a

sage who attempts to understand the foundations of political
f.~'.

societies and the springs of human action.

Peter's incidental

&

,.~
~

remark subtly forewarns the reader that Hythlodaeus' description

}.

~
~

•

of his travels concerns the most fundamental matters of human
experience.
More's creation of the character Hythlodaeus marks a
significant difference between the dialogue form of the Utopia
and that of the Republic.

The dissimilarity lies chiefly in

the fact that Hythlodaeus 1s a fictional character, whereas
Socrates actually lived and taught in Greece.

The other

characters in the Republic are also patterned after known
historical personages.

This is not to say that Plato has simply

recorded the opinions of other men.

The characters in his

dialogue, however, generally represent the attitudes and
personalities of their real-life counterparts.
In the Utopia the personae More, Peter Giles, and
Cardinal Morton represent actual persons in much the same way
as the characters in the Republic.

Hythlodaeus and the

anonymous lawyer at Cardinal Morton's house, however, cannot
be readily identified as historical personages.
16Utopia, p. 49/36-37.
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More may have had real persons in mind when he created these
characters, but their identity has never been agreed upon by
any consensus of readers of the Utopia.
This combination of real and fictional characters in
the Utopia is significant because it points the way that the
dialogue form was to develop in English literature.

Later

writers of serious dialogues such as John Dryden adopt the
fictional mode of representation.
Essay of Dramatic

Poetr~,

The characters in his

An

for example, represent actual persons

known to be living at the time, but their identities are disguised by pseudonyms.

Later philosophical dialogues, such as

those of David Hume and George Berkeley, carry the trend even
further away from Plato's practice of representing real persons
in dialogue form.

When this change from Plato to Berkeley is

seen in retrospect, Thomas More's creation of the fictitious
Hythlodaeus shows itself to be a milestone in literary history.
Peter Giles's description of Hythlodaeus concludes the
second section of the introduction (47/34-51/21).

In the

concluding section (51/22-55114) the persona More, as narrator,
localizes the place of the dialogue.

After exchanging

civilities, the three men retire to More's quarters, where the
discussion takes place in the garden.
The narrator first alludes to the numerous regions to
Which Raphael has traveled, thereby establishing the philosopher'
qualifications to make astute observations and to compare

~~--------~
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various countries.

The narrator then indicates what is to be

the matter of discussion in the ensuing dialogue.

Indicating

that he and Peter Giles are not curious to hear the things
ordinary travelers talk about, the persona More explains
that they want to learn of more serious matters:

"Scyllas

and greedy Celaenos and folk-devouring Laestrygones and
similar frightful monsters are common enough, but well and
wisely trained citizens are not everywhere to be found.,,17
In this sentence the mythical beasts contrast with the wisely
trained citizens in a manner that parallels the contrast between
Book I and Book II.
act like beasts.

The Europeans as described by Hythlodaeus

This allusion foreshadows More's use of

animal imagery in various other places in Book I and forms a
pattern which reinforces the theme of injustice.

For example,

the most vivid animal image in the entire work symbolizes the
injustice of the practice of enclosure.
how

~he

greed of a

f~w

Hythlodaeus tells

wealthy landowners has created a

horde of man-eating sheep.

The animal imagery which Hythlodaeus

uses in Book I is discarded in Book II when he describes the
wisely trained Utopians.
More's choice of the mythical beast Scylla as ona of
those that are "common enough" is also interesting, because
Plato uses the same image in the Republic to describe the
17utopia, p. 53/37-39.
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tyrant's nature.

Explaining the miserable conditions of the

unjust man, Socrates asks his listeners to fashion in their
minds a symbolic image of the soul.
composite of three different animals:

He visualizes man as a
a human being representing

the reason, a lion representing the spirit, and a monster
representing the appetite.

The monster, he says, is like

"one of those natures that the ancient fables tell of • • • as
that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerperus, and the numerous
other examples that are told of many forms grown together in
18
one."
In the soul of the unjust man, Socrates explains, the
part represented by the monster rules over the parts
represented by the lion and the man.
More's juxtaposition of the image of the mythical
beasts and wisely trained citizens typifies the technique of
comparison and contrast that he uses throughout the UtoQia.
He not only draws the comparison between the injustice in
Book I and the justice in Book II, but he also makes similar
smalier contrasts within each book.

For example, in Book I the

Europeans are variously compared with the Polyerites in regard
to penal justice, the Macarians in regard to foreign policy,
and the Achorians in regard to fiscal policy.

In Book II the

Utopians are contrasted with other fictitious peoples such as
the Anemolians in their treatment of gold, the Alaopolitans,
the Nephelogetes, and the Zapoletans in their attitudes
18

Rep. IX 588 C (Shorey, II, 399-401).

P':=------~-----------------2-7-5-----------------------,
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toward

war~

This technique used by Raphael is already

Suggested at the conclusion of the introduction:

"Raphael

had touched with much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and
that, of which he found very many in

bo~h,

and had compared

the wiser measures which had been taken among us as well as
among them. u19 Peter Giles's expressed surprise at Raphael's
wide experience and sagacity opens the second part of Book I.
In Part II (55/15-85/37) four sections are related to
one another by the theme of injustice:

(1) the injustice that

prevails in the ruling class in Europe (55115-59/18), (2)
the causes and results of injustice in England

(59/19-71/3~),

(3) the just Polyerite penal system as a glaring contrast to
that prevailing in England (7r/J8-81/22), and (4) a comic
interlude, emphasizing how far the corruption extends into
the various classes in society (81/23-85/37).
The first section (55/15-59/18) opens with Peter Giles's
suggestion to Hythlodaeus that he offer his services to some
king.

He urges Hythlodaeus to become a councilor for his own
--

welfare as well as for the good of the king.

Peter concludes

his remarks with his least convincing argument:

"Thus, you

would not only serve your own interests excellentiy but be of
great assistance in the advancement of all your relatives and
friends. H20
19Utopia, p. 55/9-12.
20Vtopia, p. 55/20-22.
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Hythlodaeus' answer deserves special notice, for it is
indicative of some of More's literary techniques.

Here More

as author gives a good example of how he advances the dialogue
by a method of

of ideas.

assoc~ation

Hythlodaeus does not

answer Peter Giles as a participant might in formal debate but
rather as one might in informal conversation.

In his reply,

Hythlodaeus fastens on the words ftrelatives and friends,ft
which are the key words in the last idea advanced by Peter:
As for my relatives and friends • • • I am not greatly
troubled about them, for I think I have fairly well
performed my duty to them already. The possessions, which
other men do not resign unless they are old and sick and
even then resign unwillingly when incapable of retention,
I divided among my relatives and friends when I was not
merely hale and hearty but actually young. I think they
ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and
not to require or expect additionally that ~lshould, for
their sakes, enter into servitude of kings.
Hythlodaeus' fastening on the last idea mentioned by Peter Giles
exemplifies the way More as author makes transitions
throughout the whole work.
/

The mariner's answer itself is less important in
respect to the debate on councilorship than it is in stressing
some important aspects of his character.

The revelation of

his uncommon values conditions the reader for his eulogy on
communism later in Book I.

Because Hythlodaeus reveals

hi~

personal disregard for private property here, his unstinting
praise of communism in the latter part of the book is more
21Utopia, p. 55/23-31.

-
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convincing.

Hythlodaeus' answer also shows his quick wit and

his versatility with language.

He prompts the desired reaction

from Peter by using the word servitude instead of the word
service.

When Peter innocently corrects him, Hythlodaeus

replies that "the one is only one syllable less than the
22
other."
This inversion of the meaning of the word service
typifies the inverted order of the institutions, laws, and
customs described in Book I.
as being in servitude.

The whole of Europe is depicted

The people are in servitude to the

ruling class, who are in turn enslaved by their own ignorance
and vice.

This servitude contrasts with the condition of the

Utopians, who are truly free, because they "serve" their
fellow men.
Hyth10daeus uses the discussion of counci1orship
counci10rship as a
pretext to launch into his attack on the unjust conditions in
the states of Europe.
ruling class.

He begins with his condemnation of the

The nersona

M~re

prompts his remarks with the

comment that tlfrom the monarch, as from a never-failing spring,
flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole
nation.,,23

This striking image epigrammatically signals the

22utopia, p. 55/34.
23Utopia,
23UtopiB, p. 57/16-18~
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main point being made in this section (55/15-59/19).

The

/,

meaning epitomized by the image recurs throughout the
remainder of Book I.

The reader is constantly made aware

that the responsibility for the evils of the state rests chiefly
with the ruling class.
Taking his cue from the persona More's' statement,
Hyth10daeus assails the corrupt ruling class.

He describes

how kings and councilors customarily act in a way directly
contrary to their proper function.

The duty of a king should

be to promote the peace and prosperity of his people, but, as
Hyth10daeus points out, most of them do exactly the opposite:
"Almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in the pursuits
of war • • • rather than in the honorable activities of peace,
and they care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may win
fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well what they
have got.,,24

At the same time that Hyth10daeus assigns

responsibility to kings in this statement, he also introduces
the subject of war, a minor theme which recurs throughout
Book I and reinforces the major theme of injustice.

In

addition he foreshadows the anecdotes of the council meetings
of the French and anonymous kings.
Next, Hythlodaeus condemns kings' councilors because
they lack the primary virtue required for their function.
24Utopia, p. 57/26-30.
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the Republic Socrates pOints out that the ruling element in a
just state must possess wisdom.

According to Hythlodaeus,

however, wisdom is the virtue most lacking in the councilors
of Europe.

They show this deficiency by refusing to accept

new ideas.

Hythlodaeus identifies the councilors with

irrational creatures by likening their attitudes to those of
crows and monkeys.

They prefer their own ignorance to the

wisdom of others, "just as the crow and the monkey like their
own offspring best.,,25
In this first section (55/15-59/18), then, More traces
the roots of injustice in the state to the ruling class.

Thus

begins the picture of injustice that he develops throughout
Book I.

The picture is one of inverted order and of disunity,

the same symptoms of injustice that Plato recognizes in the
ReQublic.

The inverted order is already adumbrated in the

ruling class, which acts in a perverted manner.

..,
,
,l
\

"

.

In the next. section (59/19-71/37) Hythlodaeus recounts
his discussion with the
Cardinal t-lorton.

ano~ymous

lawyer at the table of

As he begins, it appears that Hythlodaeus

intends to support his contention that councilors are corrupt.
Ironically, however, he describes the councilor, Cardinal
Morton, in the highest terms.

In contrast to his condemnation

of the councilors' lack of wisdom in the previous section (5511525utopia, p. 57/37-38.

~
~
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59/18), he commends especially Morton's statesmanlike sagacity.
He praises Morton further by commenting that "his knowledge of
law was profound, his ability incomparable, and his memory
astonishingly retentive, for he had improved his extraordinary
natural qualities by learning and practice. fl26 Here again More
displays his respect for law, learning, and experience, the
same qualities he emphasizes in the characters of the Utopians.
Hythlodaeus' abrupt switch from his condemnation of
councilors in general to his high praise of Cardinal Morton in
particular is difficult to understand if one expects the theme
and structure of Book I to follow the syllogistic argumentation
of a formal debate.
in this way.

The dialogue, however, does not develop

Rather, the author More, in feigning to record

the casual conversation, connects the sections of his structure
by an association of ideas.
The transition turns on the word England.

In his

sweeping condemnation of kings and councilors in the previous
section (55/15-59/18), Hythlodaeus indicates that he has
encountered corrupt councilors allover Europe and also in
England.

The gersona More's expressed surprise at Hythlodaeus'

having been in England recalls to the philosopher's mind the
incident at Cardinal Morton's house.

The anecdote he tells

does not support his point about the corrupt nature of councilors,
26utoPia, p. 59/35-38.
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but it effectively portrays the insidious results of the unjust
laws and institutions of England.
This transition between segments of the structure is
indicati ve of how

~10re'

s style differs from that of Plato.

In

the Regublic the tightly reasoned dialectic is not as realistic
as the casual conversation in Book I of the

UtoR~~.

Although

the characters seem real, Socrates' careful development of
ideas does not convey the impression of informal dialogue.

The

theme is easier to follow, therefore, in the ReQublic than in
the Utopia.
Unlike Socrates' carefully controlled argument,
Hythlodaeus conversational manner approaches verisimilitude.
One encounters his habit of mind not infrequently in ordinary
conversation.

He is dominated by an idea that breaks through

in his remarks whenever the opportunity presents itself.
Concerned with social justice, he cannot suppress the urge
to criticize injustice wherever it exists.

Therefore, although

he begins ostensibly to talk about councilorship, he takes the
opportunity to talk about a much wider variety of subjects.
In his seeming digression (59!19-85!J7) from the matter put
before him by More and Giles, the thread that ties his remarks
together is his attack on injustice in England.
After describing the character of Cardinal Horton,
Hythlodaeus draws another contrast.

The lawyer, who next

enters the scene, is an example of one who perverts the law.
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Though the discussion between Hythlodaeus and the lawyer centers
on the question of penal justice, Hythlodaeus uses the occasion
to describe a wider range of evils.

In his description of how

one unjust condition begets another, he shows the cancerous
nature of evil.

Greed, sloth, pride, and prodigality in the

ruling class result in a condition of injustice in all strata
of society.
The lawyer offers Hythlodaeus the opportunity to talk
about injustice by expressing his tacit admiration for "the
strict justice" that was then dealt out to thieves in England. 2 7
He expresses surprise that despite large-scale capital punishment,
the number of thieves increases.

Hythlodaeus answers that

severe justice is not true justice.

For one reason, capital

punishment is too harsh a penalty for thievery.

For another,

such punishment does not go to the root of the problem.
The lawyer retorts that responsibility must be
attributed to the thieves themselves.

They prefer to be

rascals instead of law-abiding citizens.

This retort

implies a theory of man's nature akin to that which Thrasymachus,
Glaucon, and Adeimantus assume in the Republic.

By hisassertlon

the lawyer assumes that the law, by threat of punishment, must
coerce men to act justly.

Hythlodaeus responds that most thieves

would not steal if the laws and institutions of England were
27

Utopia, p. 61/10-11.
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not oppressive.
In making his

point~

Hythlodaeus describes the true

causes and results of injustice, namely, war and oppression
brought about by the greed, pride, and idleness of the rich.
Cripples, veterans home from war service, Hythlodaeus explains,
are not fit for their customary occupations and so must turn
to begging or stealing.

Furthermore, the practice of retaining

a standing army creates a savage and brutal class in the
society.

Hythlodaeus observes that "robbers do not make the

least active soldiers, nor do soldiers make the most listless
robbers, so well do these two pursuits agree.,,28
Thievery is also caused by the sloth and greed of the
noblemen.

Preferring to be idle themselves, they attract

parasites who also remain idle.

When their masters fallon

hard times, the parasites, never having learned a useful trade,
must turn to stealing or begging.

The idle rich, who are too

lazy to work themselves, enclose vast amounts of pasture land
to raise sheep for their own profit.

As a result, they evict

the poor, who must then turn to thievery.

Thus, in exposing

England as an unjust commonwealth, Hythlodaeus explains how
evil begets evil.
This picture of England has the essential lineaments of
Socrates,'explanation of injustice in Book VIII of the Republic.
The classes in England correspond to the three in Plato's
28UtQpia, p. 63/32-34.
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oligarchic state.

The first class of rich landowners sit idle

and live off the labor of the poor.

They gather around them

a second parasitic class of idlers who pay for their keep by
fawning and flattery.

The third class of disenfranchised poor,

if not deprived of their livelihood altogether, are forced into
virtual slavery.
In this discussion More employs figurative language
that subtly reinforces the theme.

The imagery and the diction

make vivid a condition of oppression, inverted order, and
disunity.

The lawyer opens the discussion with an image, perhaps

the dominant one in the entire first book.

He ironically

labels his picture of the treatment of thieves as "strict
justice":

"They were everywhere executed, he reported, as many

as twenty at a time being hanged on one gallows, and added that
~

~.

he wondered all the more, though so few escaped execution, by
what bad luck the whole country wa& still infested with them. u29
This image of the gallows symbolizes the oppression and injustice
which permeates the whole first book.
Hythlodaeus also uses language which suggests the theme
of injustice.

In his answer to the lawyer, he compares the

members of the ruling class to schoolmasters "who would rather
beat than teach their scholars."JO
29Utopia, p. 61/11-15.
JOUtopia, p. 61/24-25.

Thus he conveys the

285
impression of England as divided into two warring classes.

In

describing the parasitic nature of the idle rich, he uses the
same drone metaphor that Socrates uses in Book VIII of the
gepublic (552 A-560 E).

He describes how the rich with their

sycophants prey on the poor:

"Now there is the great number

of noblemen who not only live idle themselves like drones on the
labors of others, as for instance the tenants of their estates
whom they fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for
that is the only economy they know of, being otherwise so
extravagant as to bring themselves to beggary!) but who also
carry about with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have
1
With this statement
never learned a trade for a livelihood.,,3
Hythlodaeus vividly and concisely describes the three classes
of an oligarchy--the rich, their sycophants, and the poor--and
identifies the characteristic vices of the drone class, namely,
sloth and prodigality.
The inverted order of values in England is shown in the
attitude of the ruling class toward the sick.

When the parasites

fall ill, they are turned out of the noblemen's homes; for, as
Hythlodaeus ironically comments, "the idle are maintained more
readily than the sick.,,3 2 This perverted practice contrasts
with the institutions in Utopia, where no one remains idle and
31Utopia, p. 63/5-11.
32Utopia, p. 63/12-13.
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where the sick are cared for in public hospitals.

The lawyer

also reveals a reversal of values in his attitude toward the
proud gentlemen who fallon hard times.

He opines that these

parasites should be encouraged because on them ffdepend the
strength and sinews of our army when we have to wage war.,,33
Hythlodaeus, quickly perceiving the spurious logic in this
opinion, comments that "you might as well say that for the sake
of war we must foster thieves.,,3 4
Hythlodaeus then cites the example of the French to
show the folly of the lawyer's attitude.

France retains a

large number of idle and useless soldiers during peace in order
to be prepared for war.

Describing these idlers as a plague

which infests the country, Hythlodaeus points out that the
French policy is not only ineffective but also self-destructive.
The policy eventually results in the worst elements in the
state overthrowing the government.

Hythlodaeus again uses

a beast image to describe this condition:

"Yet how dangerous

it is to rear such wild beasts France has learned to its cost,
and the examples of Rome, Carthage, Syria, and many other
nations show.,,35

The language here suggestive of the bestial

element controlling the state echoes Socrates' description of
33UtoQia, p. 63/26-29.
34utoQia, p. 63/30-31.
35UtoQia, p. 65/9-12.
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tyranny in Book IX of the Republic (588 S-589 E).
In his explanation to Cardinal Morton of why enclosure
causes thievery, Hythlodaeus evokes perhaps the most dominant
image of inverted order in·the entire first book:

"Your

sheep • • • which are usually so tame and so cheaply fed, begin
now, according to report, to be so greedy and wild that they
devour human beings themselves and devastate and depopulate
fields, houses, and towns. fl36

The practice of enclosure,

Hythlodaeus explains, has made England a wilderness where a
few greedy gluttons control vast areas of land and poverty
haunts the rest of the people.

Picturing the poor as oppressed,

evicted from their land, overwhelmed by violence, and wearied
by «unjust acts,,,37 Hythlodaeus asks rhetorically how this
oppression can be called justice:

flAfter they have soon spent

that trifle in wandering from place to place, what remains for
them but to steal and be hanged--justly, you may say!--or to
wander and beg. fl38
Concluding his condemnation of the unjust institutions
and laws of England with an Impassioned exhortation, Hythlodaeus
calls for an end to these evils and suggests remedies that must
be enacted to "cast out these ruinous plagues. n39
36utopia, pp. 65/38-67/2.
37Utopia, p. 67/18.
38Utopia, p. 67/27-29.
39Utopia, p. 69/38.

He tells the

288
lawyer that unless the changes he suggests are enacted, tlit is
useless for you to boast of the justice you execute in the
punishment of theft. Such justice is more showy than really
just or beneficial. fl40
With his pompous rejoinder to this exhortation, which
the Cardinal cuts off sharply, the lawyer concludes the second
section (59/19-71/37) of Part II (55/15-85/37).
The next section (71/38-81/22) opens with the Cardinal's
suggestion that Hythlodaeus offer an alternate solution to the
problem of thievery:

"But now I am eager to have you tell me,

my dear Raphael, why you think that theft ought not to be
punished with the extreme penalty, or what other penalty you
yourself would fix, which would be more beneficial to the
41
public."
The first part of the Cardinal's query is curious
at first glance, for Hythlodaeus has already spoken at
considerable length about why he thinks simple theft ought not
to be punished with the extreme penalty.

Cardinal Morton,

however, recognizes that Raphael's harangue has gone far beyond
--

the subject of capital punishment.

Although Hythlodaeus had

begun to speak of capital punishment in his answer to the
lawyer at the beginning of the previous section (59/19-71/}7),
he had quickly launched into a condemnation of the general
40 Ut

.

~Ql~,

p. 71/9-11.

41Utonl'a,
~
pp. 71/38 - 73/2 •
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condition of injustice in England and in France.

Now, however,

prompted by the Cardinal's reminder, he returns to the specific
issue of penal justice.
The section on penal justice (71/38-81/22) divides into
two segments corresponding to the twofold request made by the
Cardinal.

Before offering an alternative penal. system,

Hythlodaeus points out why capital punishment for thievery is
unlawful.

First of all, Hythlodaeus maintains that extreme

justice violates the principle of equity, because one man's
life cannot be. equated with another man's possession.
make this point, Hythlodaeus declares:

To

"In my opinion, not

all the goods that fortune can bestow on us can be set in the
scale against a man's life ••,42
Hythlodaeus then cites the laws of the Old and New
Testaments.

The divine law, he says, forbids us to take a

man's life for such a trivial reason as stealing.

Even the law

of Moses, "though severe and harsh • • • punished theft by
n43 He argues that if the old law did not
fine and not by death.
death.,,43
--

exact such a harsh punishment for thieving, surely the new law
of mercy does not allow greater license for cruelty.
he appeals to common sense.

Finally,

He maintains that a law that treats

a thief as though he were a murderer will result in not a
42utoQia, p. 73/10-12.
43UtoQia, p. 73/37-39.
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decrease in theft but an increase in murder:

"Since the robber

sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for
theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single
consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise

[

'I'

he would only have robbed. t,44
In the next segment (75/16-81/22) Hythlodaeus describes
polyerite penal justice, which makes the English system
even more cruel.
satiric technique.

seem~

This anecdote reveals More's characteristic
Instead of outlining an abstract legal

code, he cites a concrete example by which Europeans can
measure their own institutions and laws.

Hythlodaeus describes

the Polyerites as people who by aid of reason alone and without
benefit of Christianity have developed a more just and humane
penal system than that of the English.
The Polyerites, like the Utopians, contrast with the
English in many respects.

Content to be isolated from other

nations, they live a life more comfortable than splendid.
Free from militarism, they are unconcerned about expanding
their territory.

In his description of the land of the

Polyerites, Hythlodaeus continues his criticism of the pride,
greed, and warlike attitude of the European rulers.
The Polyerite system of penal justice, in contrast to
that of the English, does not favor the rich and powerful at
44

.
Ut ogla,
p. 75/7-10.

r;
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the expense of the poor and oppressed.

The Polyerites exact

punishment which benefits the common good.

An apprehended

thief must make restitution, not to the prince, but to the
person from whom he has stolen.

In punishment the criminal

works on public projects which help all the citizens.

Seeking

justice, not revenge, thePolyerites attempt to rehabilitate
a thief so that he may become a useful member of society.
Perhaps more than any other, this section shows
Hythlodaeus' curious logic and More's subtle irony.

Hythlodaeus

ostensibly cites the example of the Polyerites as an argument
against capital punishment, yet he unabashedly mentions that
the Polyerite people exact the death penalty for reasons
almost as trivial as the English.

They condemn a prisoner

to death for plotting escape or for throwing away his badge
of servitude.

These offenses which draw the death penalty

are more serious than that for which the English execute their
citizens, since escape from penal servitude and throwing away
the badge of slavery show a defiance of law and authority.
--

Nonetheless, these examples of the Polyerite retributive justice
are surprising arguments to use against the injustice of
capital punishment.
The most astonishing offense that exacts the death
penalty, however, is for a free man to give money to a slave.
In contrast to England, where the poor are executed for
stealing from the rich, in the Polyerite land the main burden
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of responsibility rests with the rich.

Those with money are

executed for giving aid to a poor criminal.

The irony in this

comparison condemns the avarice of the English with superb
subtlety.

Hythlodaeus emphasizes the contrast by stressing

,'.'

the point that the Polyerites are so kindhearted that they
care for their slaves almost entirely by almsgiving.
This section on the Polyerite penal system, then,
advances the theme of injustice by showing an example of
justice juxtaposed to the injustice in England.

It also

provides another link between Book I and Book II by foreshadowing the contrast between the Europeans and the Utopians.
The final section (81/23-85/37·) of Part II (55/1585/3$) is a brief interlude which appears to be inserted
primarily for comic variety.

Hythlodaeus explains that he is

at a loss as to whether to suppress the humorous incident
which occurred at Cardinal Morton's because, as he says, it
is quite absurd.

He decides to relate it, however, "since it

was not evil in itself and had some bearing on the matter in
qUestion. tt45
More than a simple humorous digression, however, the
incident reveals the extent to which corruption pervades the
social classes of Engrand.

The hanger-on and the friar,

representing different classes in the society, exhibit the
45Utopia, p. 81/24-25.

~-··-------------------------2-9-3------------------------~
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same vices as the lawyer.

As he insists on the strict

interpretation of the law despite the injustice in it, they
both quote Scripture to revile one another.

Not without

point the humor satirizes those who use the letter of the
Scripture to pervert the spirit of the word.

Here, then, is

another example of the inverted order of values in the
body politic.
This section (81/23-85/37) also contains a foreshadowing
of Book II.

One of the guests at the Cardinal's table,

ignorant of the existence of any better order of society,
naively and sarcastically suggests that which he assumes to be
an absurdity:
for thieves.
vagrants.

"Raphael's proposal has made good provision
The Cardinal has taken precautions also for

It only remains now that public measures be

devised for persons whom sickness or old age has· brought to
want and made unable to work for a living_ ft46 Public
measures, of course, have been devised to care for the aged and
the infirm in Utopia (see 139/33-141/11, 185/37-187/17), but
the hanger-on ironically assumes that such a

pla~

as. the guest

sarcastically suggests would be beyond the realm of possibility;
He opines that this sort of person, the aged or infirm, be
distributed and divided among the Benedictine monasteries.

This'

• anecdote, then, links· Book I· with Book II by More's' t.echnique .
46Utopia, p. 81/35-38.
46utopia,

•
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of foreshadowing.
This section (81/23-85/)7-) concludes the second part of
Book I.

Hythlodaeus has exposed effectively some of the causes

and results of injustice in England.

Moreover, the picture

that he has drawn is one of inverted order (i. e., disorder)
and disunity, the condition that Plato associates with
injustice in the Republic.

In the next part (85/38-103/23)

of Book I More develops another variation on the same theme
of injustice.

~
i
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CHAPTER X
NATURE OF THE UNJUST TYRANT
In the third part (85138-103/23) of Book I, the
author More, continuing to lash out at injustice, brings into
focus the problem of a good man's duty in an unjust society.
Part III (85/38-103/23), like Part II (55/15-85137), divides
into four sections.

In the first section (85/38-87/25), the

nersona More prompts Hythlodaeus to speak further about the
injustice in Europe.

The second section (87/26-91/31) and

the third (91/32-97/38) taken together portray the nature of
a tyrant:

the French king's council shows the insidious

methods used by a tyrant and how his evil corrupts other
countries; the anonymous king's council demonstrates how the
greed of a tyrant enslaves his subjects.

The last section

(97/39-103/23) resumes the question of the good man in an
unjust society.
/

.

The first section (85/38-87125), though brief,
focuses the theme of injustice in Book I.

Urging Hythlodaeus

to become a councilor, the Qersona More paraphrases Plato's
important requisite for justice in the ideal state:

"Your

favorite, Plato, is of opinion that commonwealths will finally
be happy only if either philosophers become kings or kings
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turn to philosophy.HI

To apprehend the full significance

of this statement one must bear in mind Plato's great
emphasis on the idea of a philosopher-king in the ReQublic.
Occuring in Book V at the middle of the dialogue, Socrates'
proposal is the crucial imperative for justice in the ideal
state. 2

He insists that philosophers must rule the state if

justice is to be attained.
The persona More's paraphrase of Socrates' proposal,
stated at the thematic center of Book I of the Utopia, emphasizes
the plight of the states of Europe.

It is obvious from what

has gone before and from what follows this central section that
no state of Europe "will finally be happy."

The kings and

their councilors described by Hythlodaeus are the very opposite
of philosopher-kings.

This pathetic irony is accentuated by

the refusal of the philosopher Hythlodaeus to serve as a
councilor in Europe.
The problem put before Hythlodaeus should not be
interpreted simply as' the author More's personal problem
worked out in a fictional exe·rcise.

The choice confronting

Hythlodaeus in the Utopia not only had to be faced by Thomas
~ore

in his own life but also must be faced by every good man

who sees the reality of evil in the world.

Any man wanting

1Utopia, p. 87/11-13; cf., Rep. V 473 C-D (Shorey,
I, 507-509).
2This important passage in the Republic is discussed
in Chapter V.
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to build a better world order must decide whether and how he
can best contribute to that end.

Hythlodaeus and the persona

More, like personifications in a morality play, represent
universal alternative choices.

The decision Hythlodaeus

confronts, however, is subordinate to the theme of the entire
work.

His alternatives gain significance because he comprehends

fully the dichotomy between Europe and Utopia.

He reacts to the

.Qersona More's advice that he enter the politics at court as
Socrates says any philosopher who has seen the form of true
justice would react:
and corruption.)

he prefers to retire from the world of vice

The gersona More, however, considering the

matter from a different vantage point, feels keenly the tragedy
for Europe if good men refuse to serve the state.

The Qersona

Hore's appeal·to
appeal 'to the philosopher, namely, that service as a
councilor not only is Hythlodaeus' duty but ·'is the duty of
every good man,.,4 indicates the universality of the issue.
In the structure of Book I the funct.ional purpose
of this exchange between the persona More and Hythlodaeus is
to provide a context within which the philosopher can denounce
injustice in Europe.

The Qersona More's appeal only

stimulates Hythlodaeus to return to the matter that dominates
)The similarity between Hythlodaeus' attitude and
that of the philosopher described by Socrates is discussed in
Chapter VI.
4Utopia, p. 87/10-11.
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his thinking, the condemnation of injustice begun in the
earlier part of the dialogue.

Whereas in the dialogue at

Cardinal Morton's he has attacked mainly unjust laws and
institutions, now he exposes the true nature of an unjust
tyrant.
The two kings described by Hythlodaeus.contrast
ironically with the nersona More's wistful hope for a
philosopher-king in Europe.

The French king

a~d

the anonymous

king represent two different aspects of the tyrant described
by Socrates in the Republic,5 one portraying the tyrant's constant
need to fight wars and the other showing his oppressive greed.
Hythlodaeus suggests that these hypothetical kings
are typical of rulers throughout Europe.

Moreover, he

despairs of ever changing their characters, saying that they
"have been from their youth saturated and infected with wrong
ideas."6

He explains that because the evil of kings is so

deeply rooted his attempt to change them would be abortive:
"If I proposed beneficial measures to some king and tried to
uproot from his soul the seed-s of evil and corruption, do you
not suppose that I should be forthwith banished or treated
with ridicule?,,7
5ReR • VIII 566 A-567 A (Shorey, II, )23-25).
6Uto~ia, p. 87/21-22.

7Utopia, p. 87/23-25.
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Hythlodaeus' figurative language is similar'here to
that used by Socrates in describing an evil soul.

Both convey

the idea of the tyrant's incorrigible nature with metaphors
of weeds and of infection.

Socrates explains how the tyrant

from his youth is infected by the drone's sting of unsatisfied
yearnings.

If the drone "finds in the man any opinions or

appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it
slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of
sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in
from outside."'-8

He implies that such a man would not

likely change, because "when a tyrant arises he sprouts from
a protectorate root."9
Using language similar to that of Socrates,then,
Hythlodaeus suggests that corruption infects the body of
Europe in its most vital part.

To support his general

observations about European monarchs, he cites two hypothetical
but realistic examples of how kings spread their contagion
over their subjects and into other countries.

These examples

constitute the next two sections of Part II.
In the second section (87/26-91/31), Hythlodaeus
portrays the French king plotting to conquer Italy and
Burgundy "and other nations, too, whose territory he has
SReg. IX 573 B (Shorey, II, 343).
9Rego• VIII 565 D (Shorey, II, 319).
9Reg

~--------------~------3-0-0--------------------~
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already conceived the idea of usurping. ulO

To achieve his

nefarious objectives he gathers round him a "circle of his
most astute councilors. nIl
Hythlodaeus' language in these opening remarks
emphasizes the evil and calloused nature of the king's war
preparations.

His assertion that the decision to usurp other

nations has already been made implies that the French king is
a hardened and incorrigible tyrant.

Any advice received from

his councilors, therefore, is bound to echo his own perverse
desires.

Hythlodaeus also uses the word astute in an ironic

way to convey a meaning directly opposite to its denotation of
wise or sagacious.

Although the councilors' war machinations

cannot be called astute in a just society, they are astute in
the unjust society which the councilors control.
This opening sketch of the king and his councilors
contains overtones of Socrates' description of the tyrant's
relationship with his advisors, for the tyrant, according
to Socrates, must gather round him "base companions fl because
Uthe better sort hate and av;id him. ff12 In the same ironic
tone that Hythlodaeus uses to impugn the king's councilors,
Socrates assails the wisdom of the tyrant and his flatterers.
10Utopia, p. 87/35-36.
llutopia, p. 87/27-28.
12Rep • VIII 568 A (Shorey, II, 327).

,
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Explaining why Euripides is called wise, Socrates comments,
"Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said,
'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.'

He meant

evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.,,13
socrates obviously uses

~

uses astute in the Utopia.

here in the same way Hythlodaeus
In both works the irony subtly

reinforces the theme by suggesting the inverted order of

&

1

values in a tyranny.
Hythlodaeus' enumeration of the councilors'
recommendations conveys the impression that all Europe suffers
under a tyrannical yoke.

The councilors spread a net of

alliances, treaties, and agreements involving most of the
countries of Europe for the purpose of bringing Italy under
French control.

The French plan is to draw other peoples into

a snare by pandering to their lust for power, money, and land.
The Germans and the Swiss are to be lured by gold, the King
of Aragon by the promise of another kingdom.

The Prince of

Castile, like an unwary animal, is to be "caught by the
prospect of a marriage alliance. u14 The Scots are to be
"posted in readiness, prepared for any opportunity to be let
loose on the English if they make the slightest movement.,,15
13Rep. VIII 568 B (Shorey, II, 329).
14Utopia, p. 89/10.
15Utopia, p. 89/17-18.
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With this language--ffcaught," "posted in readiness," and Hlet
loose"--Hythlodaeus conveys the impression that Europeans act
like beasts and not like rational human beings.
As Hythlodaeus offers the maneuvering of the French
councilors to argue against becoming a councilor, More as
author ironically offers advice to King Henry ViII.

By

exposing the French attitude toward treaties, More as author
suggests that England stay clear of entangling alliances.
Hythlodaeus explains that the French Hagree that negotiations
for peace should be undertaken, that an alliance always weak
at best should be strengthened with the strongest bonds, and
that the English should be called friends but suspected as
enemies. f1l6 More as author makes the same point again in
Book II through Hythlodaeus' description of the Utopian
foreign policy (197/18-199/35).

In contrast to the French,

the Utopians do not think treaties necessary between peoples
who trust one another:

If'What is the use of a treaty,' they

ask, 'as though nature of herself did not sufficiently bind one
man to another?

If a person does not regard nature, do you

suppose he will care anything about words?,«17
More as author continues his indirect counseling
through Hythlodaeus' recommendations for the French king.
16
.
Ut OR1q, p. 89/13-16.
17Utopia, p. 197/20-25.
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Castigating the injustice of war and the disastrous consequences
of an imperialistic foreign policy, Hythlodaeus would urge on
the French king the principle of one king for one kingdom.
Citing the example of the Achorian people, who learned to their
regret that the acquisition of an additional kingdom brings
only misery and slavery, Hythlodaeus points out that war results
in complete disorder in the society.

The Achorians lost lives

and money, their country became a breeding ground for thieves,
and a general condition of injustice resulted which was
reflected particularly in the fact that "the laws were held
18
in contempt."
Fortunately, however, the Achorians saw the error of
their ways.

They gave their king a choice of ruling one or

the other of his two kingdoms, telling him that "he could not
keep both because there were too many of them to be ruled by
half a king, just as no one would care to engage even a
muleteer whom he had to share with some one else.,,19

This

animal image, like that of the man-eating sheep (65138-6712),
contributes to the impression of the inverted order of values
in Europe.

Hythlodaeus implies in his statement that the

average man cares more about his beasts of burden than kings
do about their subjects.
18Utopia, p. 91/9.
19UtoQia, p. 91/15-17.
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This story of the Achorian people exemplifies again
the inconsistency of Hythlodaeus' position in the debate on
councilorship.

Indeed, his evidence diametrically opposes

the point he purportedly wishes to make.

The account of the

French council meeting supposedly shows that kings cannot be
swayed from an evil course of action, yet the AQhorians prove
just the opposite by persuading their king to relinquish one
of his kingdoms.
The primary function of the anecdote of the French
council is not to advance Hythlodaeus' argument but rather to
point out an aspect of the tyrant's nature and to demonstrate
the cancerous nature of evil in European society.
The French king reveals one characteristic vice of
a tyrant; in the next section (91/32-97/38) the anonymous king
shows another.

Hythlodaeus exposes the insidious methods used

by the monarch and his councilors to extort money from the
people.

As was indicated in Chapter VII, the anonymous king

and the tyrant described by Socrates have a similar preoccupation
with war which drives them t6 extreme measures of raising .
revenue.

Thus the councilors pervert the laws because they

hold that "no amount of gold is enough for the ruler who has
to keep an army."

20

The anonymous king's councilors assume, as Thrasymachus
20

Utopia, p. 93/38-39.
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does in the ReQublic, that justice is the advantage of the
stronger.

Each councilor proposes a scheme to fill the king's

coffers at the expense of the people.

One councilor, for

example, would recommend to the king "that under heavy penalties
he prohibit many things and especially such as it is to the
people's advantage not to allow.

Afterwards for money he should

give a dispensation to those with whose interests the prohibition
has interfered.,,21
The councilors realize that the king can best dupe the
people by manipulating the laws and by binding the judges to
himself, for with the judges under his influence "there will
be no cause of his so patently unjust in which one of them will
not either from a desire to contradict or from shame at
repeating another's view or to curry favor, find some loophole
22
whereby the law can be perverted."
In a kingdom with judges
such as these, no regard is given to the spirit of the law.
Justice becomes synonymous with the will of the king, and for
the king, "it is enough that either equity be on his side or
the letter of the law or the twisted meaning of the written
word or, what finally outweighs all law with conscientious
judges, the indisputable royal prerogative!tt 2 3
21Ut02ia, p. 93/10-13.
22Ut 02 1a
. , p. 93/23-26.
23ut02ia, p. 93/33-36.
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The perversion of laws and the dichotomy between the
spirit and the letter of the law are emphasized throughout
Book I.

As was indicated above (Chapter IX), William BUde

particularly notes this European attitude and contrasts it
specifically with the attitude of the Utopians, who promulgate
few laws but honor their spirit.
The anonymous king's councilors' perversion of law
is particularly obnoxious because it attempts to maintain an
appearance of justice.

One councilor, for example, recommends

exacting fines for the violation of "certain old and motheaten laws. "24

Such a scheme would be ~ot only an excellent

means of raising money, but also would be desirable because
there is none "any more honorable than such as has an outward
mask of justice. u25 The image here of sinister councilors
shrewdly manipulating laws behind an outward mask of
justice symbolizes the hypocrisy of the whole legal system.
Another example of the hypocrisy and the inverted
order of values in the kingdom is evoked by one councilor's
recommendation to impose taxes for war:

"Another suggests a

make-believe war under pretext of which he would raise money
and then, when he saw fit, make peace with solemn ceremonies
to throw dust in his simple people's eyes because their loving
24

Utopia, p. 93/5-6.

25Utopiq, p. 93/9-10.
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monarch in compassion would fain avoid human bloodshed. tt26
Hythlodaeus makes the point particularly effective by the ironic
comment that the "loving" monarch acts with solemn ceremonies
to avoid human bloodshed.
Hythlodaeus maint2ins, like Socrates (I 342 A-342 E),
that the true test of the administration of justice in a state
is the well-being of the citizens.

He argues that a king,

rather than owning his subjects, has them entrusted to his
care as sheep are committed to the care of a shepherd.

In

Chapter II it was indicated how Hythlodaeus uses the same
shepherd image as Socrates to explain the proper relationship
between the king and his people. 27
That a king who oppresses the people can expect
nothing but strife and revolution is emphasized by Hythlodaeus'
rhetorical question:

"Who is more eager for revolution than

he who is discontented with his present state of life?

Who is

more reckless in the endeavor to upset everything, in the hope
of getting profit from some source or other, than he who has
nothing to lose?f,28

Rather than oppressing beggars, a true

king exercises authority "over prosperous and happy subjects;;29
26Utopia, pp. 91/39-93/4.
27 Supra, p. 46; cf., Utopia,
UtoQia, p. 95/10-19, and Rep.
I 345 C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75.
28Utopia, p. 95/22-26.
29UtoQia, p. 95/33.

~
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Socrates makes a similar point in Book IX.

Contending that a

tyrant who rules over slaves is in great danger of revolution,
Socrates speculates that if a tyrant were without protection
from his henchmen, "how great would be his fear • • • lest he
and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves."3 0
Likening the domain of a tyrant to a prison, Hythlodaeus
emphasizes the tyrant's lust in portraying his wretched existence:
"To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of pleasure
and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations of all
around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but of a
jail."3 1 In addition to comparing the domain of a tyrant to
a prison, Socrates describes the tyrant's nature in the same
way:

"And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the

tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described
and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and
appetites?H3 2
Hythlodaeus and Socrates also employ similar medical
metaphors in referring to the tyrant and his state.
likens the tyrant to an incompetent physician
cure a diseased body:

Hythlodaeus

who attempts to

"As he is an incompetent physician who

30Rep • IX 578 E (Shorey, II, 363).
31utopia, p. 95/37-39.
32Rep. IX 579 B (Shorey, II, 365). In his discussion
of tyranny Socrates emphasizes that the people are in bondage.
See particularly IX 577 A-529 E (Shorey, II, 357-67).
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cannot cure one disease except by creating another, so he who
cannot reform the lives of citizens in any other way than by
depriving them of the good things of life must admit that he

_.

does not know how to rule free men."

33

Explaining how the

tyrant must purge the city of the wise and rich citizens who
would be likely to revoltr Socrates describes this practice
as "just the opposite of that which physicians practice on our
bodies.

For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he

does the reverse."3

4

Hythlodaeus concludes his portrayal of the tyrant and
his state with an exhortation which parallels that made in
the French king's council and that at the home of Cardinal
Morton.

Recommending partial remedies for the injustices

described, he cites a particular example.

The Macarians, a

people not far from Utopia, have a law that the king shall never
have at one time in his coffer more than a thousand pounds of
gold or its equivalent in silver.

A good king promulgated the

law to insure the prosperity of his people and the integrity
of future monarchs.

This pre-vious sage felt "that since the

king had to payout whatever came into his treasury beyond the
limit prescribed by law, he would not seek occasion to commit
injustice.,,35
33Utopia, pp. 95/39-97/4.
34Rep. VIII 567 C (Shorey, II, 325-27).
35Utopia, p. 97/31-34.
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The Macarians, like the Achorians and the Polyerites,
compare favorably with the Utopians and contrast sharply with
the Europeans on particular pOints of justice:· the Polyerites
display an exemplary system 'of penal justice, the Achorians and
their king have learned to be content with one kingdom, and
the Macarians and their king are content with moderate riches.
The specific reforms suggested in these three examples,
however, are only partial remedies which might alleviate the
gross injustices in Europe.

Only in Utopia are the causes

of injustice completely eliminated.
The general state of corruption in Europe portrayed
by Hythlodaeus makes the concluding debate between him and the
Qerson~

More more meaningful.

The resumption of the discussion

of the moral duty of the good man constitutes the final
section (97/39-103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23).
Hythlodaeus and the

Rerso~

Although

More come to no agreement on the

question in the work itself, More as author implies his
resolution of the problem by an oblique reference to his own
practical policy.
The Rersona More resumes the debate by advising
Hythlodaeus on the method necessary to effect changes in the
attitudes of kings and councilors.

He argues that Hythlodaeus

should eschew his academic philosophy and adopt another kind,
more practical for statesmen; for, if the philosopher cannot
completely bring about good, he has at least a duty to abate

~-.----------------------------------~
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evil.

The

£e~~

More emphasizes the desperate plight of

Europe with figurative language of weeds overgrowing a
garden:

"If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the

root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire
vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert
the commonwealth. tt36 He appeals specifically to Hythlodaeus'
loyalties as a mariner by evoking the image of the ship of
state floundering in a storm:

"You must not abandon the

ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds.,,37
The £ersona More, aware of the philosopher's blunt
manner, specifies the method that a statesman should use:
"By the indirect approach you must seek and strive to the best
of your power to handle matters tactfully.

What you cannot
turn to good you must make as little bad as you can.,,3 8 In
the remainder of this section (97/39-103/23) Hythlodaeus, in

rejecting the indirect approach, insists that such a method
is not only wrong but also ineffective.
Hythlodaeus
with an appeal to

~haracteristically

authorities~

supports his argument

He refers first to Plato by

identifying himself, the Utopians, and Plato on one side, in
contrast to the councilors:

"What if I told them the kind

----------------~---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

36ptopia, p. 99/31-34.
37Utopia, p. 99/34-35.

38Utopia, pp. 99/38-101/2.

~
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of things which Plato creates in his republic or which the
Utopians actually put in practice in theirs?

Though such

institutions were superior (as, to be sure, they are), yet
they might appear odd because here individuals have the right
of private property, there all things are common."39

This

passage not only identifies the Utopia specifically with the
Republic, it also suggests the connecting link between Book I
and Book II of the

gtopi~.

Although Hythlodaeus has not,

up to this point in the dialogue, mentioned private property
as such, he has shown it to be a cause of injustice in
Europe.

In Book II he reveals how the Utopians achieve justice

by eliminating private ownership of property.

Thus in this

passage he suggests the contrast between the Utopians and
Europeans which he later develops in Book II.
Proceeding with his rejection of More's advice by
appealing to the authority of the Gospels, Hythlodaeus argues
that Christ never urged an indirect approach.

On the

contrary, "what He has whispered in the ears of His disciples
He commanded to be preached openly from the housetops.tt40
Hythlodaeus maintains next that the indirect method is
irrevelant:

"As to that indirect approach of yours, I cannot
41
see its relevancy."
Insisting that the method would not
39Utopia, p.

101/12~18.

40UtoQia, p. 101/27-28.
41Utopia,
41UtoQia, p. 103/1-2.
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work and furthermore might endanger his soul, he rejects the
gersona More's advice with unequivocal finality:

"Thus you

are far from being able to make anything better by that
-42
indirect approach of yours."
The irony in Hythlodaeus' continued rejection of
the indirect approach is that More as author uses just such an
approach throughout the Utogia to influence the rulers of
Europe, particularly Henry VIII.

In Book I Hythlodaeus not

only decries the injustice in Europe but gives specific
recommendations for reform, recommendations which point up the
balanced structure in the three different anecdotes

related~

He concludes each anecdote with an exhortation of specific
advice that pertains to particular abuses in the Europe of
More's day.43
Thus More as author, through the main character
Hythlodaeus, follows the indirect approach rejected by the
character himself in the -dia logue.

As his contemporaries

observe, More as author intends to teach as well as to delight.
The dialogue on council is an ingenious literary device through
which Thomas More can advise kings indirectly while ostensibly
rejecting the role of councilor.

In fact, he suggests through

the character Hythlodaeus that kings would do well to attend
42Utopia, p. 103/14-15.
43For a discussion of the structural balance achieved
by these exhortations, see Surtz, Utopia, Introduction, p. cxxiv.
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to such books as philosophers have written.

Hythlodaeus

insists that kings could find the good counsel of philosophers
in published books "if the rulers would be ready to take good
44
advice."
Hythlodaeus concludes this final section (97/39103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23) with an image drawn
directly from the Republic (VI 496 E).

Justifying his

decision to remain apart from the political affairs of
Europe, he appeals again to Plato's authority:
For this reason, Plato by a very fine comparison shows
why philosophers are right in abstaining from administration
of the commom'1ealth. They observe the people rushing out
into the streets and being soaked by constant showers and
cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain. They
know that, if they go out, they can do no good but will only
get wet with the rest. Therefore, being content if they
themselves at least are safe, theY4keep at home, since they
cannot remedy the folly of others. ,
'
As
~s

was discussed above (Chapter VI), Hythlodaeus' reasoning

here distorts Plato's full meaning in the Republic and therefore
remains an unconvincing argument.
The final part of Book I (103/24-109/36) serves as a
transition between the first

~nd

second books.

The two sections

in this part correspond to the two books of the work as a
whole.
~hole.

In the first section (103/24-107/4) Hythlodaeus

summarizes his description of the wretched condition of life

4~ptopia, p. 87/18.
45 Ut opla,
.
p. 103/16-23.
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in Europe and specifies the immediate cause of injustice.

In

the remaining section (10715-109/36) he gives a preview of
the well-ordered commonwealth of Utopia and stresses the
chief differences between the European and the Utopian peoples.
Hythlodaeus opens the first section (103/24-107/4) by
attributing the injustice in Europe to the institution of private
property and by picturing at the same time the disunity that
exists in a society divided into two classes, rich and poor:
"Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my
heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever you have
private property and all men measure all things by cash
values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to
have justice or prosperity--unless you think lustice exists
where all the best things flow into the hands of the worst
citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among very
few--and even they are not altogether well off, while the rest
are downright wretched.,,46

This passage epitomizes the moral

that Hythlodaeus has been advancing throughout Book I.

In each

of his anecdotes the oppressi9n of the poor by the rich results
from greed for territory, gold, or goods.
In the next paragraph More as author represents in
capsule form the overall structure of his whole work.
Hythlodaeus contrasts the unjust conditions in Europe with
46utopia, p. 103/24-31.

(Italics mine.)
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the good order in Utopia.

The paragraph, which is only one

sentence, divides neatly into two parts, each part corresponding
to a book of the work as a whole.

In the first half of the

sentence Hythlodaeus first praises the Utopians who achieve
equality through their institutions:

ttAs a result, when in

my heart I ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions
of the Utopians, among whom, with very few laws, affairs are
ordered so aptly that virtue has its reward, and yet, with
equality of distribution, all men have abundance of all

47'

things • •• "

He continues in the second half by comparing

this happy state to other nations:

" • • • and then when I

contrast with their policies the many nations elsewhere ever
making ordinances and yet never one of them achieving good
order--nations where whatever a man has acquired he calls his
own private property, but where all these laws daily framed
are not enough for a man to secure or to defend or even to
distinguish from someone else's the goods which each in turn
calls his own, a predicament readily attested by the numberless
and ever new and interminable lawsuits.,,48

In this sentence

Hythlodaeus summarizes Book I and foreshadows Book II.

The

Europeans cannot achieve good order despite innumerable laws
and interminable lawsuits, whereas the Utopians have built a

47Ut oP1a,
.

p. 103/32-35.

48Utopia, pp. 103/36-105/4.

~
~
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just society with few laws.

The Utopians reward virtue and

achieve justice through equality, in contrast to the Europeans,
who ignore virtue and create inequalities.
Hythlodaeus goes on to insist that Europeans cannot
attain complete justice until they abolish private property
and establish equality.

To support this opinion he cites

Plato, saying that "this wise sage, to be sure, easily foresaw
that the one and only road to the general welfare lies in the
maintenance of equality in all respects. fl49

This reference is

interesting because in the Republic Plato does not insist
on "equality in allrespects. fl

In fact, the primary difference

between Utopia and the republic is that in the former the
citizens are equal and in the latter they are not.

The

guardians in the republic, however, are equal in regard to
private property, this communism with the guardian class
apparently being the equality to which Hythlodaeus refers.
In his reference to Plato Hythlodaeus obviously
intends to identify Utopia with Plato's ideal state and to
contrast it with Europe.

He wishes to stress that the injustice

in Europe results from institutions and laws that are manipulated
by the ruling class and not from the perfidity of the people.
In Europe he observes the proper order is completely reversed:
"It generally happens that the one class pre-eminently deserves

~----------------------------------,----------~
~--------~------------------------------------~
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the lot of the other, for the rich are greedy, unscrupulous,
and useless, while the poor are well-behaved, simple, and by
their daily industry more beneficial to the commonwealth than
to themselves. n50

To correct this inverted order Hythlodaeus

calls for the complete abolition of private property.
Allowing that partial remedies might be applied to
correct some abuses in Europe, Hythlodaeus makes suggestions
which summarize most of the partial remedies previously
recommended in each of the anecdotes in Book I.

For example,

he suggests legislation similar to that previously accredited
to the Macarians:

"Special legislation might be passed to

prevent the monarch from being overmighty and the people
overweening. ,,51
The only complete remedy to injustice, however, is the
establishment of communism.

To make this point, Hythlodaeus

again uses a medical metaphor.
solutions to repeated

medic~l

He likens other haphazard
treatment that keeps a sick

body at the point of death for a prolonged period.

Only the

abolishment of private property can effect a permanent cure,
for otherwise, he says, "While you are intent upon the cure of
one part, you make worse the malady of the other parts.

Thus,

the healing of the one member reciprocally breeds the disease

50Ut o121a,
.
p. 105/14-18.
.
5 1Ut oR1a,
p. 105/28-29; cf. Utopia, p. 9715-38.
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of the other as long as nothing can so be added to one as not to
be taken away from another. fl52 With this evocative image of
the diseased body politic reminiscent of Socrates' description
of injustice, Hythlodaeus concludes the first section (103/24-

10714) of the final part (103/24-109/36) of Book 1. 53
The last section (10715-109/36) begins with the
Eersona More's objection to communism.

Maintaining that communism

would destroy personal incentive to work and disrupt the order
and authority of the commonwealth, he advances traditional
arguments similar to those made by Aristotle 54 against the
ReQublic.

Hythlodaeus suggests that the picture of Utopia

which he draws in Book II will reveal the answer to More's
objection:
I do not wonder • • • that it looks this way to you, being
a person who has no picture at all, or else a false one,
of the situation I mean. But you should have been with me
in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs
as I did, for I lived there more than five years and would
never have wished to leave except to make. known that
new world. In that case you unabashedly would admit that
you had never seen a well-ordered people anywhere but there. 55
52UtoQia, pp. 105139~107/4.
53In Books VIII and IX of the Republic Socrates'
discussion of injustice is an extended metaphor of the pathology
of a diseased state. See particularly VIII 563 E-564 A and
567 C (Shorey, II, 311-13 and 325-26).
54POlitics ii, 1, 1260 b -ii, 4, 1262a • ;he Basic Works
of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941),
pp. 1146-49.
55Utopia, p. 107/17-23.

320

The reference here to the Utopians as a well-ordered people
signals the theme of Book II:

according to both More and Plato

justice is synonymous with proper order.

In this passage

Hythlodaeus' assertion that he uwould never have wished to
leave" Utopia also indicates the natural reaction of the
philosopher.

In the Republic Socrates acknowledges that any man

who has apprehended the form of justice is reluctant to return
to the cave (Reg_ VII 517 C).
When Peter Giles expresses surprise that a "betterordered people" could exist outside of Europe, Hythlodaeus
again emphasizes the contrast between Europe and Utopia.

Whereas

in the first section (103/24-107/4) he describes the contrast
between the two peoples in regard to private property, in this
section (107/5-109136) he delineates the differences in their
characters_

Pointing to the main reason why the Utopians have

achieved a just society and the Europeans have not, Hythlodaeus
implies that the Europeans are too proud and prejudiced to
learn from others and are too slothful to apply themselves
diligently to arduous tasks_

The Utopians, on the other hand,

work hard and are al\,lays open to new ideas.

Indicating that the

distinction between Europeans and Utopians is not one of
intelligence but of moral fiber, Hythlodaeus explains that

'I even

though we surpass them in brains, we are far inferior
6
to them in application and industry_"5

56Utopi~, p_ 107/37-39.
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The final part (103/24-109/36) of Book I, then, links
the two books of the Utopia by summarizing the injustice
condemned in Book I and by foreshadowing the justice approved
of in Book II.

Book I closes with the three men's retiring

to the persona More's house for dinner and returning afterward
to his garden to hear Raphael describe Utopia.

~is

discription

is made particularly startling by the corruption and disorder
which has been portrayed throughout Book I.

Utopia contrasts

with Europe as sharply as the ideal state contrasts with
tyranny in the

Republi~.

Unlike Plato's logical treatment in the Republic,
More's theme in Book I unfolds like a large painting.

Hythlodaeus

persistently exposes the various causes and results of injustice
in the states of Europe.

Furthermore his diction and imagery,

as well as his stories and arguments themselves, reveal his
dominant concern with injustice throughout Book I.
In Book I More creates Hythlodaeus as a character with
/

the same understanding and opinion of injustice as those
videnced by Socrates in Books I, VIII, and IX of the Republic.
n the attitudes against which Hythlodaeus argues, More also
xposes the same false concepts of justice as those represented
y Socrates' adversaries.

Although More uses a different style

nd includes less in his scope, he has the same purpose as
hat of Plato.

By sketching the negative side of the portrait

on Book I in preparation for the positive side in Book II,

~--------------------------------------~
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More leaves no doubt that justice is superior to injustice
for man and for the state.

When Hythlodaeus completes the

total picture of Utopia at the close of Book II, the unity
of More's work will reveal itself clearly.

/

CHAPTER XI
FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE
To apprehend the unity of the Utopia, one should read
Book II with reference to Book I.

The theme of justice in the

second book reveals itself more clearly in light of the theme
of injustice in the first book.

From these complementary

themes taken together arises the meaning of the work as a
whole.

In this broad sense the Utopia parallels the Republic,

for the meaning of Plato's work also emanates from the
juxtaposition of the complementary but contrasting themes of
justice and injustice.
In each work the central character commences his
description of the ideal state in response to skeptical
remarks made by his listeners.

In the Utopia the persona

More's defense of private property and Peter Giles's expression
of loyalty to European traditions prompt Hythlodaeus to give
an account of the Utopian commonwealth.

The persona More and

Giles defend the status quo even though Hythlodaeus has gone on
at considerable length to point out the injustice in the
kingdoms of Europe.

In the Republic Socrates delineates the

ideal state in reply to Glaucon's and Adeimantus' justification
of the popular notions of justice.

In the second book Glaucon

and Adeimantus request Socrates to continue'the search for
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justice even though he has shown in Book I the inadequacy of
the popular notion of justice.

Thus both the place and the

function of the Utopian commonwealth in More's work correspond
in a general way to the place and the function of the ideal
state in the Republic.
More, however, alters Plato's structure- so that his
portrayal of injustice in Book I takes up a greater proportion
of the entire

~topia

than Plato's treatment in Book I occupies

in the whole of the Republic.

In the Republic, however, Plato

returns to the theme of injustice in Books VIII and IX, after
is description of the ideal state.

As has been shown in the

preceding chapters, More in Book I of the Utopia gives various
specific examples of injustice in Europe, which correspond to
lato's explanation of the nature of injustice in Books VIII
nd IX.

Thus More compresses into Book I of the Utopia the

ssential elements of the subject matter treated by Plato in
ooks I, VIII, and IX of the Republic.

Despite this alteration

f the parts of the ReRublic, More achieves the same final
ffect:

--

justice is shown to be preferable to injustice.
In reading Book II of the Utopia one must bear in

ind how More's didactic purpose and style differ from those
f Plato, lest the thematic and structural similarities between
he two works be missed.

Plato attempts to devise an ideal

tate that will reflect the true form of justice.

Socrates

akes this intention clear in Book V, as he comments on his

)25
own attempt "to create in words the pattern of a good state."

1

Explaining that it would hardly be possible to realize in
action what can be pictured verbally, Socrates advises Glaucon
not to insist flthat I must

~xhibit

as realized in action

precisely what we expounded in words."

2

Socrates, therefore,

hypothesizes a theoretical state, which he

admit~

exists

nowhere in reality.
In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to create
a hypothetical vision of justice, but he suggests its form by
representing a practical model.

More's intention can be inferred

from Hythlodaeus t implication that the excellence of Utopia
is beyond description.

No wonder, then, that the Qersona More

cannot be convinced verbally of the advantages of communism,
since he "has no picture at all") of the situation in Utopia.
Hence Hythlodaeus tells the gersona More, flyou should have been
with me in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs
4
as I did ...
Hythlodaeus implies in this remark a meaning
directly opposite to that of Socrates.

Hythlodaeus might well

have paraphrased Socrates t co-mment to Glaucon thus:

tlDon t t

insist that I must exhibit in words what the Utopians realize
1
HeR. V 472 D (Shorey, I, 505).
2Hep • V 47) A (Shorey, I, 507).
)Utopia, p. 107/18.
4utopia, p. 107/19-20.
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in action."

Rather than conjecturing how an ideal state

would surpass any real one, More represents a state that
purports to suggest an existing reality greater than words
can describe.
This difference between the two works is suggested in
the translation of the quatrain that precedes the Utopia:
«Alone of all lands, without the aid of abstract philosophy,
I have represented for mortals the philosophical city.u5

By

concrete details and particular instances, then,More depicts
as existing in actuality what Plato brings into existence only
in the mind.
More's method particularly suits his didactic purpose,
for while delighting his readers, he also points out specific
abuses in Europe.

Therefore,he details concretely in Book II

corrective measures to particular abuses described in Book I.
Book II of the Utopia, then, should be read not only with the
difference in method between the rrtoQia and the ReQublic in
mind, but also with reference to the injustices in Book I
of the gtopia.
Because More's didactic purpose and style differ from
those of Plato, his description of Utopia contains details omitted
from the republic and lacks both the theoretical explanations
and the particulars included by Plato.
5UtoQia, p. 19/24-25.

For example, Socrates not
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only specifies the kinds of tales that should be told to the
youth, but he also explains why such tales should be included
in the educational system.

Hythlodaeus, in contrast, merely

mentions that Utopian children are introduced to good literature. 6
Conversely,

Hythl~daeus

describes the religious ceremonies of

the Utopians, whereas Socrates passes over the matter of
religion with the slight comment that "the founding of temples,
and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons,
and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the
services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to
keep them gracious.,,7
Despite the different emphasis and ordering of details
in the respective descriptions of the ideal state, the works
are similar in that both are unified by the theme of justice.
As has been pointed out in the earlier chapters, Plato maintains
that justice results when each constituent part in the state
performs its function.

Conversely, when one part fails in

performing its function, the result is injustice.
The first book of the UtoQia points out how disordered
and disunified the states of Europe are.

In the second book

More as author shows how the institutions, laws, and customs of
the Utopians contribute to order and unity among the parts of
6

U~opia,

p. 159/11.

7Rep • IV 427 C (Shorey, I, 345).
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the commonwealth and hence to justice throughout the whole.
Although he accepts Plato's criterion that justice is
manifested by order and unity in the state, More has his own
ideas as to how these can be achieved.

He adopts important

features of the Republic, therefore, to suit his own purposes.
Instead of following the Republic in arranging- the parts of
Book II, however, it appears that More turned to Aristotle's
Politics.
In the Politics Aristotle mentions the two elements
in which the well-being of the state consists:
Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to
determine out of what and what sort of elements the state
which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed.
There are two things in which all well-being consists:
one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action,
and the other the discovery of the actions which are the
means tow~rds it; for the means and the end may agree or
disagree.
These two elements correspond to the major parts of Book II
of the Utopia.

In Part I (111/7-185/14) Hythlodaeus describes

the institutional foundations of the just state and the end to
which the state is directed.-· In Part II (185/15-237/36) he
shows how the citizens act in their relations to each other, .
to foreign states, and to God.

Book II concludes with a

peroration (237/37-247/3) which summarizes the subject matter
of the whole work.
The first major part (111/7-185/14) divides into
8politics vii, 13, 1331b, p. 1294.
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three sections in which Hythlodaeus delineates the geopolitical
(111/7-135/24), socioeconomic (135/25-159/2), and the
educational and philosophical (159/3-185/14) foundations of the
just state.

The labels given here to the separate sections, of

course, are chosen arbitrarily.

In some cases, moreover,

individual passages seem to be out of place under a specific
label.

Hythlodaeus' conversational narration does not allow

for strict logical categories in his material.

Indeed, much

of the verisimilitude achieved in More's style would be lost
if the description of the island conformed to a precisely
drawn outline.

Nonetheless, the divisions indicated above

appear to be clearly discernible.
In the first section (111/7-135/24), describing how the
geography and political institutions of Utopia are conducive
to a peaceful, well-ordered, and unified state, Hythlodaeus
begins by briefly explaining how the Utopians have combined
art with nature to make their island an impenetrable fortress.
Utopus, the founder of the commonwealth, apparently wanted to
improve the defensive advantage of his country by' making an
island out of a peninsula.

Ordering the excavation of fifteen

miles on the side where the land was connected to the continent,
he caused the sea to flow around the land.

This incredible

feat struck the neighboring peoples with wonder and terror.
Thus, the Utopians developed their own institutions and laws
away from the corrupting influence of other people.
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The Utopians subsequently took advantage of their
insular position and further enhanced their defensive capability.
They controlled the navigation of the mouth of the bay, which
flis rendered perilous here ~y shallows and there by reefs,fl9
with the help of landmarks placed on shore.

These landmarks

also serve for defense, because if they fl were removed to other
positions, they could easily lure an enemy's fleet, however
numerous, to destruction. 1110
The fortunate combination of the natural physical
advantages of the island with the ingenious skill and hard
work of the people accounts in part for the Utopian attitude
toward war.

They devote their time and effort to developing

the island's natural resources instead of finding pretexts to
gain more land and riches.

The Utopians' attitude contrasts

with that of the Europeans, who are described in Book I as idle,
resistant to new ideas, and occupied with planning or engaging
in war.
Because of the pretense that Utopia has a.real existence,
the description of the geography and the other physical
characteristics of the commonwealth has no parallel in the
Republic.

Such detailed description would be irrelevant in

Socrates' hypothetical state.
Hythlodaeus next describes the political divisions
9Utopia, p. 111/19-20.
10utopia, p. 111/28-30.
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which reflect the order and harmony among the constituent parts
of the common\'leal tho

Fifty-four city states, equal in size

and population, encircle the capital, Amaurotum, which
symbolizes the unity of all the people.

No conflict arises among

the city states because they consider themselves tenants instead
of masters of what they hold.

Hence, "no city has any desire to

extend its territory."ll
The rural districts give further evidence of the
regularity and harmony of the commonwealth.

A specified

number of inhabitants occupy the farmhouses, spaced "at suitable
distances from one another" throughout the rural area. 12 Since
all the workers share the burdens, they produce more food than
they need.

As Hythlodaeus explains, they overproduce from

charitable motives:

"Though they are more than sure how much

food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they
produce far more grain and cattle than they require for their
own use: they distribute the surplus among their neighbors. fl13
Such distributive justice differs markedly from the practice
in England, where "one insatiable glutton" can join field to
field for raising sheep and cattle and drive the tenants from
14
the land.
11Utopia, p. 113/36-37.
12
Utopia, p •. 115/1~2.
13Utopia, p. 117/8-12.
14Utopia, p. 67/14-26.
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Harmony exists not only among the farms themselves but
also between rural areas and the cities.

The practice of

requiring all the citizens to work for two years on the farms
prevents any distinction from arising between city and farm
workers.

The Utopian cities display the same order and

regularity as the farms.

With identical houses laid out in

symmetrical rows, they all follow the pattern of the capital,
Amaurotum.
Socrates does not describe the political divisions
in his ideal state, because, for one reason, the republic is
not a confederation of cities but only one city state.

In

contrast to the rotation of farm and city workers in Utopia,
however, the guardians in the republic live apart from other
citizens. 15 Socrates reasons that this separation will remove
the guardians from the temptation of soft living and will keep
them in readiness to defend the city.
The Utopians defend their cities by an ingenious
combination of art and nature.

They have the foresight, for

example, to think of protecting their water supply in the event
of an enemy invasion.

Hythlodaeus explains how the head and

source of a little river "just outside the city has been connected
with it by outworks, lest in case of hostile attack the water
might be cut off and diverted or polluted."16

The Anydrus

15Rep • III 416 D-417 B (Shorey, I, 311-13).
16Utopia, p. 119/27-30.
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River serves as a natural barrier of defense.

The Utopians

augment this natural feature by building a moat around the
other three sides of the city, in addition to a wall with
towers and battlements.
The exterior of the Utopian cities, although hostile
and formidable in appearance, allows life inside to go on·
without fear of interruption.

The peace and tranquility of the

cities are symbolized by gardens situated back of the rows of
houses.

Hythlodaeus describes their luxuriance:

"In them

they have vines, fruits, herbs, flowers, so well kept and
flourishing that I never saw anything more frultful and
more tasteful anywhere.«17

The lush Utopian gardens and the

fertile farmland contrast sharply with the barrenness of the
English countryside.

Referring in Book I to the English

landowners, Hythlodaeus comments ironically that ·'these good
fellows turn all human habitations and all cultivated land into
18
a wilderness. l'
Not only the physical characteristics of the island
but also the equality of the people reveal the order and the
regularity of the commonwealth.

The citizens neither own

property nor enjoy privacy in their homes because "folding
doors, easily opened by hand and then closing of themselves,
17UtoRia, p. 121/16-18.
18
.
Ut OR1a, p. 67/12-13.
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give admission to anyone. "19

In this respect all Utopians are

similar to the guardians in the republic.

Like the Utopians,

the guardians must not "possess any private property" or
"have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for
all to enter at will.,,20

But communism in Utopia applies to

all the citizens, where in Socrates republic only the guardians
and the leaders eschew private property.
Their voting privilege, however, makes the Utopian
citizens different from all classes in the republic.

They

elect representatives, who in turn elect the governor.

Any

citizen may become an official, even governor, because all
have equal opportunity to advance into the class of scholars
from which the citizens "choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors,
and finally the governor himself."21

In the republic the

people have no voice in the selection of their officials.
Socrates assumes that the leaders will have offspring who will
also be leaders.

Occasionally, however, the leaders will

select the son of a guardian to be trained as a future member
22
of their class.
Though the Utopian method of electing officials
19Utopia, p. 121/11-12.
20
Rep. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).
21utopia, p. 133/6-8.
22Rep • III 415 A (Shorey, I, 305).
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differs from the practice in the republic, they have leaders
who possess the qualities required of a leader by Socrates.
A consideration of the method of choosing officials and of
the philosophical education-given the scholars makes it evident
that the Utopian leaders combine a knowledge of civic affairs
with theoretical wisdom.

Thus the Utopians attain through a

democratic method the end which Socrates prescribes as the
crucial imperative for justice--their chief executive is a
philosopher-governor.
The governor and other elected officials differ
greatly from the kings and councilor.s in Europe.

The Utopians

take precautions that a tyrant will not arise among them.

The

governor who otherwise holds office for life can be "ousted
on suspicion of aiming at a tyranny. u2 3 Although the elected
officials "enter into consultation with the governor every
other day and sometimes, if need arises, oftener," they are
forbidden to enter into agreements in private. 24 Hythlodaeus
explains the reason for such practice:
To take counsel on matters of common interest outside the
senate or the popular assembly is considered a capital
offense. The object of these measures, they say, is to
prevent it from being easy, by a conspiracy between the
governor and the tranibors and by tyrannous oppressi~u of
the people, to change the order of the commonwealth. )
23UtoQia, p. 123/20-21.
24UtoQia, p. 123/24-25.
25UtoQia, p. 125/1-6.
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The Utopians put the same emphasis on maintaining the established
order of the commonwealth as Socrates does in the Republic.
As has been indicated above, Socrates prohibits any influence
which might upset fundamental political and social principles.
He therefore warns that the leaders of the republic "must
throughout be watchful against innovations in music and
gymnastics counter to the established order.,,26

How different

the stability of Plato's republic and More's Utopia appears in
comparison with the agitated condition of Europe as portrayed
in Book I!

No doubt Hythlodaeus has the wise measures of the

Utopians in the back of his mind when he describes how the
anonymous king and his councilors oppress the people by
manipulating the laws to satisfy their greedy desires.
Another Utopian regulation that curtails the kind of
corruption prevalent in the councils of Europe is the "custom
of debating nothing on the same day on which it is first
proposed. ,,27

This custom insures that an impetuous councilor

who blurts out a foolish remark will not be tempted to defend
it imprudently just to save his reputation.

Such a law would

obviously benefit the states of Europe, where the councilors
express opinions on any proposal immediately.

According to

Hythlodaeus, European councilors act "as if their whole
26

Rep. IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 331).

27Utopia, p. 125/11-13.
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reputation for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they
would deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could
lay hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries
of others."28
The Utopians also exhibit the equality and the order
in their lives by the way they work and use their leisure time.
In addition to farming every other two years, each citizen
learns and exercises a trade.

In contrast to the practice in

the republic, where each citizen performs his assigned function,
the Utopians respect freedom of choice as long as the individual
does not choose against the common good.

Although "for the

most part, each is brought up in his father's craft • • • if
anyone is attracted to another occupation, he is transferred
by adoption to a family pursuing that craft for which he
has a liking."2 9
Because the Utopians have a sensible attitude toward
work, they have plenty of leisure time.

Work occupies six

hours a day, and the remaining time, apart from meals and
sleep, may be spent in intellectual pursuits, voluntary work
at a trade, or productive and instructional recreation.
By comparing them to people of other countries,
Hythlodaeus explains why the Utopians have an abundance of
28Utopia, p. 59/3-6.
29Utopia, p. 127/12-17.
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free time.

In the remaining portion (129/30-135/24) of the first

section (111/7-135/24) he directly attacks the European vices
that he has been indirectly criticizing up to this point.
Although Hythlodaeus does not mention Europe by name, he
obviously means Europe when he refers to other countries.

He

again, as in Book I, castigates idlers and drones, rich
noblemen and their retainers, priests and so-called religious,
and sturdy beggars--all of whom live as parasites on the labor
of the poor.

In Utopia there are no such idle classes.

With

the exception of the few priests, scholars, and officials
(scarcely more than five hundred in each of the fifty-four
states) everyone in Utopia does physical labor.
Furthermore, the Utopians need not produce as much as
other peoples because they have fewer desires.

Hythlodaeus

explains that in countries other than Utopia the pride, vanity,
and licentiousness of the people create superfluous needs:
uIn a society where we make money the standard of everything,
it is necessary to practice many crafts which are quite vain
and superfluous, ministering-~nly to luxury and licentiousness."3 0 The Utopians, in contrast, produce only what "is
required by necessity or comfort (or even pleasure, provided it
1
be genuine and natural).,,3
30Utopia, p. 131/13-15.
3 1UtoQia, p. 131/26-27.
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The Utopians not only have fewer needs but also work
less than others for the necessities of life.

Their"clothing

lasts longer because they wear simple and sturdy garments and
put no value on fineness of thread.

Their houses last longer

because they are repaired regularly.

Nothing is allowed to

deteriorate from neglect.

Because they follow r.eason and

nature in their commonwealth, "everything has its proper place
and the general welfare is carefully regulated.«3 2
The Utopians, however, do not stress order and
regularity as ends in themselves.

Rather they reason that

order, unity, and stability are necessary conditions for
achieving their primary aim, which is identified by Hythlodaeus
at the conclusion of the first section (111/7-135/24):
The constitution of their commonwealth looks in the
first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens,
as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible
should be withdrawn from the service of the body and
devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind. It 1s in
the latter that they deem the happiness of life to consist. 33
The first section (111/7-135/24) of Book II, then,
shows how Utopus and his subJects deve19ped the island to
raise a rude and rustic people to a state of culture and
humanity.

Although the description of the geography and the

other physical characteristics of the commonwealth has no
parallel in the Republic, the fundamental institutions in
32Utopia, p. 133/24-25.
33Utopia, p. 135/19-24.
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Utopia conform to Plato's primary requisite for the establishment of a just society.

In Utopia, as in Socrates' republic,

the needs of the citizens prompt them to work together to
establish institutions that bring order and stability to the
state.

The basic institutions and customs of Utopia are

consistent with Plato's idea of a healthy state.

None of the

luxurious superfluities, which Socrates says are characteristic
of a fevered state, have been introduced. 34
The Utopians, on the other hand, are not as austere
as the citizens described in Socrates' elemental city.

Utopians

have plenty of leisure time to pursue pleasure, "provided it be
genuine and natural."35

The emphasis on work and leisure time

contrasts with Socrates' emphasis on military preparedness.
Utopia, where recreation receives due regard, differs from the
republic, where the best citizens "must not be prone to
laughter. ,,36
In the next section (135/25-159/2) of Part I (111/7185/14) Hythlodaeus shows how the socioeconomic basis of
Utopia contributes to the order and unity of the whole
commonwealth.
family.

The basic social and economic unit is the

By carefully regulating the number and the size of

families in the island, the Utopians maintain a constant
34FeQ. II 372 E-373 B (Shorey, I, 161).
35Utopia, p. 131/27.
36Rep • III 388 E (Shorey, I, 211).
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population that is consistent with unity.

When the population

swells beyond the fixed number, Hthey enroll citizens out of
every city and, on the mainland nearest them, wherever the
natives have much unoccupied and uncultivated land, they
found a colony under their own laws. H37
In emphasizing the unity of the Utopian people, More
as author follows Plato's prescription in the Republic.

In

Utopia, however, the ways and means of achieving unity differ
from those in the ReRublic.

Socrates, for example, says that

the state should grow "so long as in its growth it consents to
remain a unity,,,3 8 but his method of population control, unlike
that of the Utopians, is to restrict the number of marriages:
flBut the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion
of the rulers, that they may keep the number of citizens as
nearly as may be the same, taking into account wars and
diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as
possible, our city may not grow too great or too small.,,39
Although Socrates does not suggest the inhabiting of other lands
as a means of population control, he says that when the food
supply becomes insufficient to feed the population tlwe shall
have to cut out a cantle of our neighbour's land if we are

1----------------------------------------------------------------37
Utopia, p. 137/19-22.
38ReR • I 423 C (Shorey, I, 329) •

39 ReQ • V 460 A (Shorey, I, 461-63).
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to have enough for pasture and ploughing.,,40
In emigrating to the lands nearby, the Utopians wage
war against the natives if they resist living under Utopian
laws.

Hythlodaeus explains how they justify such a war:

"They consider it a most just cause for war when a people which
does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste nevertheless
forbids the use and possession of it to others who by the rule
of nature ought to be maintained by it.,.41

Such a rationaliza-

tion for war seems less surprising when the relationship
between Book II and Book I is recognized.

This passage

obviously contains a veiled attack on the English ruling
class.

Hythlodaeus, in his debate with the lawyer in Book I,

becomes quite agitated about the rich landowners who will not
use the soil for farming yet forbid others so to use it.42
Indirectly, then, More as author might be implying obliquely
that the English who neglect. to cultivate their land deserve
to have it taken away.
The unity of the commonwealth is evident also in the
method the Utopians employ to distribute goods.

The cities

are laid out in regular and equal quarters, with markets in a
central position in each sector.

The convenient markets

40ReQ • II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163).
41Utopia, p. 137/19-22.
42UtoQia, pp. 65/38-69/37.
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easily allow the head of the household to come and receive
what he needs without payment.

From the central market food is

allocated first to the hospitals and then to spacious halls
that are located on every street at regular intervals.
In these halls "at the hours fixed for dinner and
supper, the entire syphograncy assembles, summoned by the
43
blast of a brazen trumpet."
The wholesome meals in the
spacious halls symbolize the order, harmony, and unity which
exist among all the Utopian people.

The syphogrant and his

wife occupy the central position at the head of the first
table.

If the syphograncy has a temple, the central position

is shared with the priest and his wife.

The others sit in an

arrangement designed to maintain order and to educate the young.
On both sides of the syphogrant and his wife "sit younger
people, and next to them old people again, and so through the
house those of the same age sit together and yet mingle with
those of a different age.,,44
At the beginning of the meals the assemblage is
--

instructed by "some reading which is conducive to morality but
which is brief so as not to be tiresome.,,45

The reading is

followed by conversation and music, both designed to add to
43UtoQia, p. 141/20-21.
44UtoQia, p. 143/28-32.
45utoQia, p. 145/7-9.
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the relaxation and good cheer of the company.

Hythlodaeus

indicates that the meals, like every other Utopian custom and
institution, aim at the

well-bein~

of the whole citizenry:

"They burn spices and scatter perfumes and omit nothing that
may cheer the company.

For they are somewhat too much

inclined to this attitude of mind:

that no kind of pleasure

is forbidden, provided no harm comes of it. u46
Hythlodaeus' intimation of the Utopians' propensity
for pleasure foreshadows his explanation of the philosophical
foundation of Utopian society in the climactic final section

(159/3-185/14) of Part I (111/7-185/14).

Happiness and pleasure,

as will be discussed below, are the aim toward which all
Utopian institutions and customs are directed.
The Utopian method of distributing goods and their
common meals point up the primary difference between the
communism in Utopia and that in the republic.

Socrates

restricts the use of money and the communal life to the
guardian class.

He assumes that "a market-place • • • and
--

money as a token for the purpose of exchange" will be required
for the other citizens. 47

The guardian class is the only one in

which meals are eaten in common.

In contrast to the Utopians,

who eat together in order to create a feeling of unity, the

46Utonia, p. 145/22-26.
47 Ren • II 371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155).
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guardians eat apart from the rest of the citizens in order to
insure their unity.

Socrates maintains that if the guardians

become contaminated by living among other citizens the
necessary hierarchy among the classes will be destroyed. 48
After the description of the Utopian meals, the next
passage starts abruptly, headed by the caption

f~Utopian

Travel."

It does not appear at first that the ensuing discussion has
much relevance to what precedes it.

Closer analysis, however,

reveals that Hythlodaeus continues in the same vein that he
has been following up to this point.

He emphasizes the unity

of the commonwealth by explaining how a citizen can travel
anywhere on the island with confidence and security.

Because

the Utopian travelers share the work and food wherever they go,
"they are at home everywhere. u49 Furthermore, the traveler
has no temptation to avoid work, because there is "no wine
shop, no alehouse, no brothel anywhere.,,50
In contrast to this freedom and security, England
as described in Book I, is a land infested with thieves and
plagued by wandering beggars~-51
misery there is ill-timed luxury.

Alongside the poverty and
Dives, brothels, and

48Rep • III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311).
49Utopia, p. 147/5.
50Utopia, p. 147/22-23.
51Utopia, pp. 61/14-15 and 67/15-35.
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alehouses give those fortunate men who are employed a pretext
to evade work. 52
Although the description of Utopian travel is signaled
by a caption in the text, only four paragraphs are devoted to
it (145/33-147/32).

Hythlodaeus promptly moves on to describe

the trade carried on within the commonwealth (147/33-149/4) and
with other countries (149/5-159/13).

The internal trade shows

in another way how the people throughout the island are
brought closer together.

Without money they exchange goods as

though they were one big family:

«Those who have given out

of their stock to any particular city without requiring any
return from it receive what they lack from another to which
they have given nothing.
single family.,,53

Thus, the whole island is like a

The island family might be considered the

dominant symbol in this section (135/25-159/2).
Socrates also desires that the state live as one
large family, but he thinks it necessary to upset the
traditional family relationship to achieve this end.

As

in Utopia, where the traveler- feels at home wherever he goes,
in the republic each guardian will feel akin to every other
guardian, "for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he
is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son,
52Utopia, p. 69/33-37.
53Utopia, pp. 147/39-149/4.
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a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these. u54
The Utopians also treat other peoples as though they
were kindred.

Their trade with other countries displays the

Utopians' justice and charity.

In the countries to which they

send commodities, "they bestow the seventh part on the poor of
the district and sell the rest at a moderate price."55

In

contrast to the Utopians' friendly attitude toward other
countries, Socrates assumes that a natural state of enmity
exists between the republic and non-Greek nations. 56
Because the Utopians produce an overabundance and have
few needs themselves, they acquire great quantities of gold
from their exports.

In the remaining portion (149/29-159/2) of

this section (135/25-159/2), Hythlodaeus describes how the
Utopians use and regard their wealth.

They retain gold only

for the purpose of financing unavoidable wars.

Otherwise,

"gold and silver, of which money is made, are so treated by them
that no one values them more highly than their true nature
deserves ••,57

Using reason and following nature, the Utopians

measure the value of a commodity by its utility.

Hence they

have a higher regard for iron than for gold.

---------------------------------------------------------------4
5 Rep • V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473).

55Utqpia, p. 149/12-13.
56ReR • V 469 B-C (Shorey, I, 493).
57UtoQia, p. 151/18-20.
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By Hythlodaeus' description of the means that the
Utopians have devised to keep their treasures, More as author
effectively turns gold into a symbol of infamy.

Hythlodaeus

tells how the Utopians use this essentially worthless metal
to make chamber pots and other humble vessels.

In addition to

such a lowly utilitarian function, gold also marks the guilt
of criminals:

"For those who bear the stigma of disgrace on

account of some crime, they have gold ornaments hanging from
their ears, gold rings encircling their fingers, gold chains
thrown around their necks, and, as a last touch, a gold crown
binding their temples.«5 8
This last touch especially embues the symbol with
latent suggested meanings.

Most obviously the gold crown

identifies Utopian slaves with European kings and noblemen.
But more subtly, possibly, More as author intends to evoke a
comparison with.the poor Christ's crown of thorns.

The harmless

gold crown on the head of a guilty slave contrasts with the
torturous thorns on the head of the guiltless Christ.
--

Having shown gold to be a symbol of infamy in Utopia,
f10re as author then presents perhaps the finest satiric passage
in the entire work.

He introduces the Anemolian ambassadors,

who are typical satiric characters.

They come to Utopia, a

land of reason and order, with their false European values.
58gtopi q , p. 153/10-14.

Hythlodaeus portrays them as naively unaware of their exterior
similarity to the Utopian slaves:

"The ambassadors themselves,

being noblemen at home, were arrayed in cloth of gold, with
heavy gold necklaces and earrings, with gold rings on their
fingers, and with strings of pearls and gems upon their caps.".59
The naivete of the Anemolian ambassadors matches that
of the guileless Utopians, who regard their own attitude toward
gold as reasonable and the Anemolians' attitude as debased.
Hence they mistake the relative importance of the members of
the entourage:

"They therefore bowed to the lowest of the

party as to the masters but took the ambassadors themselves to
be slaves because they were wearing gold chains, and passed
them over without any deference whatever.,,60

The satiric

effect here arises from the artificial and false European
values' being introduced into a natural and reasonable environmente

With this humorous anecdote More as author shows European

values to be based on appearance instead of reality.61
The tale of the Anemolian ambassadors parallels the
analogous anecdotes of the Polyerites, the Achorians, and the
Macarians in Book I.

In Book II, however, More as author

reverses the satiric method.

The fictitious peoples in the

------------------------------------

.59ptoQia,
59ptoQia, p. 155/12-15.
1.5.5/12-1.5.
60Utopia, p. 155/25-28.
1.5.5/2.5-28.

61The similarity of Plato's and Hore's attitude toward
gold is discussed in Chapter IX, pp. 266-67.
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first book resemble the Utopians in representing an exemplary
pattern of behavior for Europeans.

In the second book the

Anemolians and other imaginary people such as the Zapoletans
represent Europeans in thinly veiled disguise.

Thus More as

author employs analogous satiric methods as literary devices
that unify the two books.
In this section (135/25-159/2), then, the theme of
justice continues to develop as in the previous section

(111/7-135/24).

The socioeconomic basis of Utopian society,

like its geopolitical foundations, contributes to unity and to .
a proper order of values in the body politic.
result, is like a large happy family.

Utopia, as a

In emphasizing the

unity of the Utopian people, More as author follows Plato's
prescription in the ReQublic.

In Utopia, however, the ways

and means of achieving unity differ from those in the Republic.
Thus, unity is emphasized in both states but for different
reasons.

In the Republic unity is synonymous with justice and

is sought as an end in itself; in the Utopia unity is thought
of as a necessary prerequisite to happiness for all the citizens.
The Utopian ideas about the end and aim of their
society are elaborated upon further in the next section (159/3-

185/14), in which Hythlodaeus discusses the educational and
philosophical foundations of the Utopian commonwealth.

He

begins with a brief description of the various branches of
knowledge pursued by the Utopians.

In contrast to the

351
theoretical approach to education advocated by Socrates, the
Utopians are more practical.

Their pragmatic investigations

and experiments contribute to the common good of all the
citizens.

It follows, therefore, that they take great interest

in that "part of philosophy which deals with morals.,,62
Socrates, in contrast, stresses that part of

ph~losophy

which

deals with epistemology and metaphysics.
This section (159/3-185/14), containing the discussion
of Utopian philosophy, occupies the important final position
in Part I (111/7-185/14), because here Hythlodaeus explains
the end toward which the institutions and customs of the
Utopians aim.

By way of introduction to his exposition of

the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus states the chief concern of
their philosophical inquiries:

"They discuss virtue and

pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is in what
thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that happiness
consists.,,64

Hythlodaeus then proceeds to explain how the

Utopians interpret "pleasure as the object by which to define
either the whole or the chie~ part of human happiness.,,65
62Utopia, p. 161/18-19.
63The similarities and differences between Utopian
and Platonic philosophy are discussed in Chapter VI, especially
pp. 168-79.
64Utopia, p. 161/23-25.
65Utopia, p. 161/27-29.
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Although they reason that the pursuit of pleasure results
in happiness, the Utopians have nevertheless accepted certain
basic principles on faith.
examples:

Hythlodaeus cites the following

ItThe soul is immortal and by the goodness of God

born for happiness.

After this life rewards are appointed for
.
66
our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes.~
The

mention of the afterlife here foreshadows the discussion of
religion and theology in the final section (217/6-137/36) of
Part II (18.5/1.5-237/36).

In the final section (217/6-237136)

Hythlodaeus indicates that the Utopians believe the laws will
be neither respected nor obeyed unless these principles are
accepted by the citizens (221/28-223/3).

In emphasizing faith

equally with reason, the Utopians deviate from Socrates'
philosophy.

Although Socrates also maintains that a belief

in God and in the afterlife is conducive to justice in man and
in the state, he does not place the same importance on this
belief as he does on the rational understanding of the form
of the good.
In the discussion of Utopian philosophy in this
section (159/3-185/14),
(159/3-18.5/14), however, Hythlodaeus does not stress
the necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul as a
condi tion

~

gua

!!Q.!!

for justice.

Rather he

sholtIS

how the

Utopians regard virtue as its own reward here on earth.

66

Utopia, pp. 161/38-163/3.
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basic principles of religion are mentioned in this section

(159/3-185/14) to indicate how the principles of philosophy
and religion complement one another.

The Utopians realize that

the beliefs in rewards or punishments after death "belong. to
religion, yet they hold that reason leads men to believe and to
admit them. *,67

This importance placed on philosophy and

religion is reflected in the position which the respective
discussions occupy in Book II.

The final section (159/3-185/14)

of Part I (111/7-185/14), containing the discussion of Utopian
philosophy, balances the discussion of religion and theology
in the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-237/36).
The balance of these two sections in the Utopia corresponds in
a general way to the analogous discussionsofo philosophy and
theology in the Republic.

Socrates explains the function and

role of reason in Book VI and the likelihood of retributive
justice in the afterlife in Book X.
Al though the

Utop~.ans

assent to fundamental theological

principles, they derive their moral philosophy from following
nature

an~

obeying the dictates of reason.

By following reason,

they hold that the proper pursuit of pleasure will result in
happiness.

Hythlodaeus explains how the Utopians associate

pleasure with happiness and with the supreme good:

"As it is,

they hold happiness rests not in every kind of pleasure but
67Utopia, p. 163/4-5.
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only in good and decent pleasure.

To such, as to the supreme

good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself, to which the
opposite school alone attributes happiness. u68
The Utopians have a broader understanding of what
constitutes a genuine pleasure than does Socrates.

Although

Socrates recognizes legitimate pleasures akin to the genuine
pleasures of the Utopians, he regards the only true'pleasure
as that which results from the pursuit of wisdom. 69 There is
no contradiction between Socrates' ideas on pleasure and those
of the Utopians, but the Utopians make the pursuit of pleasure
a positive force in the maintenance of justice.
The Utopians reason that if each citizen satisfies only
legitimate desires, then the whole commonwealth will benefit.
Conversely, to deprive another of pleasure is to forfeit your
own.

As a result they have great respect for their laws and

ordinances.

Hythlodaeus explains how these principles bolster

the administration of

just~ce

in the commonwealth:

They hold that not only ought contracts between private
persons to be observed but also public laws for the
distribution of vital commodities, that is to say,
the matter of pleasure, provided they have been justly
promulgated by a good king or ratified by the common
consent of a people neither oppressed by tyranny nor
deceived by fraud. As long as such laws are not broken,
it is prudence to look after your own interests, and to
68utopia, p. 163/18-21, cf. Rep. IX 580 D-583 A
(Shorey, II, 371-81).
69Rep • IX 580 D-583 A (Shorey, II, 371-81).
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look after those of the public in addition is a mark of
devotion. But to deprive others of their ple'Bure to
secure your own, this is surely an injustice.
The Utopians, then, relate their philosophy directly to the
common good of the state.

Although it would appear on the

surface that personal pleasure is inimical to common justice,
the Utopians show that each man's happiness actually contributes
to justice among all the citizens.
Hythlodaeus describes how the behavior that results
from Utopian philosophy differs from that of other peoples.
Most Europeans confuse appearance and reality.

They mistake

fine clothes, honors, jewels, and superfluous wealth for true
pleasure.

Obeying the dictates of reason and following nature,

the Utopians see that such opinions are erroneous:

If

Although

the mob of mortals regard these and all similar pursuits--and
they are countless-- as pleasures, yet the Utopians positively
hold them to have nothing to do with true pleasure since there
is nothing sweet in them by nature. lf71
In contrast to the "mob of mortals,fl the Utopians
seek only genuine pleasures. -- Al though they "cling above all
72
to mental pleasures,fl
they do not eschew those associated with
the body.

Since they regard health itself as a pleasure, they
70Ut

.
OQ1a, p. 165123-32.

71UtoQia, p. 171/34-37.
72UtoQia, p. 175/34.
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avoid those harmful delights that result in pain and disease.
As a result of this philosophy of nature the whole country is
healthy, vigorous, and vital.

In language sharply contrasting

with the metaphors of disease and corruption which he uses in
Book I, Hythlodaeus describes the health and prosperity of
utopia:

"Nowhere in the world is there a more plentiful supply

of grain and cattle, nowhere are men's bodies more vigorous
and subject to fewer diseases."73
After his exposition of Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus
returns briefly to describe other aspects of their learning
and education •. Their diligence and open-minded attitude enable
them to learn rapidly and thoroughly.

The Utopians have learned

Greek easily because it is somewhat related to their own language.
Hythlodaeus also tells how he brought with him to Utopia a
number of great books, the foremost of which were most of Plato's
works.

Thus, in another way More as author seems to identify his

thinking with that of the Greeks in general and of Plato in
/

particular.
This section

(159/3~185/14)

with its exposition of

Utopian philosophy parallels the corresponding discussion of
philosophy in the

ge~ublic.

Socrates explains how the form of

the good is the supreme object of knowledge at the conclusion
73utopia,
73Utopia, p. 179/27-29; cf. Utopia, 95/39-97/4, 105/35107/4. See also Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271), and Rep. IX
583 B-584 C (Shorey, II, 381-85).
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of Book VI.

As has been indicated above (Chapter VI), the

Utopian understanding of the supreme good is not unlike Socrates'
explanation of the form of the good.

The Utopians, however, do

not put as much emphasis on man's rational capability as does
Socrates.

Although in both works virtue is considered its own

reward, the Utopians put more stress than Socrates does on the
necessity for belief in rewards and punishments after death as
a sanction for justice.
Hythlodaeus' description of the Utopian philosophy
and education brings to a close the first part (111/7-185/14)
of Book II.

He has shown how the Utopians' fundamental

institutions and customs insure the order and unity of the
commonwealth and thereby contribute to the happiness of all
the citizens.

The foundations, in brief, are (1) a well-ordered

and unified confederation of city-states situated in a naturally
advantageous physical environment, {2} an efficient economy
based on and patterned after the unity and harmony in the
family, and (3) education and philosophy that contribute to
the happiness of all the citizens by stressing useful action
and correct moral behavior.

As Hythlodaeus later reveals in

Part II (185/15-237/36), it is upon these foundations that the
Utopians deal justly with their own citizens, with their
neighbors, and with God.

CHAPTER XII
THE t1ANIFESTATIONS OF JUSTICE
Having described the geography, politics, social
relations, economy, education, and philosophy of the just
state in the first part of Book II, Hythlodaeus next shows
how the Utopians act in relationships with dependent members
of their own commonwealth, with foreign nations, and with God.
Part II (185/15-237/36), like Part I (111/7-185114), divides
into three sections.

The first section (185/15-199/35) portrays

the administration of justice in the internal and the external
affairs of the Utopians.

The second section (199/36-21715)

deals with Utopian military affairs.

The third section

(217/6-237136) explains how the theological beliefs and the
religious practices of the Utopians insure the maintenance
of justice in the commonwealth.
The first section (185/15-199/35) is probably the
least well organized portion of the entire work.

It seems

that More as author does not-bave complete control of his
materials.

Hythlodaeus, after talking briefly about Utopian

slaves, successively reviews the Utopian attitudes toward illness
and suicide, marriage and divorce, and fools and cripples.
talkes then about officials, lawyers, and treaties.

Closer

analysis, however, reveals that each topic relates in one
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way or another to the internal or external administration of
justice.
More's difficulty in handling his materials in this
section (185/15-199/35) seems to result from his attempt to
show how the Utopians administer justice without numerous laws,
without lawyers, and without alliances.

For example, in

describing the internal administration of justice, Hythlodaeus
shows how the Utopians act reasonably and naturally in their
treatment of dependent members of the society (criminals, the
infirm, women, fools, and cripples).

Conversely, they punish

those who act in a manner contrary to reason and nature.

More

does not, however, describe this natural and unnatural behavior
in legalistic terminology, specifically because he attempts to
show how retributive justice can be administered without a

•

complex legal code.
Although the point cannot be insisted upon, it may be

that More entitles this section "Slavery" because he means to
indicate that the letter of the law enslaves and the spirit of
the law frees man from his vices.

There is an interesting

parallel here with Socrates' opinions on law and medicine.

Con-

cluding the outline of the guardians' education, Socrates maintains that there is no "surer proof of an evil and shameful state
of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians
and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those
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who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men. nl

In

this section (185/15-199/35) Hythlodaeus describes why the
Utopians are free from the necessity of physicians and lawyers.
Hythlodaeus begins the discussion by indicating that
the Utopians punish most crimes with slavery.

He suggests,

however, that slavery in Utopia is preferable to the ordinary
life of the poor in other countries.

It sometimes happens, for

example, that "a hard-working and poverty-stricken drudge of
another country voluntarily chooses slavery in Utopia."2

The

Utopians show their justice by treating foreign slaves better
than their own countrymen who have been convicted of crimes.
They reason that the criminal's conduct should be "regarded
as all the more regrettable and deserving a more severe
punishment as an object lesson because, having had ah excellent
rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not be restrained
from crime."3
Although Hythlodaeus gives slight attention to the
matter of slavery in the opening passage (185/15-185/37) of
this section (185/15-199/35), he returns to the subject
again as he discusses the crimes against marriage and the
family.

Not only to commit adultery but also to tempt another
1Rep • III 405 A (Shorey, I, 271).
2utopia, p. 185/31-33.
3Utopia, p. 185/27-30.
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to an impure act is punished by the strictest form of slavery.
Since this crime attacks the basic social unit of the commonwealth, namely, the family, a person convicted of more than one
offense is punished by death.
In meting out punishment for all other offenses, the
Utopians take into account the nature of the cri.me.

This

practice contrasts with that in England, where the powerful
and rich punish thieves and murderers alike by death. 4 Moreover,
the Utopians temper their justice with mercy.

They have no

motive of revenge in condemning slaves to hard labor, since
they consider the slave's labor more useful than his death.
Hythlodaeus explains that they attempt to rehabilitate even the
most hardened criminals in order that they may become useful
members of society:

tt\fuen tamed by long and hard puni shment,

if they show such repentance as testifies that they are more
sorry for their sin than for their punishment, then sometimes
by the prerogative of the governor and sometimes by the vote
of the people their slavery is either lightened or remitted
altogether. n5 The Utopians thus exercise justice and mercy
in their treatment of the lowliest members of society.
Socrates in the Republic does not discuss retributive
justice as such, but he indicates that the punishment of equals
4Utopia, p. 75/5-6.
5utopia, pp. 191/37-193/2.
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and unequals alike is the sign of the corruption of a democracy.6
He does not elaborate either on the treatment of slaves.
Apparently, however, in the republic some men are serfs by nature?
Consistent with their humane treatment of slaves, the
Utopians display the same reasonable attitude toward other
dependent citizens, such as the sick and dying, women, fools,
and cripples.

In the short passage (185/38-187/26) following

his introductory remarks on slavery (185/15-185/37), Hythlodaeus
shows how the Utopians behave reasonably and humanely toward
the sick and the dying, who, even in their sickness and death,
act for the common good.

The Utopians give compassionate

attention to all the sick, but they encourage the incurably
ill to put an end to their misery by' voluntary death.

In this

way the dying person will not be "a burden to himself, and a
trouble to others."8

Thus, even in death, the Utopians think

of their fellow citizens.

In this regard the Utopians agree

with Socrates "that for all well-governed peoples there is
a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform,
and no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his
days."9

6
ReR. VIII 558 A-C (Shorey, II, 289-91.
7ReR. VIII 547 B-C, 549 A (Shorey, II, 249, 255).
8UtOQia, p. 187/7-8.
9Rep • III 406 C (Shorey, II, 275.

Furthermore, death comes under the jurisdiction of
Utopian law.

Although the Utopians consider voluntary death

urged by the priests and officials as laudatory, they condemn
unsanctioned suicide as a crime.

Hythlodaeus indicates the

punishment for such an offense:

"If anyone commits suicide

without having obtained the approval of priests .and senate, they
deem him unworthy of either fire or earth and cast his body
ignominiously into a marsh without proper burial." IO
The discussion in this section (185/15-199/35) of the
Utopian attitude toward the sick may appear to be partially
redundant, since Hythlodaeus has noted earlier how the sick
"are lovingly cared for. nIl

The former mention of the sick

(139/33-141/11), however, relates to a different aspect of
the theme.

In the context where the earlier passage occurs,

Hythlodaeus is emphasizing the unity of the Utopian city by
describing how efficiently and reasonably the Utopians
distribute goods.

He points out how the Utopians, before

apportioning goods to the mess halls, first supply the four
--

hospitals that lie outside the city.
From the subject of sickness and death, Hythlodaeus
moves on to discuss marital relationships.

In thls

passage (187/27-193/8) he again seems to repeat a previously
10 UtoQia, p. 187/23-26.

11UtoQia, p. 185/38.
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discussed topic.

In the earlier passage (135/26-137/33), however,

Hythlodaeus explains how the family unit functions as the
basic social unit.

Here (187/27-193/8) he shows how the

Utopian laws insure the stability of this fundamental
institution.
The Utopians have strict regulations forbidding premarital sexual relationships because such offenses undermine
the basic social unit of the commonwealth.

Hythlodaeus

explains that "the reason why they punish this offense so
severely is their foreknowledge that, unless persons
carefully restrained from promiscuous intercourse, few

are
wil~

contract the tie of marriage, in which a whole life must be
spent with one companion and all the troubles incidental to
it must be patiently borne. h12
"Because the Utopians take the marriage contract
seriously, they have instituted a system of premarital
inspection which insures that neither partner will have cause
for complaint if his or her spouse should prove to have an
otherwise hidden physical deformity.

The Utopians reason that

"if such a deformity arises by chance after the marraige has
been contracted, each person must bear his own fate, but
beforehand the laws ought to protect him from being entrapped
by gUile.,,13
12UtoQia, p. 187/34-38.
13UtoQia, p. 189/23-26.

Reasonable but strict laws regulate marriage and divorce.
Hythlodaeus explains that, although the laws allow for divorce,
it is a rarity:

"Matrimony there is seldom broken except by

death, unless it be for adultery or for intolerable offensiveness
of diSPosition.u 14 The Utopians consider adultery such a
basic disruption of the commonwealth's foundation that its
repetition is one of the few crimes punished by death.
Since marriages are arranged by the rulers in the
republic, there is no reason to have premarital physical
inspections.

When exercising in their gymnastic training,

however, the women of the guardians "must strip, since
they will be cloth~d with virtue as a garment. u15 Adultery
in the republic is also considered a serious offense.

Although

Socrates does not mention the penalty for marital irregularities,
he says that for the guardians "disorder and promiscuity in
these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed
. ..16
thing in a happy state and ~he rulers will not suffer It.
As the women guardians in the republic share equal
privileges and responsibilitfes with the males, so also do
Utopian women.

The marriage and divorce laws in Utopia reveal

just and humane treatment of women, who in other countries do
14
UtoQia, p. 189/29-31.
15Rep • V 457 A (Shorey, I, 451).
16Rep. V
458 E (Shorey, I, 459).
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not share equal rights with men.

Women are protected equally

with men under the law and are punished equally for transgressions
A man, for example, cannot dismiss his wife because she has
become old or deformed, once the marriage contract has been
made.

The Utopians "cannot endure the repudiation of an

unwilling wife, who is in no way to blame, because some bodily
calamity has befallen her."l?
The Utopians also deal justly with other dependent
members of society.

They affix no penal servitude to the ill

treatment of fools or cripples, but they consider it despicably
unjust for one to be abusive to a man who is not responsible
for his deformity of mind or body.
Besides strictly enforcing their few laws with just
punishment as a deterrent to vice, the Utopians also reward
virtue:

"Not merely do they discourage crime by punishment
but they offer honors to invite men to virtue. u18
Passing from the consideration of Utopian retributive
justice, Hythlodaeus next describes the character of the men
who administer the commonwealth and the attitude of the
Utopians toward law and lawyers.

The Utopians insure that

self-seekers do not become administrators because tIthe man who
solicits votes to obtain any office is deprived completely of
17UtoQia, p. 189/34-36.
8
.
1 Utopia, p. 193/29-31.

the hope of holding any office at all. o19

The elected officials

have few laws to administer because the island functions as
one big family.

Hence the officials "are called fathers and
show that character. n20
The governor of Utopia, unlike Socrates' philosopher-

king, is hardly distinguished from other citizens.

He and the

high priest symbolize the equality and the unity of the commonwealth by their ordinary garments and by the emblems they
carry:

tiThe governor himself is distinguished from citizens

not by a robe or a crown but by the carrying of a handful of
grain, just as the mark of the high priest is a wax candle
borne before him. t ,21

The emblems of the governor and of the

high priest not only symbolize the unity of the Utopian people,
but they also evoke a comparison with those objects which
characterize the condition in Europe.

Grain, indicating the

peace and prosperity of the island, contrasts with the
gallows and man-eating sheep, symbolizing the strife and
destitution of the English people.

The candle, emitting

light, represents truth and reality, whereas gold symbolizes
falseness and artificiality.
Because the Utopians have honest officials and
I, 75).

19Utopia, p. 193/37-39; cf. Rep. I 345 E-346 A (Shorey,
20
21

Utopia, p. 195/1-2.
Utopia, p. 195/4-7.
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few laws, they, like Socrates, banish lawyers "who cleverly
manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal point. 1I22 Hythlodaeus
points out why other countries could not employ the simple
and forthright legal

proced~res

of the Utopians:

"To secure

these advantages in other countries is difficult, owing to the
immense mass of extremely complicated laws.
Utopians each man is expert in law.

But with the

First, they have, as I

said, very few laws and, secondly, they regard the most obvious
u23
interpretation of the law as the most fair interpretation.
The spirit of Utopian justice as described in this
section (185115-199/35) differs in the most essential ways
from that of the Europeans as portrayed in Book I.

The

reasonable and humane retributive justice in Utopia, which
rehabilitates the criminal, makes a mockery of the strict
punitive justice advocated by the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's.
The picture of the Utopian citizens who honestly interpret
their few laws parodies the portrait of the anonymous king's
councilors, who behind a mask of justice resurrect old
moth-eaten laws, promulgate new ones, and manipulate those
in effect.
After delineating the internal administration of

I 271).

22Utopia, p. 195/16-17; cf. Rep. III 405 B-C (Shorey,
23Utopia, p. 195/23-27; cf. Rep. IV 425 B {Shorey, I

335).

justice, Hythlodaeus turns next to the foreign relations of
the Utopians (197/1-199/35).

Explaining that the excellence

of the Utopian administration of justice has attracted
neighboring countries to borrow officials from them,
Hythlodaeus suggests that justice in the state does not depend
as much upon laws as upon the virtues of the administrators:
"These two evils, favoritism and avarice, wherever they have
settled in man's judgments, instantly destroy all justice, the
strongest sinew of the commonwealth. ft24
The identification of virtue in the rulers with
justice in the state, of course, is one of the main points which
supports the central theme of the entire work.

As Jerome

Busleyden observes, it is also a major point of likeness between
the UtoQia and the Republic.

Referring to Utopia, he writes:

The latter has devoted its energies not so much to framing
laws as to training the most qualified officials. It has
not done so without reason, for otherwise, if we are to
believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted
dead. After the likeness of such officials, the pattern
of their virtue, the example of their conduct, and the
picture of their justice, the whole setup and proper
course of a perfect commonwealth should be modeled.
Above all else, there should be a combination of wisdom in
the administrators, bravery in t25 soldiers, temperance in
individuals, and justice in all.
.
By exporting their rulers to other countries the
Utopians reveal the healthy condition of their commonwealth.
24

Utopia, p. 197/13-15.

25Utopia, p. 35/16-24.
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They follow the reverse procedure from that evidenced by
corrupt states.

Socrates makes this point in the Republic:

flDo you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad
breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others,
who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such
qualities in yourself." 26
The Utopians maintain good foreign relations, but they
put no trust in treaties and alliances.

They feel that -the

fellowship created by nature takes the place of a treaty, and
that men are better and more firmly joined together by good will
than by pacts, by spirit than by words. tl27 This attitude is
another evidence of the Utopians' opinion that legalism inhibits
justice.

They believe that a written treaty can be used as

a pretext for violating the spirit of justice.

Hence, within

and between European nations, where treaties are customary,
there arises a double standard of morality and of justice.
H~thlodaeus

metaphor:

describes this pouble standard with a striking
"In consequence men think either that all justice

is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the
majesty of kings or that there are at least two forms of it:
the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit only
for the common sort and bound by many chains so that it can

26 Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271).
27UtopiB;, p. 199/32-35.
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never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of kings, which,
as it is more august than that of ordinary folk, is also far
freer so that everything is permissible to it--except what
it finds ,'disagreeable. ,,28
Through the effective use of irony in this passage,
More as author epitomizes the false notion of justice prevailing
in Europe.

Hythlodaeus suggests here a picture of kings free

to do what they will and of people bound to do as they are
told--the notion of justice advanced by Thrasymachus in the
Republic.

Occurring in the context of the description of justice'

in Utopia, where the officials serve the people, this passage
exemplifies More's technique of comparison and contrast which
unifies the two books.
The discussion of the Utopian attitude toward treaties

(197/18-199/38), as a preliminary to the description of
"Military Affairs" (199/37-21715), has a parallel in Book I
in the council of the French king.

Whereas the French make

alliances in preparation for war, the Utopians eschew them
to preserve the peace.

This passage dealing with Utopian

foreign relations (197/1-199135), together with the following
section describing Utopian military affairs (199/37-21715),
therefore, contrasts with the French council (87126-91/31)
in Book I in the same way that the passage on internal
28 ut

.

OI21a, p.

199/10-17.
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administration of justice (185/15-195/39) contrasts with the
anonymous king's council (91/32-97/38).
This final segment (197/1-199/35) of Hythlodaeus t
description of the Utopian administration of justice serves as
a transitional link to the next section (199/38-217/5), which
deals with Utopian "Military Affairs."

The discussion of

treaties shows how, without treaties, the Utopians deal
justly with their neighbors and prefer peace to war.

Ironically,

however, other nations who continually make treaties inevitably
draw the Utopians into war.
The section dealing with Utopian military affairs
(199/38-217/6) divides logically into three segments:

the

causes for war (199/38-203/35), the conduct of war (203/36215/8), and the aftermath of war (215/9-217/5).

Hythlodaeus

begins by explaining that the Utopians, by not going to war
for slight and transient reasons, differ from other nations.
Unlike the French as described in Book I, the Utopians consider
war as inhuman:

"War, as an activity fit only for beasts and

yet practiced by no kind of beast so constantly as by man,
they regard with utter 10athing."29

Other belligerent nations,

however, force the Utopians to fight wars.
Besides the motive of self-defense, the Utopians fight
primarily to free others from the yoke of oppression.
29utoPia, p.

199/38~39.

Hythlodaeus

<HILt
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.

explains that only serious injustice perpetrated against their
friends will provoke the Utopians to launch an offense:

"They

take the final step of war not only when a hostile inroad has
carried off booty but also much more fiercely when the merchants
among their friends undergo unjust persecution under the color
of justice in any other country, either on the pretext of laws
in themselves unjust or by the distortion of laws in themselves
0
good.,,3
Distortion of laws, then, a common practice in
Europe, chiefly excites the Utopians' sense of outrage.
Displaying the same attitude toward their adversaries
as they show to criminals in their own country, the Utopians
have no desire to perpetrate excessive punishment.

Out of

mercy, "they not only regret but blush at a victory that has
cost much bloodshed,,;3 1 out of justice, "their one and only
object in war is to secure that which, had it been obtained
beforehand, would have prevented the declaration of war. fl32
In the Republic little mention is made of the causes
of war.

Socrates, however, bases the entire education of the

guardians on the assumption that his republic must inevitably
fight wars with the barbarians.

Thus both More and Plato are

realistic in that they do not imagine their ideal states can
30

Utopia, p. 201/15-20.

31UtoQia, p. 203/16-17.
32UtoQi8, p. 203/27-30.

($
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remain peaceful amidst nations that are hostile.
In the conduct of war, the Utopians take various measures
to avoid the actual involvement of their own citizens in the
hostilities.

By bribing citizens of the enemy country, they

attempt to kill the enemy king and others who foment the
war.

If this stratagem does not succeed, they sow seeds of

dissension wi thin the enemy country t1by leading a brother of
the king or one of the noblemen to hope that he may obtain the
throne. "33
,,33

Should internal strife subside, they provoke it

again by stirring.up and involving the neighbors of their
enemies.

This they do "by reviving some forgotten claims to
dominion such as kings have always at their disposal.n 34 Finally,
they hire Zapoletan mercenaries and employ

"the forces of the

people for whom they are fighting and then auxiliary squadrons
of all their other friends.,,35
The war stratagems of the Utopians may seem
inconsistent with their behavior in other respects.

After

all, their tactics resemble the nefarious plottings of the
French king and his councilors, which were condemned in Book I.
The French, however, differ from the Utopians in their motives.
The French foment dissension and hire mercenaries in order
33UtoQia, p. 205/34-35.
34UtoQia, p. 205/37-38.
35utoQia, p. 209/16-17.
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to conquer and oppress other peoples.
prepare for war.

In time of peace they

As a result, mercenaries infest the country

and create disorder among their own people.

The Utopians

use some of the same tactics, but they seek peace and justice,
not strife and injustice.

They never prepare for war during

time of peace and never allow mercenaries on their soil.
Once their own citizens engage in hostilities, they
are successful because of the justice in their commonwealth.
Hythlodaeus explains how the just order in their economy fosters
courage in the warriors:

"The absence of anxiety about

livelihood at home, as well as the removal of that worry which
troubles men about the future of their families (for such
solicitude everywhere breaks the highest courage), makes their
spirit exalted and disdainful of defeat.,,36

He adds that

"their good and sound opinions, in which they have been trained
from childhood both by teaching and by the good institutions
of their country, give

them additional courage. H37

The

Utopians, like the guardians of the republic, go to war
accompanied by women 'and children.

This practics is also

thought to bolster the courage of the fighting force. 38
36utoPia, p. 211/18-21.
37Utopia, p. 211/23-25.
38UtoPia4 p. 209/37-211/10; cf. Rep. V 455 D, 466 E
(Shorey, I, 445, 85).
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The training and good institutions in Utopia account
not only for the courage of the Utopians but also for their
military skill.

Despite their superior brawn and fierceness,

other man "are all inferior in cleverness and calculation. fl39
Moreover, the discipline inculcated in their upbringing insures
that the Utopians will not be beaten by disorder in their
ranks or by impetuous behavior.

For example, "they never

pursue the fleeing enemy without keeping one division all the
time drawn up ready for engagement under their banners.,,40
With the victory assured, the Utopians show justice
and mercy in the establishment of peace.

They keep the truce
"so religiously as not to break it even under provocation. fl41

Meting out punishment and rewards among the conquered people in
accordance with a reasonable standard of justice, they punish
by death "the men who prevented surrender and make slaves of
the rest of the defenders.,,42
those who urged surrender.

On the other hand, they reward

They injure no noncombatant unless

he is a spy.
The consideration of Utopian military affairs compares
in some interesting ways with the corresponding segment in the
39utoQia, p. 203/26-27.
40UtoQia, p. 213/2-3.
41UtoQia, p. 215/10-11.
42utoQia, p. 215/17-18.
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Republic.

Aside from the detailed points of comparison treated

above, there are interesting similarities in the way the
respective discussions relate to the respective themes of
the two works.

In the Utopia, the section on military affairs

focuses More's attitude on war, which has been assumed in
Hythlodaeus' remarks on other subjects, e.g.,
1n Book I (87!26-91!31).

t~e

French council

War is shown to be a chief cause

of injustice within nations as well as between nations.

Although

war for the Utopians is unnatural, it is inevitable even for
them.

They haye an advantage over all other nations, however,

because their just institutions, especially their educational
system, prepare them to overcome the forces of unjust nations.
In a relatively brief segment (V 466 D-471 c) in the
Republic, Socrates also focuses his attitude on war, which he
has implied throughout the whole work.

He bases the entire

education of the guardians on the assumption that his republic
must inevitably fight wars with the barbarians.

His attitude

toward war among Greek nations, however, is similar to that of
the Utopians in their wars with other nations.

Considering

war as inimical to justice, Socrates maintains that the
guardians should fight with other Greeks only in order to
achieve justice and peace.

After outlining the humane behavior

that the guardians should display, he concludes:

"And, on all

these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the
soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy

4

.i I i
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the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the pOint of
compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the
suffering of the innocent ••,43

In both works, then, the

discussion of war relates to the main theme of justice.
The last section (217/6-237/36) in Part II (185/15-

237136) appropriately concludes Hythlodaeus' description of
the three basic functions in which justice is manifested in the
ideal state.

Religion occupies the climactic final position

after law and military affairs because the religious beliefs
of the Utopians insure that justice will reign in the
commonwealth.
Hythlodaeus begins this section (217/6-237/36) with
an explanation of the fundamental tenets of the Utopian theology.
Most Utopians believe that "there is one supreme being, to whom
are due both the creation and the providential government of
the whole world.,,44

Although the Utopians generally agree that

a supreme being exists, various superstitions have arisen among
them.

Fortunately, however, they are gradually "beginning to

depart from this medley of superstitions and are coming to
unite in that one religion which seems to surpass the rest
in reasonableness. u45
43ReR. V 471 B (Shorey, I, 499-501).
44utopia, p. 217/19-21. The comparison of the Utopians'
God with that which Socrates recommends for the
guardians is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 71-73.

~nderstanding
llnderstanding of
~ducation of the

45Utopiq, p. 217/26-29.
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Hythlodaeus compares the most reasonable of the Utopian
religions to Christianity.
Utopians' common way of

In fact, he implies that the

lif~

comes closer to Christ's intention

for His followers than the way practiced by the Europeans.
Although the Utopians have not had benefit, of Christianity, they
are more reasonable than European Christians, a point Hythlodaeus
makes obliquely in an anecdote about one of his own company
who "spoke publicly of Christ's religion with more zeal than
46
discretion."
In condemning all those who did not share
his opinion, this Christian contrasts with the reasonable Utopians
who tolerate people of all religions as long as they do not
disturb the public peace.

The Utopians would even have tolerated

this zealot, except that he was "stirring up a riot among the
peoPle.,,47

Religious toleration in Utopia, then, extends as

far as the maintenance of order in the commonwealth will allow.
The Utopians' attitude stems from the wise laws
originally set down by Utopus, who sanctioned religious freedom
for the good of the state
itself.

as-~ell

as for the benefit of religion

He realized that the religious turmoil that existed

in Utopia before his arrival was the cause of disorder and
disunity.

Hythlodaeus explains that "he had made the

observation that the universal dissensions between the
46

.
Ut opla, p. 219/25-26.

47ytopia, p. 219/33.
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individual sects who were fighting for their country had
given him the opportunity of overcoming them all."48
Utopus knew also that religious freedom is meaningless
unless the laws and ordinances of the state are obeyed.

He

thought that such obedience could not be expected unless the
citizens believed in the immortality of the soul and had the
expectation of reward or punishment after death.

Hythlodaeus

explains the reasoning of Utopus in the key passage in this
section (21716-237/36):
He conscientiously and strictly gave injunction that no
one should fall so far below the dignity of human nature as
to believe that souls likewise perish with the body or that
the world is the mere sport of chance and not governed by
any divine providence. After this life, accordingly, vices
are ordained to be punished and virtue rewarded. Such is
their belief, and if anyone thinks otherwise, they do not
regard him even as a member of mankind, seeing that he has
lowered the lofty nature of his soul to the level of a
beast's miserable body--so far are they from classing him
among their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat
as worthless if it were not for fear. Who can doubt that
he will strive either to evade by craft the public laws of
his country or to break them by violence in order to serve
his own private desires when he has nothing to fear but
laws and no hope beyond the body?~9
In Utopia, then, the fundamental theological beliefs
are considered requisites to the maintenance of justice in the
state.

In this respect More's concept of justice differs

much from that of Plato.
48

As was discussed earlier (Chapter V),

UtoQia, pp. 219/38-221/2.

49utopia, pp. 221/29-223/3.
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Socrates maintains that virtuous behavior will follow from
the rational apprehension of the form of justice.

Although

he believes that virtue will be rewarded and vice punished in
the afterlife, Socrates does not insist upon this belief as
a necessary sanction for justice in the republic.

In contrast,

the Utopians "think reason insufficient and weak by itself
for the investigation of true hapPiness."SO

Thus, both

More and Plato place importance on reason and belief, but in
More's work the theological tenets receive greater emphasis
than in the Republic.
In the remainder of this section (217/6-237/36),
Hythlodaeus describes the religious services of the Utopians.
Because Socrates does not place as great emphasis on religion as
do the Utopians, he does not elaborate on the religious services
and practices in the republic.

He suggests that such matters

are beyond his province as a philosopher:

"The founding of

temples, and sacrifices, and'other forms of worship of gods,
daemons, and heroes; 'and likewise the burial of the dead and
render to the dwellers in the world beyond
to keep them graCious."Sl
graCious. nS1 Hythlodaeus, however, shows how
the services we

mu~t

the religious practices of the Utopians move them to virtuous
actions which bring about justice in the commonwealth.
SOutopia, p. 161/36-37.
SlRep • IV 427 B-C (Shorey, I, 34S).
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While paying respect to the dead in their funeral
rite, they hope to incite the living to virtue.

They erect

a pillar with an epitaph to the memory of the deceased and
extol his deeds with laudatory speeches.

They judge that

this reverence for the dead is a "most efficacious means
n52
of stimulating the living to good deeds.
In.addition, the
belief that departed souls walk among the living "keeps men
from any secret dishonorable deed." 53
The belief in life hereafter has also induced a special
class of holy men to perform exceptional good works for the
well-being of the whole commonwealth.

Hythlodaeus explains

that because these men, called Buthrescae, are determined to
merit the happiness coming after death, they perform the
menial and odious chores that most men avoid:
Some tend the sick. Others repair roads, clean out ditches,
rebuild bridges, dig turf and sand and stone, fell and cut
up trees, and transport wood, grain, and other things into
the cities in carts. Not only for the public but also for
private5~ersons they behave as servants and as more than
slaves.
The few holy priests exercise their office on behalf of
the whole people, especially since they are elected by a
popular vote.

More than any other group, they shape the

52Ut oQla,
.
p. 225/4.
53UtoQia, p. 225/17.
54UtoQia, p. 225/31-35.
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virtuous character of the people.

They not only preside over

religious services, but they also guard public morals and
educate the youth.

Considering virtuous training no less

important than learning, "they take the greatest pains from
the very first to instill into children's minds, while still
tender and pliable, good opinions which are also useful for
the preservation of their commonwealth."55
Although the holy priests can effect tremendous good
in the commonwealth, they can do no great harm.

Few priests

ever turn from virtue to wickedness, but if any should,
Hythlodaeus points out that the state is not greatly injured:
"Even if it does happen, human nature being ever prone to
change, yet since they are but few and are invested with
no power except the influence of honor, it need not be feared
that they will cause any great harm to the state."56
The priests not only foster harmony within the
commonwealth, but they also promote peace between the Utopians
and their adversaries in time of war.

In the midst of

--

hostilities, they pray for peace and urge the abatement of
bloodshed.

Finally, they are instrumental in settling the

peace on just terms.
All the manifestations of religion contribute to the
55Utopia, p. 229/11-14.
56Utopia, p. 233/9-10.
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unity of the people and to the stable order of the commonwealth.

Coming to the temples on feast days, they worship

the divine nature as a community of believers.

Because of

their unified spirit, "nothing is seen or heard in the temples
which does not seem to agree with all in common."5?
Utopian families make peace with one another before
participating in the sacrifice and go to the temples together.
"Fear of swift and great punishment" prompts a reconciliation
of hearts and dissipates any enmity that exists among them. 58
They even assign places to the worshippers in the temples in
order to instill virtue in the young people.

Elders

accompany the youth because, "if children were trusted
to children, they might spend in childish foolery the time in
which they ought to be conceiving a religious fear towards
the gods, the greatest and almost the only stimulus to the
practice of virtues. n59
Religious sacrifice, music, and prayer are conducted in
accordance with reas6n and marked by piety and simplicity.

At

the services the people dress in white garments, and the priests
wear inexpensive but artistically embroidered vestments.

Even

the latter's robes are designed to inculcate love of God and
5?Ut opla,
.
p. 233/9-10.
58ytopia, p. 233/35-36.
59Utopia, p. 235/5-8.

civic responsibility.

Through an interpretation of the pattern

on his vestments of feathers, the priests reminds the people
"of their own piety toward God and their duty toward one
another. fl60
Hythlodaeus concludes his description of the Utopian
religions with an image of the people and the priest in a great
common prayer of thanksgiving and petition.

The priest, leading

the prayer, recognizes God as creator and governor of all
things and thanks Him "for all the benefits received, particularly
that by the divine favor he has chanced on that commonwealth
which is the happiest and has received that religion which he
hopes to be the truest."61

The celebrant ends the prayer

with a petition to God for union with Him in life everlasting.
In the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15237/86), then, the sanction for justice in the commonwealth
is strongly affirmed.

The Utopians hold that justice in the

state cannot be achieved unless all the citizens adhere to
the basic tenets of religion.

Utopia functions as a stable and

well-ordered commonwealth principally because a perfect harmony
exists between church and state.
In the ReQublic Socrates also discusses the belief
in rewards and punishment after death in the concluding pages
60

.
UtOQla, p. 235/29-30.
61
.
Ut opla, p. 237/14-17.
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of the final book.

As has been indicated above, however,

Socrates' account of the myth of Er is an epilogue that does
not contain in it the primary sanction for justice.

Socrates

gives evidence of belief in retributive justice in the afterlife,
but he predicates the establishment of justice in the republic
on the theory that man will act virtuously without external
inducements if he comes to understand the form of justice.
Nonetheless, Socrates' final remarks in the Republic indicate
the expectation of immortality.

He explains that if we

believe in the immortality of the soul and act righteously,
"both here and in that Journey of a thousand years, whereof I
have told you, we shall fare well. tI
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Thus Socrates concludes

the Republic with the same thoughts of the afterlife as those
expressed by the Utopian priest at the conclusion of Hythlodaeds'
description of Utopia.
After his account of the Utopian religions, Hythlodaeus
summarizes in his peroration the theme of the two books of the
entire work.
~ersona

The peroration (237/37-245/16), together with the

More's concluding remarks (245/17-247/3), constitutes

tne final part (237/37-247/3) of Book II.

In summarizing the

tvheme of the two books, Hythlodaeus compares the- injustice in
~urope to the justice in Utopia and concludes that the Utopian

pommonwealth is far preferable.

62

fi~Q.

In the first three paragraphs

X 621 D (Shorey, II, 521).
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(237137-239/25) of the peroration,

Hythlo~aeus

emphasizes the

difference between Utopia and other countries in regard to
the well-being of all the citizens.

In Utopia the public

and the private welfare are synonymous.

In contrast, outside

Utopia each man seeks his own welfare, a situation which
militates against the common good.

In Utopia, where no one

owns property, everyone shares the wealth.

Thus, there is

peace and security among all the citizens.
In the next three paragraphs (239/26-241/35) Hythlodaeus
reviews the unjust conditions in Europe which he had described
in detail in Book I.

Beginning this review, he emphasizes

how the situation in Utopia differs from that which is thought
to be just in other countries:

"At this point I should like

anyone to be so bold as to compare this fairness with the
so-called justice prevalent in other nations, among which,
upon my soul, I cannot discover the slightest trace of justice
and fairness ••163

He asks, /flWhat brand of justice is i ttl that

the rich and idle attain luxury and grandeur, and the poor
common laborers who perform the essential work "earn such
scanty fare and lead such a miserable life that the condition
of beasts of burden might seem far preferable tl ?64
He proceeds to show that the parasitic nature of the
63utoPia, p. 239/26-29.
.
64
Ut opla, p. 239/29-39.
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economic system aggravates the condition of injustice.

Not

only do the rich perform no useful work, but they also extort
money from the poor.

This injustice is made more galling,

because the rich pervert the laws to perpetuate their injustices.
Hythlodaeus maintains that even before the practice of
distorting the public laws became prevalent, "it seemed unjust
that persons deserving best of the commonwealth should have
the worst return.

Now they have further distorted and debased

the right and, finally, by making laws, have palmed it off as
justice. H65
After reviewing the situation in Europe, Hythlodaeus
explains that the Utopians have achieved justice by eliminating
the material cause of injustice(241/36-243/10).

He exclaims

that with the elimination of money «what a mass of troubles
was then out away!
by the roots!,,66

What a crop of crimes was then pulled up
The elimination of money in other countries,

he maintains, would result in plenty for all and security for
the rich as well as the poor.

To reinforce his argument, he

points out the irony of the unjust system of private property:
the rich are enslaved as much as the poor:

"Even the rich,

I doubt not, feel that it would be a much better state of
affairs to lack no necessity than to have abundance of
65 ut

.

opla, p. 241/21-24.

66ut opla,
.
p. 243/1-2.
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superfluities--to be snatched from such numerous troubles
rather than to be hemmed in by great riches.,,67
With the contrast between injustice and justice
completely drawn, Hythlodaeus points to the chief reason why
the whole world has not adopted the form of a commonwealth
established by the Utopians.

He proclaims passionately that

pride is the principal cause of all the injustices in the
world.

Pride, like a serpent from hell, "entwines itself around

the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in preventing and
hindering them from entering on a better way of life. u68

In his

final remarks Hythlodaeus explains that, because the Utopians
are free from pride, they have attained a stability and order
in their commonwealth which cannot be disrupted by either
internal discord or foreign invasion.
Thus, Hythlodaeus' peroration ties together the theme
of injustice in Book I with the theme of justice in Book II.
One can hardly escape the conclusion that justice is to be
preferred to injustice.

Ironically, however, in his concluding

remarks, the Qersona More remains unconvinced about the means
advocated by Hythlodaeus.

His realistic and essentially

pathetic reaction is perhaps the only one possible for a man
who must go on living in the unjust condition of European
67Utopia, p. 243/22-25.
68Ut .
OP18, pp. 243/39-24512.
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affairs:

"I cannot agree with all that he said.

But I readily

admit that there are very many features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries .
than to have any hope of seeing rea1ized."69
Thus, when the contrasting themes of injustice in
Book I and justice in Book II are discerned,

th~

relationship

between the structures of the Republic and the Utopia
evident.

becomes

The Republic, like the Utopia, reveals through a

contrast of the best and the worst examples of the body
politic that justice is to be preferred over injustice.

Although

the individual parts of the structures of the two works are
arranged differently, each part in the Republic and in the
Utopia is unified to the whole by the central theme of justice.
69

Utopia, pp. 245/39-247/3.

CHAPTER XIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This thesis has been undertaken to understand better
the subject matter and the form of the Utopia.

To add another

full-length study to the alr.eady voluminous criticism of
More's work might seem superfluous.

If my objective has been

accomplished, however, the study is justified, because it treats
significant questions about the Utopia which have remained
hitherto unanswered.

The great variety of critical articles

and books dealing with diverse aspects of the ytopia indicates
a general disagreement as to its main theme.

A common

assumption underlying much of this criticism is that the work
is not a unified whole but that two distinct and different
themes run through its two books, namely, councilorship in
Book I and communism in Book II.
Besides the many conflicting interpretations of the
work itself, there is general disagreement about Plato's
influence on the form and content of the Utopia.

Some critics

note that More has borrowed numberless details from the Platonic
dialogues.

Others, however, minimize Plato's influence.

Although a few have recognized a general similarity between the
themes and the structures of the two works, no full-length
analysis of their formal relationship has been made.
The foregoing study grew out of the conviction that the
1
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theme of justice unified the structure of the Utopia.

It

appeared, moreover, that the relationship of theme to structure
in the Utopia was analogous to the corresponding relationship
in the Republic.

This basic assumption was supported by the

opinions of More and his contemporaries.

In contrast with

many modern critics, they placed great emphasis

~n

the theme

of justice in the Utopia and identified More's work very
closely with that of Plato.

A general conviction, then,

supported by More's contemporaries, led to this analysis that
has attempted to ascertain the extent and limit to which
More had used the Republic as a model for the Utopia.
The method chosen for this thesis has been to analyze
inductively the structure of each work in order to discern
the formal relationship between theme and structure in the
two works.

This procedure has necessarily presented difficulties

which might not have occurred had the subject been approached
deductively.

Perhaps some repetition and some elaboration of

details might have been eliminated had evidence from each text
been selected primarily to support the initial assumption.
The inductive method, however, has achieved better the objective
of showing not only the similarities between the two works but
also the differences.
This inductive approach has revealed indeed that More
follows the basic plan of the Republic but that he changes
and rearranges the details of Plato's work to suit his own

J9J
purpose.

More, like Plato, argues for the superiority of justice

over injustice by describing an ideal state where justice
reigns and by contrasting it with a corrupt state which
epitomizes injustice.

More; however, writes with a tone. and

style different from those of Plato.

Because he intends more

overtly to delight as well as to teach, he reveals the
theme and the structure in the [toRia less obviously than
Plato

do~s

in the Regublic.

Furthermore, More's didactic intention is more
specific than that of Plato.

His aim to reform specific

current abuses in Europe, such as enclosure and war, determines
to some extent the inclusion of and the emphasis on certain
details in the various parts of the structure of the work.
On the other hand, Plato writes with a more universal intention.
He obviously draws upon experience and observation in his own
and other societies and criticizes populer notions relating to
justice, but he appears rarely to allow a particular contemporary
/

abuse to determine details in the description of his ideal
state.
In portraying the ideal state, More assumes meanings
of justice and injustice similar to those of Plato.

In Utopia,

as in the republic, justice originates in the needs of mankind
and manifests itself in order and unity in society.
states the citizens cooperate mutually in

In both

establishi~g

and institutions toward those two primary ends.

laws
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More differs from Plato, however, in his conception of
how order and unity may be achieved.

Most fundamentally, the

difference concerns the functioning of the parts of the state'
and those of the soul of man.

In Plato's republic three

distinct classes, each assigned a specific responsibility,
work together to produce order and unity in the.body politic.
Socrates' division of the state into three distinct classes
stems from the theory that a man performs best when he has only
one function.

Hence, justice results when the rulers, guardians,

and workers each do the task for which they are most suited.
In Utopia order and unity are achieved by minimizing
the distinctions between classes.

Each man performs more than

one function, and every man has the opportunity to advance to
the ruling class.

Order and unity are attained when each and

every citizen is concerned with the function of the whole
commonwealth instead of attending only to a single narrow
task.
Despite their differences as to the proper activity
of the individual citizen, both More and Plato have a similar
concept of the nature of man.

Justice in a man's soul, like

justice in the state, results from a proper relationship
among the soul's parts.

When the rational element, with the

aid of the spirit, rules over the appetites, man's soul
achieves order and unity.
Because More and Plato differ in some respects on

,<
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what contributes to order and unity in the state, they must
also diverge on the causes of disorder and disunity.

In the

Regublic injustice results from the blurring of distinctions
between classes.

In the UtoQia, on the other hand, More

indicates a reverse process of corruption.
disuni~y

classes.

Disorder and

occur when artificial distinctions arise among
In both works, however, a tyranny constitutes the

most unjust state because in it the worst element rules the
best.

Likewise, in the soul of man, the worst corruption comes

about when man inverts the proper order in his nature and
allows the appetites to rule the reason.
Plato, however, places greater emphasis on the
power of man's reason to achieve justice in his own soul
and consequently in the state.

He therefore theorizes that

man, if he really comprehends and appreciates the nature of
justice, will act justly.

This position repudiates the

deterministic philosophy which insists that justice must be
imposed on the state by external coercion.
More also emphasizes reason, but he does not assume
that man will act virtuously simply by understanding the
form of true justice.

In the Utopia the sanction for justice

involves the belief in God and the expectation of either
reward or punishment after death.

Plato also indicates that

man will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife for his
behavior here on earth, but he does not make this expectation
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the vital sanction for justice in the ideal state.

In

Plato's republic, where philosophers are kings, justice is made
manifest without the necessity of belief in the hereafter.
Neither in the UtoQia nor in the Republic, however,
does the demonstration of the advantage of justice over
injustice depend upon the expectation of immortality.

In both

works justice is shown to be its own reward and injustice its
own punishment.

In the republic and in Utopia the happiness of

all the citizens results from the proper functioning of the
whole state.

Conversely, a tyranny, because of its injustice,

is the most unhappy state for rulers as well as for subjects.
These basic similarities and differences in the
subject matter of the two works are reflected in the development
of the themes and in the arrangement of the parts.

The

general structural plan of the ytopia exhibits More's objective:
a demonstration of the advantages of justice oyer injustice.
In Book I he exposes the causes and the results of injustice
in preparation for his portrayal of justice in Book II.

This

plan follows Plato's model in a general way, as will be made
clear at once.
In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodaeus discredits the
notion that justice is the advantage of the stronger.

He

shows in the first half of this book that those who use the
laws and institutions of England to satisfy their own lust for
money, prestige, and power have caused a general condition of

397
poverty, crime, debauchery, and war in the commonwealth.

In

the second half of this first book he describes how kings
and councilors bring about this same result by distorting the
nation's laws and by manipulating international treaties and
alliances.

Hythlodaeus' concept of justice answers to that

of Socrates, and the concept which Hythlodaeus attacks
corresponds to that of Thrasymachus, in Book I of the Republic.
Although less detailed in its discussion of the
abstract theory of justice that Book I of the Republic,
the first book of the Utopia presents a broader picture of the
causes and results of injustice.

To compensate for the ideas

found in the first book of the Republic but omitted in his own
first book, More draws additional subject matter from Books
VIII and IX of the Republic.

Describing injustice in England

and throughout Europe, Hythlodaeus gives various specific
examples of contemporary injustice that correspond to Plato's
explanation of the stages in the disintegration of the ideal
state.

England as described in the first half of Book I, and

the nations ruled by the French and anonymous kings in the
second half, show the same symptoms of injustice that Plato
asserts are characteristic of oligarchic and timocratic states.
The total picture of corruption in Europe conforms to Plato's
description of the debased condition of a tyranny.
At the conclusion of Book I More inserts an exordium
which pinpoints the differenqe between injustice in Europe and

M
A S.
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justice in Utopia.

The position of the exordium--at the

conclusion of the picture of injustice--corresponds to the
place of the exordium in the ReQub1ic.

Plato's exordium is

found early in his second book, that is, after he has rejected
the popular false notion of justice (in Book I) and before he
begins to delineate the ideal state (in the rest of Book II).
In both works the description of the ideal state
follows in response to skeptical remarks made by other
participants in the dialogue.

Thus both the place and the

function of the description of Utopia in More's work correspond
in a general way to the place and the function of the picture
of the ideal state in the Repub1ig.
The ideal states in the two works, though different
in details and in arrangement of materials, are made alike by
the unifying theme of justice.

Although More does not

organize the parts of his structure in exactly the same order
as does Plato, he inserts in each section in Book II of the
Utopia one or more of Plato's key concepts, adapted and
changed to conform to his plan for the achievement of order
and unity in the state.
In Part I (111/7-185/14) of Book II, Hythlodaeus
describes the geopolitical, socioeconomic, and educational
and philosophical foundations of the just state.

In aiming

at the happiness of all the citizens, the Utopians haye shaped
their laws and institutions to insure that order and unity
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prevail in the commonwealth.

In the first section (111/7-

135124) More in a broad sense adapts Plato's concept of the
elemental society that Socrates explains at the beginning of
his remarks on the origin of the city (II 369 B-372 E).

Socrates

maintains that men can live in peace and harmony in a city which
has only the necessities of life.

The introduction of luxuries,

however, brings war and other activities which result in a
fevered state.
At the beginning of the description of Utopia, More
develops this concept of the elemental city by adding variety
and details without introducing the superfluities that
Socrates says are characteristic of a fevered state.

Because

Hythlodaeus purports to describe an actually existing
commonwealth, he mentions geographical features and physical
characteristics which would be irrelevant in Socrates'
hypothetical republic.

The geopolitical foundations of Utopia,

however, conform to Plato's requisite for the establishment
of justice.

In Utopia, as in Socrates' elemental city, the

needs of the society prompt the citizens to develop only the
basic crafts and to work together to establish institutions
that produce order and stability_
In the next section (135125-159/2) More shows how the
Utopians achieve Plato's desideratum of a unified family state.
In contrast to Plato, who finds it necessary to realign
traditional family relationships, More establishes the family
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as the basic socioeconomic unit.

Instead of regulating the

number of marriages, which Socrates suggests as a means of
controlling population, the Utopians avoid over population
through the emigration of families to colonies found in sparsely
inhabited lands nearby.

All Utopians live together as one

large family because they neither own nor desire to own
private property, the source of greed and friction in other
states.

With this complete abolition of private property

More alters Plato's concept of a restrictive communism that
applies only to the guardian class.
In the final section (159/3-185/14) More adapts and
changes Plato's system of education and philosophy.

The Utopians

study the same subjects as the guardians in Socrates' republic
but they deviate from his insistence on a theoretical and
speculative approach.

Not only do they search for truth but

they also study practical subjects for the material betterment
of the whole comoonwealth.
Similarly, in philosophy the Utopians emphasize mora.l
--

behavior as the requisite for justice in the state, whereas
Socrates stresses dialectic and metaphysics.

Socrates maintains

that if the rational faculty is sufficiently developed to
apprehend the forms of goodness and justice, virtuous action
will follow.

Although the Utopians consider the contemplation

of truth as the appropriate aim of philosophical inquiry, they
hold that reason by itself, without the aid of religion, is
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unable to apprehend the supreme good.

Despite this difference,

the underlying philosophy in both states is similar:

virtue

is its own reward and vice its own punishment.
The section (159/3-185/14) containing the discussion
of Utopian philosophy occupies the important final position
in Part I (111/7-185/14).

Here Hythlodaeus explains the

Utopians' opinion that pleasure properly understood will bring
justice and therefore happiness to the entire commonwealth.
Socrates' discussion of philosophy, which occupies a central
position in the Republic (Book VI), describes how the
apprehension of the form of the good by the philosopher-king
insures that justice will prevail in the ideal state.
In Part II (185/15-237/36) of Book II, More borrows
and changes key ideas on law, medicine, military affairs, and
In the first section (185/15-199/35)

religion in the ReRublic.

he adopts Socrates' idea that a just state is characterized
by the sound body and mind of its citizens.

Socrates maintains

/

that it is a shameful state which tolerates petty laws, lawyers
arguing subtle pOints, and physicians treating long illnesses
brought on by debauchery.

The Utopians live in a just common-

wealth with few laws and no lawyers.

They are healthy and

robust so that the service of physicians is not required.

Even

those who chance to become mortally ill are not encouraged to
live beyond the period of usefulness to their fellow citizens.
In the next section (199/38-217/6) More shows how the
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Utopians' institutions and education insure their prudence in
avoiding war, their courage in fighting, and their justice in
establishing peace.

In like manner, all the institutions in

Plato's republic, particularly the educational system, inculcate
these virtues in the guardians.

But in contrast to the

republic, where only the military class

manifes~s

these virtues

in war, in Utopia all the citizens engage in military affairs.
Even ordinary Utopian women, like women guardians in Plato's
republic, accompany their men into battle.
The last section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185115-

237136) appropriately concludes Hythlodaeus' description of
the basic ways in which justice is manifested in the ideal
state.

Religion occupies the climactic final position because

the religious beliefs of the Utopians insure that justice will
reign in the commonwealth.
religion in the

Uto~ia

than Plato does in the Republic because

the basic beliefs of the
commonwealth together.

More puts greater emphasis on

U~opians

are the sinews that hold the

For example, the Utopians hold that no

man will act justly unless he believes at least in the existence
of God and in reward or punishment after death.
Because More lays great stress on the need for religion
_ in the maintenance of justice in the commonwealth, he devotes
considerably more discussion to it than Plato.
sense, is a theocratic democracy.

Utopia, in a

Herein it differs from

Plato's military and philosophical aristocracy.

Despite the
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difference in emphasis on religion, however, the descriptions
of both ideal states conclude with thoughts of immortality.
From the evidence advanced in the foregoing chapters,
our conclusion is that More has used the Republic as a model for
the theme and structure of the Utopia.

His intention is

basically the same, and he merely borrows and apranges details
in a different order.

He shows that justice is more

advantageous than injustice by contrasting the best with the
worst examples of the body politic.

After perceiving fully

the formal relationship between these two works, we can see
that both the Republic and the Utopia reveal order and unity
among all their parts.

Thus More and Plato achieve justice

in their works--both in subject matter and in form.
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